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Information Campaigns and Migration Perceptions

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Abstract

The research studies the effect of information campaigns on migration on perceptions and intentions to migrate among high school students in Dakar, Senegal. Through a randomized experiment, I analyze the role of expectations, migration perceptions, and intention to migrate and assess if (and, if so, which) actors and information content are effective the most in shaping students' migration intention and perceptions. I find that students display a high level of distrust in domestic labor markets, and the information treatment with an external expert reduces the misperceptions on some measures of labor market statistics but has no effect on the perception of the illegal journey. In addition, narratives reduce the willingness to migrate illegally, but none of the treatments has impacts on the intention to migrate. The effect of narratives is stronger for students with close family members abroad.

Keywords: Migration intentions, information provision, expectations.

JEL Codes: O15, D83, F22.

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1 Introduction

The IOM estimated that more than 119,000 irregular migrants arrived in Europe from West African countries from January 2017 to June 2020, representing more than 25% of total arrivals in Europe, and more than 24,000 migrants have died in the Mediterranean Sea since 2014 (IOM, 2020). These data are further supported by the dramatic increase in migrants undertaking the Canary Islands route in 2020 (more than 23,000 departures from the Senegalese coast in 2020 versus 2,867 departures in 2019), which remained high even in 2021 (IOM, 2021). Different papers have documented the misperceptions that potential migrants have about the labor market and the lifestyle in destination countries (e.g., McKenzie et al., 2013; Rehman, 2020), which is often the consequence of misreporting by the networks that migrants have abroad. However, evidence on the effect of information on the perceptions and the expectations on migration is still limited (e.g., Bah and Batista, 2020; Mesplé-Somps et al., 2021; Tjaden and Dunsch, 2021) and each study analyzes a different mean and type of information so that it is hard to reconcile the relative effect of one against the others.

This paper studies the effect of different means and types of information on migration on the perceptions and the intentions of high school students in Dakar, Senegal. Specifically, I assess the impact of different information campaigns to analyze if (and, if so, which) actors and information content are the most effective in shaping students' migration intentions and perceptions. From 2015 to 2018, Senegal was one of the main countries of origin for migrants arriving in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Malta, and arrivals from this country remain high after 2018 (Dunsch and Quiviger, 2019). In addition, remittances represent a high share of GDP (9.8% in 2022;World Bank (2022)) so migration is a valuable resource to the country's economy. According to a report by UNICEF and IOM, 38% of young Senegalese who passed

through the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) completed secondary education (IOM and UNICEF, 2017) and 30% (the largest group) of irregular migrants selecting Europe as their intended destination completed secondary education (IOM, 2021). In addition, Aksoy and Poutvaara (2021), using data from the IOM's Flow Monitoring Surveys, find that 46% of those interviewed in Italy (2016 wave) completed secondary education. In addition, data from the 4Mi project (Mixed Migration Centre) from 442 Senegalese along the irregular migration journey show that more than 35% completed secondary school and almost 13% obtained a university degree so almost half of the interviewees attended secondary schooling. Therefore, analyzing high school students' perceptions and intentions might be important to understand the migration phenomenon from Senegal, with a focus on irregular migration.

In cooperation with an Italian NGO, I administered a questionnaire to roughly 1,500 randomly chosen students from 8 public high schools in Dakar. Each class is, then, assigned to one of three treatment groups or the control. Classes in treatment group 1 (T1) receive a two-hour lesson on the statistics and the laws on migration in Europe by a consultant from the NGO; teachers of classes in treatment group 2 (T2) receive the same training as students do and replicate the lesson with their classes; students in treatment group 3 (T3) virtually meet Senegalese migrants living in Italy and listen to their migratory experience. Classes in the control group (C) do not receive any information. Around one month after the treatment, students are administered an endline questionnaire. The approach of testing Teacher training vs. Consultant is similar to the one in Dupas et al. (2018), which assess the effect of different information campaigns on risky behavior and HIV among high school students in Cameroon.

I find that students have a high level of distrust for the Senegalese labor market, and misperceptions of the labor market in Senegal are much larger than those of the labor mar-

ket in Europe. In addition, I find that there is low awareness of the migration phenomenon, though most students are willing to migrate. After the information treatment, students in group T1 reduce their misperceptions of some measures of labor market statistics. The effects of T1 on other beliefs on migration statistics are mixed. T2, instead, is less effective than T1 in increasing students' knowledge on migration. Finally, T1 decreases the propensity to completely exclude migration while T3 reduces the willingness to migrate irregularly. The small effects of all treatments confirm the results that separate studies have found.

Recent literature studies the impact of information provision on potential and actual migration, either through statistics (quantitative information) or through narratives. Bah et al. (2022) study the impact of different interventions to deter irregular migration from the Gambia to Europe. They offer the first treatment group an information treatment that combines both quantitative information and narratives; they offer an easier way to migrate to Dakar to a second treatment group; and, finally, they offer free vocational training. The treatments prove effective for increasing knowledge on irregular migration and reducing the intention to migrate, but no effect on the perceived riskiness of the journey. Bah and Batista (2020) provide evidence from a lab-in-the-field experiment in the Gambia. They find that potential migrants overestimate the probability of dying along the journey and obtaining a stay permit in Europe. Providing them with the number of actual deaths increases the intention to migrate irregularly, while information on actual stay permits reduces it. Interestingly, they find that intentions to migrate are a good predictor of the actual migration. Beine et al. (2020) and Frohnweiler et al. (2022) study the effect of providing information on the earnings in the intended destination, respectively, in Tirana and in Ghana and Uganda. Shrestha (2020) shows that *unexperienced* potential migrants from Nepal overestimate both the earnings abroad and the mortality

rate along the journey. Obtaining the current earnings abroad makes potential migrants reduce their intention to migrate, whereas being informed of the current mortality rates increases it. Bazzi et al. (2021) studies the effect of providing information on the quality of agencies connecting potential migrants and employers at destination in Indonesia on migration outcomes. Another strand of literature provides evidence of the effects of narratives on migration intentions and behavior. Mesplé-Somps et al. (2021) assess the effect of specific narratives (successful migrants, successful natives at home, unsuccessful migrants) on migration intentions and aspirations, finding an overall zero effect of every treatment, though individual characteristics largely influence how individuals respond to the treatments. Tjaden and Dunsch (2021) and Tjaden and Gninafon (2021) evaluate the effects of awareness-raising campaigns through the videos of irregular migrants in Dakar and rural Guinea, respectively. This paper adds to this (still limited) evidence on the effectiveness of information campaigns on migration in that it is the first to assess the impact of different information content (quantitative vs. qualitative) and different actors delivering this information.

