SUMMER SCHOOL

Markets and Governments: a Theoretical Appraisal

FOURTH EDITION

OWNERSHIP, INCENTIVES AND CONFLICTS

Villa Mondragone, Rome - June, 17th-19th, 2026

“Painting by Enzo Amendola

“Professor Hayek does not see, or will not admit, that a return to free competition means for the great mass of people a tyranny probably worse, because more irresponsible, than that of the State”, George Orwell: “A Review of The Road to Serfdom by F.A. Hayek”, Observer, April 9th 1944.

“It seems to be nothing more than simple and obvious wisdom to compare social institutions as they might be expected actually to operate rather than to compare romantic models of how such institutions might be hoped to operate. [...] The socialist mystique to the effect that the state, that politics, somehow works its way toward some transcendent “public good” is with us yet, in many guises, as we must surely acknowledge”, James Buchanan: “Politics without romance: a sketch of positive public choice theory and its normative implications”, Physica, 1979.

Why a School on Ownweship

Property occupies a surprisingly marginal position in contemporary economic theory, despite its foundational importance to market economies. In traditional neoclassical approaches, property rights are typically assumed rather than analyzed—they constitute part of the background institutional framework that enables exchange, but are rarely treated as objects of inquiry themselves. The price mechanism and market equilibrium take center stage, while the legal and social arrangements that determine who owns what, and what ownership entails, remain largely invisible.

A notable exception is the incomplete contracts literature, which explicitly examines how the allocation of ownership rights affects final allocations. Here, property becomes analytically central: ownership is understood as conferring residual control rights over assets, and the optimal assignment of these rights emerges as a crucial determinant of organizational boundaries and economic outcomes. Yet even this strand of research treats property primarily through the lens of efficiency and incentive alignment, leaving broader questions about the legitimacy, justice, and social meaning of property largely unaddressed.

Beyond economics, property remains a vibrant topic across the social sciences and political philosophy, where a wider range of normative and analytical frameworks come into play. Legal scholars examine how property rights are constructed, enforced, and contested, while sociologists and anthropologists explore the cultural meanings and social practices surrounding ownership in different contexts. In contemporary political philosophy, debates continue between libertarian approaches that treat property rights as natural or pre-political entitlements, liberal egalitarian perspectives that subject property to principles of distributive justice, and  traditions that emphasize property's role in enabling domination or fostering solidarity.

This summer school aims to bridge these diverse disciplinary perspectives, bringing together insights from economic theory, legal analysis, history, and political philosophy to develop a richer, more multidimensional understanding of property as both an economic institution and a site of normative contestation.

Applications

We expect to accommodate a maximum of seventy participants at the school. Interested participants should apply by filling the registration form. The deadline for applying to the school is April 24th, 2026. Acceptance decisions will be communicated by April 30th, 2026 (non EU-citizens who may need to apply for VISA can contact us if they need an earlier answer).

To ensure effective participation, and to guarantee that the available seats will actually be filled, the school requires a registration fee of 250 euros. However, we are pleased to announce the availability of several scholarships that will guarantee exemption from the tuition for selected applicants .

 

THE APPLICATIONS ARE OPEN

Directions and Accommodations

In what follows you can find useful indications to reach Villa Mondragone

 

Directions 

Fiumicino Airport  
From Fiumicino airport take the fast train (LEONARDO EXPRESS) to Termini railway station (departures every 30 minutes, first departure at 06:35, last departure at 23:35, ticket 9,50 €.
A taxi to reach Rome should cost around 40,00/60,00 €.
Frascati downtown can be conveniently reached from Termini central railway station by train. Trains nearly every hour; journey takes about 40 minutes. Tickets are available at the Station and cost 1,70 €.


Ciampino Airport  
The following bus and train services are available from Ciampino:
• the Terravision bus (Roma Termini central station - Roma Ciampino airport )
• the Cotral/Schiaffini bus nightly connections (Roma Termini central station - Roma Ciampino airport )
• the subway + the Cotral/Schiaffini bus (Line A, Anagnina station - Roma Ciampino airport )
• the train + the Cotral/Schiaffini bus (Ciampino railway station - Roma Ciampino airport)
Back


From Termini Railway Station  
Take the underground "A" to the final stop Anagnina (ticket 1 €).
From ANAGNINA underground "A" final stop catch a blue COTRAL bus direction Rocca Priora (bus-shelter n.° 6) to Monteporzio Catone and get off at the Villa Mondragone.
Frascati downtown can be conveniently reached from Termini central railway station by train. Trains nearly every hour; journey takes about 40 minutes. Tickets are available at the Station and cost 1,70 €.


By Car or Taxi/Uber
From highway A1 Milano - Napoli or from highway A24 Roma - L'Aquila/Pescara: follow direction Roma Sud, exit Monte Porzio Catone, then follow signs to Villa Mondragone and Hotel Villa Vecchia (follow the road signs for Frascati).
From downtown Rome:
take the G.R.A. (Grande Raccordo Anulare, the ring highway around Rome) to the highway A1 Roma - Napoli, then exit Monte Porzio Catone. Follow signs to Villa Mondragone and Hotel Villa Vecchia.


Accommodations

Below are some of the hotels in convention with Tor Vergata University in Frascati

Organisers and Contacts

Scientific Organisers

CNRS-TSE and University of Rome Tor Vergata

Andrea Attar

Köln Universität

Felix Bierbrauer

Princeton University

Philip Pettit

Queen Mary University of London

Roberto Veneziani

 

Organising Committee

Nicola Amendola (University of Roma Tor Vergata), Eloisa Campioni (University of Roma Tor Vergata), Salvatore Morelli (University of Roma Tre), Paolo Naticchioni (University of Roma Tre), Andrea Piano Mortari (University of Roma Tor Vergata), Guillaume Pommey (University of Roma Tor Vergata), Antonio Scialà (University of Roma Tre)
 

Scientific Committee

Claude d’Aspremont (Université Catholique de Louvain), Herakles Polemarchakis (Warwick University), Jean Charles Rochet (Toulouse School of Economics), John Roemer (Yale University)
 

Contacts

Summer School: “Markets and Governments: a Theoretical Appraisal”
c/o Villa Mondragone, Monte Porzio Catone (Rome) Italy
phone: +39 06 7259 5601 
e-mail: MGTA@ceistorvergata.it