This paper also relates to the literature analyzing the role of expectations on migration intentions, which are often influenced by the information that those who stay receive from their family and friends abroad. Ambler (2015) studies strategic behavior among Salvadorian migrants to the U.S. when their choice over remittances is revealed to their networks at home. Beber and Scacco (2020) show that potential migrants from Nigeria are somewhat informed about the riskiness of the journey, but are confident that they will make it to Europe. However, Mbaye (2014) provides evidence of misinformation among a random sample of potential migrants from Dakar and relates the willingness to migrate to close networks abroad. McKenzie et al. (2013) builds the expected distribution of earnings for potential migrants from Tonga to New Zealand, finding that they underestimate

the earnings at the destination (even more in the case of extended family members living abroad). Finally, both Baseler (2022) and Rehman (2020) document strategic misreporting from migrants to their families in Kenya and the Philippines, respectively. This paper shows how different types of information shape the expectations from labor markets and conditions at destination among young Senegalese from Dakar.

Roadmap The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 includes an overview of the context (schooling system and migration in Senegal) and a description of the information campaigns. In Section 3, I illustrate a theoretical migration model and the data collection. Section 4 covers a description of the baseline migration perceptions and intentions. In Section 5, I describe the empirical analysis and the results from the main regressions, including heterogeneity analysis. Section 7 concludes.

2 The context and the interventions

The schooling system in Senegal is the same as the French system, namely after elementary and middle schooling, youths usually attend secondary schooling (Seconde, Première, and Terminale) and are aged 16-18. According to the report of the National Agency of Statistics and Demography (ANSD) *Economic and Social Situation in Senegal 2019* (which is the most recent), the capital city, Dakar, has one of the highest rates of transition from middle to secondary schooling (41%), after Ziguinchor (72%) and Thiés (45.5%), which account for a very small portion of the Senegalese population (less than 5% in total).

According to the UN DESA (2022), in 2021 around 694,000 Senegalese are international migrants (slightly less than 4% of the Senegalese population) and almost half of them (49%) live in Europe. Migration is a valuable resource for the country's economy as personal

remittances in 2022 represented 9.8% of the national GDP. More than half of remittances (56.4%) come from Europe, 33% from Africa, and 10% from America. Dakar is the region originating the largest share of migrants, around 30% (ANSD and IOM, 2018).

The interventions Jointly with the implementing partner, Sophia Social Enterprise, we randomly assigned each class to one of the following treatments or the control group, which did not receive any treatment. The treatments were:

1. A practitioner gave a two-hour lecture on data and laws related to migration with a particular focus on irregular immigration (T1);
2. We offered teachers a mini-course (around 3 hours) on data and laws related to irregular migration (T2);
3. We organized live (virtual) testimonies of three Senegalese migrants who irregularly entered Italy (T3).

Specifically, the quantitative information treatments (T1) and (T2) include the same data, namely:

- the numbers of international migrants globally, with a focus on Senegalese international migrants. The source of this data is the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs and refers to the year 2019 (pre-COVID19);
- a description of the stay permits issued in Europe, with the corresponding duration and an explanation of how to request them;
- the illustration of the main irregular routes from Senegal to reach Europe. The data source is the IOM;

- the reported risks of the illegal journey: how many declared to have been robbed and how many declared to have been subject to physical violence. The data source is the Mixed Migration Center's 4Mi database, covering more than 10,000 interviews of migrants from West and Central Africa between 2019 and the beginning of 2022[1];

- the share of irregular migrants who left through the Central Mediterranean route and arrived in Europe over attempted crossings. I calculated this data following the instructions of the IOM: arrivals in the main ports of entry (Italy and Malta), the number of deaths reported by the IOM's Missing Migrants project[2], and the number of intercepted migrants reported by the Libyan and Tunisian coast guards. We specified that this share represents the maximum share of arrivals as the number of deaths might be much larger than that reported by IOM;

- the rate of acceptance of asylum requests from Senegalese in the three main European destination countries (France, Italy, and Spain). The data source is Eurostat and refers to the years 2017-2020;

- the unemployment rates in Senegal and Europe for Sub-Saharan Africans. The data sources are ANSD and Eurostat and both rates refer to the year 2019;

- the type of occupations by gender performed by Sub-Saharan Africans in France, Italy, and Spain and the type of occupations by gender performed by Senegalese in Senegal. The data sources are Eurostat and ANSD and refer to the year 2019.

As an incentive for teachers' participation in the training course, we paid them 13,000 FCFA (21 USD) to attend the training course and, when giving the lecture in class, the

[1]The data can be recovered on the website *https://mixedmigration.org/4mi/4mi-interactive/data-on-mixed-migration/.*

[2]https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean.

implementing partner sent a trained enumerator to assist and verify that teachers covered all the arguments without intervening directly.

T3 involved virtual testimonies with Senegalese migrants. Specifically, the implementing partner trained three migrants who had already participated in an integration program. All of them were males[3], arrived in Italy illegally, and only two of them had received the stay permit in Italy (the asylum request of the third migrant is still pending after two rejections) and all of them had their asylum requests rejected at least once. The platform used to connect the class with the migrant was Skype and the migrants told their migration stories, including their journey, the challenges and the opportunities of their experience in Italy for an hour, while students had the possibility to make questions and discuss with the migrant during the remaining hour.

3 Research Design

3.1 The model

The research questions build on the standard model of migration decision as explained in Chin and Cortes (2015) and Grogger and Hanson (2011). An individual is willing to migrate if her utility from migration is larger than the utility from staying in the origin country, namely: $P^U \equiv I[V_{i1} - V_{i0}] > 0$. The utility from migrating depends on the perceived amenities in the destination country, the perceived labor market conditions in the destination country (e.g., wages), and migration costs, i.e. $V_{i1} \equiv \beta_1 \cdot A_{i1} + \beta_2 \cdot (w_{i1} - C_{i01})$. The utility from staying depends on the amenities from staying and the perceived labor

[3]Unfortunately, Senegalese women contacted for the testimonies refused to participate. As male students may be more responsive to this third treatment, while females might not identify with the models presented, I include heterogeneity analysis by gender.

market conditions in the origin country, i.e. $V_{i0} \equiv \beta_1 \cdot A_{i0} + \beta_2 \cdot w_{i0}$.

The decision to migrate depends, then, positively on the perceived labor market conditions at the destination and negatively on the perceived labor markets at the origin. Also, it depends positively on the perceived amenities at the destination and negatively on the amenities at the origin. Finally, the willingness to migrate depends negatively on the perceived migration costs. If one considers irregular migration (which is, often, the easiest way to migrate from West African countries), the costs associated might be linked to the monetary and non-monetary costs of irregular migration: the risks along the journey, the possibility of not making it to the destination country, the possibility to not obtain the stay permit, and the waiting time to obtain it (in case of recognition of the permit).

The information interventions may change the beliefs of individuals. For example, if the expected labor market conditions at the destination are worse (better) than expected (and provided that there is belief updating), one's willingness to migrate might decrease (increase), given everything else equal.

3.2 Data collection

Sampling and assignment to treatment The eligible population is composed of high school students from Dakar in their 1^{st}, 2^{nd}, and 3^{rd} classes. The region of Dakar is divided into four departments (Dakar, Guédiawaye, Pikine, and Rufisque). Due to budget constraints and logistic reasons, we excluded from our study the department of Rufisque so that we are left with a total of 24 public schools[4]. We proposed the intervention to 10 out of the 24 schools (schools were selected based on school proximity and budget) and 8 of them agreed to participate. Each school provided our team with a list of ten classes

[4]We exclude private schools from the analysis as they might not be the right target of schools for our purpose. Also, we exclude 2 high schools only for females.

available for program participation, together with the contact of one teacher per class who might have been randomly picked for the training (T2) and the list of students.

We randomized classes into the treatment groups and the control group, stratifying by school[5]. We, then, randomly selected 20 students per class to answer the survey, slightly oversampling males to reflect the features of Senegalese migration (2/3 of migrants are males). Unfortunately, due to high absenteeism and school disorganization, in some classes we had to select more females and fewer males than planned and, in a few cases, we picked less than 20 students.

Attrition The initial sample of students who completed the survey is 1,523. Due to extra-ordinary teacher strikes, we could not reach 36 students, for a final panel of 1,487 students and an attrition rate of 2%[6].

The endline survey asked whether the student attended school on the treatment day (only for groups T1, T2, and T3). The final results include the answers of those who were absent on the treatment day, hence the main regression specification will provide Intention-To-Treat (ITT) estimates.

3.3 The survey

Before the interventions, students were administered a questionnaire to elicit their migration perceptions and intentions. The questionnaire lasted around 20 minutes and, in each class, 20 students were randomly picked to fill it in. I built the questionnaires on the sur-

[5]To contain spillovers, we asked students to specify if their five closest friends are in other classes within the same school and, if so, to provide their classes. All the regressions control for the presence of friends in classes which received other treatments.

[6]Teacher strikes did not impede the intervention implementation, but they shifted the interventions for some classes, thus shifting also the survey. Some students, then, were surveyed during summer and, though our team tried to contact as many missing students as possible, in 35 cases the team could not reach them, 1 student died.

vey platform *Qualtrics* and, jointly with our team, administered them on tablets so that students could fill them in by themselves. At least one member of our team was always available to answer the students' questions and help them fill out the questionnaires.

The first block of questions collected students' demographics (e.g., age, gender, language spoken at home). It included, additionally, questions on whether they talk about migration at home, about migration networks (including whom and where they knew someone living abroad and whether they received anything from their migrant networks).

The second block of questions elicited students' aspirations for their future career, migration intentions (either "regular" or alternative), and expected challenges from migrating (e.g., to get documents, to find a house, to find a job, to cover monthly expenses, to integrate into local culture) and from staying.

The last block of questions elicited beliefs on labor market conditions abroad and at origin (e.g., wages, unemployment rates), knowledge about migration laws in Europe, and expected risks of the illegal journey (in case of irregular migration).

Around one month after the intervention, our team administered to the students an endline questionnaire, similar to the baseline blocks two and three, but asking also if the student attended the treatment and, if so, whether they trusted the information received (not for the control group), and for their e-mail addresses if they wanted to know more about migration.

3.4 Descriptive statistics

Table 1 reports the main summary statistics from the baseline survey. Students' average age is almost 19 and 40% of them have one of their parents with at least a high school diploma. The vast majority of them have networks abroad (77%) and 28% have close

networks abroad (i.e., parents or siblings). 48% and 13% of the students declared to be highly or at least somewhat likely to migrate in the following five years, respectively, while 6% and 2.5% declared to be a bit or not at all likely to migrate in the next five years. 40% of the students state to have received money from their migrant networks, 28% received gifts and 13% received food (almost none received letters). The majority of the students would like to continue their studies, either as professional training (35%) or at a University (23%), while fewer students would like to start a business (13%) or immediately look for a job (8%). After the baseline survey, a large share of students feels very or somewhat sure about their answers (43 and 46%, respectively).

Table 2 reports the results from t-tests on the mean values in all the couples of treatments. None of the characteristics is unbalanced across the treatment (and the control) groups.

4 Baseline migration perceptions and intentions

4.1 Labor markets

As stated in the standard model in Section 3, the perceived labor market conditions influence the decision to migrate abroad. In the survey, I asked the students questions on the expected wages, the unemployment rate, and the occupation of most Senegalese in Europe. In the wage questions, I followed Haaland et al. (2020) and provided students with the average wage in Europe in an attempt to reduce measurement error. Students were, then, asked the questions "Imagine that you will live in Europe in five years. How much do you think that you will earn per month?" and "How much do you think that you will earn per month in five years if you stay in Senegal?"

Table 3 shows the distribution of the answers to these two questions and the corresponding individual wage gap between Europe and Senegal. As anticipated, the expected wage in Europe is, on average, much larger than the expected wage in Senegal. However, the students have high expectations of their own wage even in Senegal, with a median expected wage of 417,000 FCFA (Senegalese Francs, around 1,670 USD at World Bank PPP) per month, against an average wage in Europe of 330,000 FCFA (around 1,320 USD at World Bank PPP). The median expected wage in Europe is, instead, 945,800 FCFA (around 3,780 USD at World Bank PPP).

The survey asked, then, the expected unemployment rate for Senegalese in Europe and in Senegal. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the misperception in the unemployment rate, measured as the expected minus the current value[7]. The unemployment rate for Senegalese in Europe is collected from the Eurostat Labor Force Survey and proxied by the average unemployment rate among Sub-Saharan Africans in 2019 in France, Italy, and Spain (the three main destination countries for Senegalese immigrants), which is 15.9%. The unemployment rate in Senegal is collected from the ANSD and refers to the year 2019, being 11.6%. As Figure 1 illustrates, the average misperception of the unemployment rate in Senegal is much larger than it is in Europe, and less than 25% underestimates the unemployment rate in Senegal, while 50% underestimate the unemployment rate for Sub-Saharan Africans in Europe.

Figure 2 shows, instead, the answers to the questions "What is the main occupation that Senegalese living in Europe do in your opinion?". According to the students, Senegalese in Europe are mostly merchants and street vendors (roughly 40% of the answers) and, secondly, unskilled manual workers (21% of the answers), while the least selected categories are security workers (less than 2%) and mid-level professionals (less than 3%).

[7]To measure misperception, I adopt the approach of Alesina et al. (2022).

Table 2 reports the results from t-tests on the mean values in all the couples of treatments. None of the characteristics is unbalanced across the treatment (and the control) groups.

4.2 Migration conditions

The survey includes questions on the conditions of migrants: when reaching Europe through the illegal journey, the dangers of the journey and how many reach Europe; when in Europe, the type of document necessary to reside there and how many of those who arrive irregularly obtain the documents. I obtained the statistics from the Mixed Migration Center's 4Mi Project, which collects data from interviews in different hubs located along the illegal migration route through the Mediterranean. I only select answers from Senegalese migrants. 83% of them report physical violence and 67% to have been robbed along the journey. Figures 3 and 4 represent the distribution of misperception in these two shares. In both cases, the students largely underestimate, on average, the risks along the journey (only 18% and 21% overestimate the true value, respectively, of the share who suffered from physical violence and the share having been robbed along the journey). However, consistent with Bah and Batista (2020), I find that students at baseline underestimate the share of irregular migrants who reach Europe after having left their home country (on average, by 34 p.p., and only 13% of the sample overestimate the true value), but more than half of them underestimate the share of Senegalese asylum seekers who obtain the document to reside in Europe (54% of the students underestimate the true value). I compute the share of irregular migrants reaching Europe through the Central Mediterranean Route (58%) as the number of arrivals by sea in Italy, Greece, Malta, and Spain between 2017 and 2020 divided by the attempted crossings (the sum of arrivals, the reported number of deaths -

both taken from the IOM - and the number of migrants intercepted by the Libyan and the Tunisian coast guards). The survey includes the question *What is the document needed to reside in Europe?* (see Figure 5). Only 21% of the students answer correctly (namely, answer *Stay permit*).

Finally, Figure 7 illustrates the perceived difficulties when in the (desired) destination country. According to the students, the hardest steps to take when in the destination country are finding a job (57% expecting it to be very difficult) and covering monthly expenses (55% expecting it to be very difficult), while the least hard are finding a home (20% answering *Not at all*) and integrating within the local culture (15% answering *Not at all*).

4.3 Migration intentions

Another survey block investigates students' aspirations and migration intentions, with a focus on migration intentions. Following the Afrobarometer series, I used the question *How much would you say you are likely to migrate within the next 5 years?* as a proxy for migration intentions (see Figure 8). Those who answer *Fairly* or *Definitely* are defined as willing to migrate, while the others as not willing to migrate. 50% of the students declared that it is very likely that they will migrate within the following 5 years, whereas only less than 10% answered *A bit* or *Not at all*. I also tried to elicit intentions to migrate irregularly with the question *What would you do if you found that you are not eligible to immigrate to the country you would like to reach?*. 34% of the students declare that they would look into other possible routes to reach their intended destination, while roughly 52% answer that they do not know and 14% answer that they would let it go. Those who answer *I would look into alternative routes* are defined as willing to migrate irregularly.

5 Empirical Analysis

5.1 Econometric model

To estimate the impact of each treatment, I employed the following regression model[8]:

$$Y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T1_c + \beta_2 T2_c + \beta_3 T3_c + \beta_4 Y_{ict-1} + X'_{ic}\beta_5 + \delta_s + \epsilon_{ict}$$

where Tj_c is a dummy equal to 1 if the class received treatment j and δ_s are school fixed effects. X_{ic} include the following individual characteristics: sex, age, region of birth, migrant networks, and parents' education. Additionally, to control for spillover effects, I include a dummy for having friends in classes which received other treatments. I cluster errors at the class level.

I use as outcome variables the following: beliefs on labor market conditions, defined as the misperception of unemployment for Senegalese in Europe and Senegal and the beliefs on the main occupation performed by Senegalese in Europe; knowledge on the laws and the statistics of migration in Europe, defined as the dummy for correct document needed to legally reside in Europe, misperception of the share of migrants arriving illegally in Europe who obtain the documents to legally reside there, the dummy for the possibility of repatriation for migrants arrived illegally in Europe; aspirations and migration intentions, defined as future prospects, intention to migrate, intention to undertake alternative routes (intention to migrate irregularly).

[8]In the Pre-Analysis Plan, I included a slightly different model specification, using the delta of the outcome. However, I opted for the ANCOVA as it provides large gains in power when compared to the difference-in-differences specification (McKenzie, 2012). In the appendix, I have added the results from the estimation using the difference-in-differences approach.

5.2 The impact of information campaigns on the beliefs on labor market conditions

Table 4 shows the effect of each treatment on the misperception of unemployment in Europe and in Senegal, where misperceptions are calculated as perceived minus actual value so that a negative value stands for an underestimation, while a positive value stands for an overestimation. Columns (1) and (2) report the results on the unemployment rate of Senegalese in Europe. The only treatment reducing the misperception is the two-hour lecture with a trained expert on migration (T1). Specifically, it reduces misperception by 5.2 percentage points (p.p.), which is approximately 42% of the mean. Treatment 1 (class lecture) also reduces the misperception of unemployment in Senegal by 6.8 percentage points, which is around 23% of the mean value (column (4)). Instead, neither teachers' training nor migrant narratives significantly affect students' misperception of unemployment rates.

Table 5 illustrates students' beliefs on the main occupation that Senegalese perform in Europe. The classification of occupations included in the survey question is similar to the one in the question *What is your main occupation?* in the Afrobarometer[9]. While very few students selected *Security worker* as the baseline, both T1 and T3 further reduced the share of students selecting it as the main occupation for Senegalese in Europe, while significantly increasing the share of students selecting *Skilled manual worker* by 4.9 and 5 p.p. (31 and 39% of the mean), respectively, for T1 and T3. T2, instead, reduces the share of students answering *Merchant/street vendor* by roughly 7 p.p. (20% of the mean value). Therefore, to make a summary of the results, all treatments somewhat influence the beliefs of students on migrants' occupations in Europe: in the case of T1 and T3, towards

[9]Potential answers are: Farmer or Fisherman, Merchant or Street vendor, Store clerk, Unskilled manual worker, Skilled manual worker, Security worker, Mid-level professional, High-level professional.

manual work; in the case of T2, reducing the choice of traditional works as a street vendor. Eurostat data reveal that most Sub-Saharan African men in France and Italy (the top destinations for Senegalese in Europe) perform both unskilled and skilled manual jobs, while women mostly perform unskilled manual workers (cleaning and personal assistance). Thus, there is some evidence of updating by the students. In addition, all of the migrants providing their testimonies performed at least once manual work and it is worth noticing that there is some updating after the virtual meeting with them so that students might take them as an example.

5.3 The impact of information campaigns on the knowledge of risks and dangers of the illegal journey

The second set of variables of interest considers the risks linked to the illegal journey and Table 6 reports the results from related regressions. Specifically, the first variable (in columns (1) and (2) of the Table) measures the misperception of the share of migrants reaching Europe through the Central Mediterranean Route out of those who leave illegally. While the students largely underestimate the share of migrants reaching Europe, none of the treatments significantly reduces the misperception. In addition, students largely underestimate physical violence and robberies along the illegal journey. Again, none of the treatments has any effect on students' misperception of the dangers of the journey.

5.4 The impact of information campaigns on the knowledge of laws and statistics on migration

The survey investigates students' knowledge of the laws and the statistics on Senegalese migration in Europe. The first variable used is the dummy for knowledge of the document needed by Senegalese to reside in Europe (i.e., the stay permit). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 show that only the virtual meeting with a migrant had some significant and positive effect: students in T3 have 14.9% higher likelihood to answer correctly to the question with respect to the control group students. I also assess the impact of the treatments on the misperception of the share of asylum seekers who obtain a document. While the students initially overestimate this share, both T1 and T2 significantly contribute to a reduction in the misperception by roughly 4 p.p., resulting in a decrease in misperception by 46% of the mean value. The survey includes, additionally, a question on whether an illegal migrant in Europe can be repatriated to the origin country. While most students answer correctly (the mean value is 0.82), students in T3 slightly reduce the propensity to answer correctly. Specifically, they have 5.5% lower probability to answer correctly with respect to control group students. This effect is in line with migrants' stories: all four migrants arrived illegally in Italy and all of them remained in the country without having received a stay permit. Therefore, regression results confirm that students are receptive to role models.

5.5 The impact of information campaigns on aspirations and migration intentions

Finally, I investigate the role of information campaigns on students' aspirations. One of the survey questions asks where the students think they can develop their future careers. While most students selected declared that they could pursue their intended career in Senegal after an experience abroad (almost 60%), this share further increased after T1 as compared to the control group (columns (3) and (4) of Table 8). T1 and T2, in addition, reduce the propensity of students to declare that they could pursue their future career only in Senegal by 3.2 and 4.1%, respectively. T3, instead, did not affect any of the answers.

Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 show the effect of information campaigns on the intention to migrate that I define as a dummy equal to one if the student declared to be *Fairly* or *Definitely* likely to migrate abroad in the next 5 years. None of the treatments has an impact on the intention to migrate abroad. Columns (3) and (4) display the results of the estimation of the main regression model using the intention to undertake alternative routes as the dependent variable, which is defined as a dummy equal to one if the student declared to be willing to look into alternative routes to rejoin its desired destination country and found not possible to migrate regularly. While T1 and T2 do not affect the intentions to migrate irregularly, T3 reduces the propensity to answer that they would look into alternative routes if they cannot migrate regularly (by 12 p.p., which represents 35% of the mean value).

5.6 Heterogeneity Analysis

Males and females may react differently to the program as Senegalese migrants are mostly male. In addition, it will be important to analyze the impact of the interventions by

migration network (e.g., close family members - parents or siblings - who migrated).

Table A.1 shows the results of heterogeneity analysis by gender on the beliefs on labor markets in Europe and Senegal. The coefficients of the interactions do not display any statistical significance, hence gender does not matter in explaining information campaigns' effectiveness on labor markets beliefs. I find an analogous result when assessing the heterogeneity effect by gender on knowledge of migration issues (see Table A.2).

Finally, Table 10 includes the results of heterogeneity analysis by gender on aspirations and intentions to migrate. After T3, females are less likely to declare that they would develop their career in Senegal after an experience abroad (column (2)) and more likely to select *Not at all* when stating their likelihood to migrate within 5 years (column (5)). In addition, after Treatment 1, females are less likely to select *Fairly* when stating their likelihood to migrate (column(5)). I found no effect on intentions to migrate illegally (columns (9)-(11)). Therefore, information campaigns (specifically, direct information - T1 - and migrants' testimonies - T3 - somewhat discourage females from being willing to migrate.

Table A.3 includes the heterogeneity analysis by migration network on the beliefs on labor markets, where migration network is defined as a dummy for close family members abroad (parents and/or siblings). Students with close family members abroad do not display any difference in the coefficients with respect to students who have no close family members abroad.

Table A.4 shows the heterogeneity analysis by migration network on the knowledge of migration issues. While having close family members abroad does not impact differently the effect of information campaigns on the majority of outcome variables, it does have some (negative) impact on the misperception of robberies along the journey for Treatment 2 (column(3)) and especially on the type of document needed by Senegalese to legally reside

in Europe for Treatment 1 (column (4)). Students with close family members abroad have, indeed, 17.7 p.p. lower probability to select the correct document needed after Treatment 1.

I show the heterogeneity analysis by migration network on aspirations and migration intentions in Table 11. Having a close family member abroad has a no different effect on aspirations and likelihood to migrate in 5 years. Instead, students having a close family member abroad are more likely to declare that they would let it go if they could not migrate legally to Europe after T2 and T3 (column (9)) and less likely to declare that they would look into alternative routes after T3 (column (11)). Therefore, those with close migrant networks are more responsive to information treatments concerning intentions to migrate illegally.

6 Discussion

The results highlight that students mostly update their beliefs on the conditions at destination (e.g., the labor market situation at the destination or the share of irregular migrants who obtain a stay permit in Europe) while keeping unchanged their beliefs on the conditions of the journey. Moreover, their intention to find alternative ways to migrate if regular migration is not feasible reduces after the narrative but not after the quantitative information treatments (T1 and T2). The first policy suggestion emerging from these results is that students might need alternatives in their origin country as their distrust in labor market conditions in Senegal is so high that even updating their beliefs on the conditions at the destination and origin (labor markets, amenities) does not influence their intention to migrate. As Table 12 shows, no treatment makes the students less likely to report unemployment or finding a job as the main obstacle for staying in Senegal, thus suggesting

that the fear of not finding a job is one of the main drivers of migration intentions[10]. A policy offering alternatives in the home country (such as policies directed at job search or agencies aim at employer-employee matching) may represent a valid alternative to irregular migration.

The second policy suggestion is that narratives might be more effective than quantitative information in shaping students' intentions to migrate. Future research should be directed at exploring which models are effective the most and in which settings they are considered as role models (e.g., Mesplé-Somps et al. (2021) find that none of the role models presented in documentaries has any effect in shaping potential migrants' intentions in Malian villages).

7 Conclusion

As the standard models of migration decision emphasize, the willingness to migrate is often encouraged by misperceptions of the conditions of labor markets at the origin vs. those at the destination, the conditions of the journey to migrate (including the illegal migration journey), and the perceived amenities at destination. This paper investigates the baseline migration perceptions and intentions and the effects of different information campaigns among high school students in Dakar, Senegal. Students have a wrong perception of labor markets in both origin and destination countries and, specifically, they have high distrust in Senegalese labor markets. In addition, students display a partial knowledge of laws and statistics to migrate, even though the majority of them are willing to migrate and have networks abroad. After a two-hour lecture with an expert in class, students' misperceptions

[10]Focus group discussions unveiled that students are convinced that those who do not have *good* social connections for finding a job would hardly make it in their home country.

decrease, while after the same lecture with their (trained) teachers, they display the same misperceptions as before. None of these two information treatments have any effect on the perception of the risks of the illegal migration journey and on the intention to migrate, either legally or illegally. Narratives, instead, change somewhat students' knowledge of migration laws and reduces the intention to migrate illegally. This last result is larger if students have close family networks abroad.

The results highlight that role models are, indeed, fundamental in shaping students' migration intentions. The key policy recommendation is, then, to create links between students and migrants, eventually showing different migration stories, such as return migrants or repatriated migrants.

One of the limitations of this study is the lack of female role models within the treatment of the narrative and it would be important to test male and female role models in shaping students' migration perceptions and intentions, which the literature still lacks. In addition, it would be interesting to test the effect that different teaching methods would have on students' knowledge of migration issues.

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Figures

Figure 1: Baseline misperception: Unemployment rate in Europe and Senegal



Notes: The graph shows baseline misperception in Europe and Senegal, measured as expected value minus current value. The red vertical line indicates the median value.

Figure 2: Baseline knowledge: Main occupation of Senegalese in Europe



Notes: Share of answers to the question "What is the main occupation that Senegalese living in Europe do in your opinion?" at baseline.

Figure 3: Baseline misperception: Physical violence along the illegal journey



Notes: The graph shows baseline misperception in the share of illegal migrants who declare physical violence along the journey, measured as expected value minus current value. The red vertical line indicates the median value.

Figure 4: Baseline misperception: How many illegal migrants are robbed along the illegal journey



Notes: The graph shows baseline misperception in the share of illegal migrants who declare to having been robbed along the journey, measured as expected value minus current value. The red vertical line indicates the median value.

Figure 5: Baseline knowledge: Document needed to reside in Europe



Notes: The figure shows the answers to the question "What is the document needed to reside in Europe?" at baseline.

Figure 6: Baseline misperception: How many illegal migrants obtain the document to reside in Europe



Notes: The graph shows baseline misperception in the share of Senegalese asylum seekers who obtain the document to reside in Europe, measured as expected value minus current value. The red vertical line indicates the median value.

Figure 7: Baseline perceptions: Expected difficulties abroad



Notes: The graphs show the expected challenges of migration at baseline (share of answers).

Figure 8: Baseline intentions: Likelihood to migrate



Notes: The graph shows the percentage of answers to the question *How likely are you to migrate in 5 years?* at baseline.

Figure 9: Baseline intentions: Intention to undertake alternative routes



Notes: The graph shows the percentage of answers to the question *What would you do if you found that you are not eligible to immigrate to the country you would like to reach?* at baseline.

Figure 10: Baseline intentions: Future career



Notes: The graph shows the share of answers to the question *Where do you think you can realize your future career?* at baseline.

Tables

Table 1: Summary statistics (baseline values)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Female	0.43	0.495	0	1	1489
Age	18.799	1.493	15	24	1454
Parents with at least diploma	0.394	0.489	0	1	1489
Close family member abroad	0.279	0.449	0	1	1489
Network in Europe	0.772	0.42	0	1	1489
Network in America	0.201	0.401	0	1	1489
Received money	0.41	0.492	0	1	1489
Received gifts	0.285	0.451	0	1	1489
Received food	0.126	0.332	0	1	1489
Received letters	0.009	0.097	0	1	1489
Future plan: University	0.236	0.425	0	1	1307
Future plan: Start a business	0.14	0.347	0	1	1307
Future plan: Professional/vocational training	0.347	0.476	0	1	1307
Future plan: Look for a job	0.083	0.275	0	1	1307
Alternative route: I would let it go	0.142	0.349	0	1	1489
Alternative route: I don't know/no answer	0.517	0.5	0	1	1489
Alternative route: Other possible routes	0.341	0.474	0	1	1489
Future: in Senegal after an experience abroad	0.574	0.495	0	1	1480
Future: indifferent	0.03	0.17	0	1	1480
Future: only abroad	0.321	0.467	0	1	1480
Intended destination: Europe	0.332	0.471	0	1	1489
Intended destination: America	0.142	0.35	0	1	1489
Repatriation	0.821	0.384	0	1	1489
Sure about answers: not at all	0.025	0.155	0	1	1469
Sure about answers: a bit	0.086	0.28	0	1	1469
Sure about answers: somewhat	0.46	0.499	0	1	1469
Sure about answers: a lot	0.43	0.495	0	1	1469
Likely to migrate: fairly	12.693	33.301	0	100	1489
Likely to migrate: definitely	47.683	49.963	0	100	1489
Likely to migrate: a bit	5.91	23.589	0	100	1489
Likely to migrate: not at all	2.552	15.775	0	100	1489
Speak Wolof at home	0.648	0.478	0	1	1489
Share reaching Europe (misperception)	-30.275	25.11	-57	42	1400
Physical violence along the journey (misperception)	-36.731	31.279	-82	17	1414
Share obtaining asylum (misperception)	8.659	22.389	-12	88	1400
Unemployment in Europe (misperception)	12.316	27.447	-15	84	1375
Unemployment in Senegal (misperception)	37.996	30.737	-4	96	1343

Table 2: T-tests for the difference in means

	(1) Control		(2) Lab		(3) Lab docenti		(4) Testimonianza		T-test Difference					
Variable	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	N	Mean/SE	(1)-(2)	(1)-(3)	(1)-(4)	(2)-(3)	(2)-(4)	(3)-(4)
Female	20	0.431	20	0.410	20	0.444	20	0.442	0.021	-0.013	-0.012	-0.034	-0.033	0.001
		(0.018)		(0.018)		(0.030)		(0.018)						
Age	20	18.650	20	18.768	20	18.807	20	18.957	-0.117	-0.157	-0.307	-0.040	-0.190	-0.150
		(0.161)		(0.206)		(0.218)		(0.119)						
Migration Network (dummy)	20	4.861	20	5.082	20	4.616	20	5.049	-0.221	0.244	-0.188	0.465	0.032	-0.433
		(0.244)		(0.273)		(0.251)		(0.241)						
Family abroad	20	0.454	20	0.431	20	0.471	20	0.446	0.023	-0.017	0.007	-0.040	-0.015	0.024
		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.022)		(0.029)						
Network in Europe	20	0.773	20	0.807	20	0.738	20	0.760	-0.033	0.035	0.013	0.068	0.046	-0.022
		(0.028)		(0.021)		(0.036)		(0.028)						
Parents with at least diploma	20	0.425	20	0.389	20	0.403	20	0.413	0.036	0.022	0.012	-0.014	-0.024	-0.010
		(0.026)		(0.032)		(0.025)		(0.027)						
Speak Wolof at home	20	0.651	20	0.663	20	0.673	20	0.616	-0.013	-0.022	0.035	-0.010	0.047	0.057
		(0.033)		(0.029)		(0.029)		(0.031)						
Likely to mi grate: not at all	20	2.738	20	4.621	20	2.556	20	2.698	-1.883	0.182	0.040	2.065	1.923	-0.142
		(1.168)		(1.202)		(0.869)		(0.911)						
Likely to migrate: a bit	20	9.188	20	9.773	20	8.442	20	7.603	-0.585	0.745	1.585	1.331	2.170	0.840
		(1.751)		(1.467)		(1.404)		(1.902)						
Likely to migrate: fairly	20	17.286	20	18.337	20	17.452	20	22.149	-1.051	-0.166	-4.863	0.885	-3.812	-4.697
		(2.341)		(2.061)		(2.965)		(2.481)						
Likely to migrate: definitely	20	70.788	20	67.269	20	71.549	20	67.550	3.519	-0.761	3.238	-4.280	-0.281	3.999
		(3.052)		(2.872)		(3.128)		(3.525)						

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 3: Expected monthly wages (thousands FCFA) in Europe and Senegal

	Mean	sd	Min	p25	p50	p75	Max	N
Expected wage in Europe	1688.73	3328.05	0	501.69	831.14	1165.12	75000.00	1,042
Expected wage in Senegal	741.72	1633.59	0.00	155.26	351.93	644.67	10180.00	1,217
Wage gap	1024.55	3423.94	-9481.12	90.25	324.27	691.89	74705.00	922

Table 4: Misperception of unemployment in Europe and Senegal

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Unemployment rate in Europe		Unemployment rate in Senegal	
Class lecture	-5.912***	-5.232***	-8.064***	-6.841***
	(1.733)	(1.848)	(2.302)	(2.394)
Teacher training	-1.772	-1.460	-1.640	-1.049
	(1.820)	(1.862)	(2.474)	(2.605)
Narrative	0.240	0.086	-2.479	-2.146
	(1.700)	(1.698)	(2.589)	(2.555)
Observations	1,321	1,321	1,277	1,277
Adjusted R-squared	0.101	0.111	0.088	0.091
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	12.25	12.25	30.33	30.33

SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 5: Main occupation of Senegalese in Europe

VARIABLES	(1) Security worker	(2)	(3) Merchant/street vendor	(4)	(5) Unskilled manual worker	(6)	(7) Farmer or fisherman	(8)
Class lecture	-0.019**	-0.021***	-0.052	-0.064*	-0.009	-0.004	0.008	0.009
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Teacher training	-0.003	-0.002	-0.064	-0.072*	0.028	0.032	0.001	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Narrative	-0.018**	-0.017**	0.004	0.003	-0.011	-0.014	-0.020	-0.020
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.016)	(0.017)
Observations	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421
Adjusted R-squared	0.088	0.099	0.110	0.111	0.063	0.059	0.107	0.104
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0227	0.0227	0.392	0.392	0.211	0.211	0.0585	0.0585
VARIABLES	(9) High-level professional	(10)	(11) Mid-level professional	(12)	(13) Skilled manual worker	(14)	(15) Store clerk	(16)
Class lecture	-0.007	-0.005	0.009	0.011	0.047**	0.049**	0.026	0.025
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Teacher training	-0.003	-0.001	-0.009	-0.009	0.031	0.031	0.018	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Narrative	-0.024*	-0.024	-0.010	-0.011	0.050**	0.050**	0.034	0.037*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Observations	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421	1,421
Adjusted R-squared	0.086	0.088	0.012	0.016	0.088	0.084	0.021	0.020
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes								
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Mean Dep. Var.	0.0647	0.0647	0.0330	0.0330	0.138	0.138	0.0812	0.0812

SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 6: Misperception of the risks of the illegal journey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Share reaching Europe		Physical violence along the journey		Robberies along the journey	
Class lecture	-1.393	-1.346	-4.127	-4.350	-3.612	-3.848
	(1.916)	(1.920)	(2.806)	(2.848)	(2.736)	(2.767)
Teacher training	-2.407	-2.680	-0.205	0.061	-2.113	-1.590
	(1.853)	(1.894)	(2.625)	(2.677)	(2.566)	(2.583)
Narrative	-2.087	-2.103	-0.845	-1.131	-0.488	-0.696
	(1.865)	(1.910)	(2.862)	(2.799)	(2.919)	(2.876)
Observations	1,327	1,327	1,337	1,337	1,315	1,315
Adjusted R-squared	0.129	0.136	0.120	0.129	0.151	0.161
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	-30.27	-30.27	-36.87	-36.87	-28.10	-28.10

SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 7: Knowledge on the laws and the statistics of migration in Europe

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Document needed to migrate		Share obtaining document		Illegal can be repatriated	
Class lecture	0.094	0.091	-3.988**	-4.028**	-0.037	-0.036
	(0.074)	(0.074)	(1.790)	(1.817)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Teacher training	0.038	0.044	-3.887**	-4.062**	-0.032	-0.028
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(1.682)	(1.705)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Narrative	0.147*	0.149*	-2.520	-2.528	-0.055*	-0.055*
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(1.762)	(1.781)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Observations	1,397	1,397	1,331	1,331	1,482	1,482
Adjusted R-squared	0.131	0.127	0.108	0.100	0.062	0.059
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.210	0.210	8.610	8.610	0.820	0.820

SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 8: Future prospects

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Only abroad		In Senegal after an experience abroad		Indifferent		Only in Senegal	
Class lecture	-0.036	-0.036	0.085***	0.087***	-0.019	-0.021	-0.034*	-0.032*
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Teacher training	-0.003	0.004	0.029	0.025	0.009	0.007	-0.041**	-0.041**
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Narrative	0.020	0.021	0.003	0.005	-0.002	-0.005	-0.024	-0.023
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455	1,455
Adjusted R-squared	0.272	0.269	0.206	0.205	0.102	0.098	0.152	0.154
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.319	0.319	0.575	0.575	0.0299	0.0299	0.0760	0.0760

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 9: Intentions to migrate

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Intention to migrate		Alternative route	
Class lecture	0.049	0.050	0.001	0.004
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Teacher training	0.000	-0.002	-0.049	-0.049
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Narrative	0.008	0.007	-0.116***	-0.118***
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Observations	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488
Adjusted R-squared	0.086	0.088	0.122	0.125
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.603	0.603	0.340	0.340

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. Controls include: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 10: Heterogeneity by gender: Aspirations and intention to migrate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Future prospects				
VARIABLES	Only abroad	In Senegal after an experience abroad	Indifferent	Only in Senegal	Intention to migrate	Alternative route
Class lecture	-0.034	0.113***	-0.032	-0.040	0.063	-0.005
	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Teacher training	0.016	0.025	-0.006	-0.038*	0.003	-0.067
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.049)
Narrative	-0.024	0.056	-0.012	-0.024	0.042	-0.106**
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.054)	(0.051)
Female = 1	-0.041	0.071**	-0.014	-0.003	0.001	-0.008
	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.044)
Class lecture · Female	0.041	-0.076	0.017	-0.002	-0.023	-0.010
	(0.049)	(0.059)	(0.022)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.061)
Teacher training · Female	-0.019	-0.008	0.020	0.001	0.002	0.073
	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.053)	(0.066)
Narrative · Female	0.065	-0.093	0.023	0.009	-0.067	-0.036
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.058)
Observations	1,465	1,465	1,465	1,465	1,488	1,488
Adjusted R-squared	0.272	0.205	0.088	0.155	0.089	0.124
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.321	0.574	0.0297	0.0750	0.605	0.340

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 11: Heterogeneity by migration network: Aspirations and intention to migrate

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Future prospects				
VARIABLES	Only abroad	In Senegal after an experience abroad	Indifferent	Only in Senegal	Intention to migrate	Alternative route
Class lecture	-0.040	0.105***	-0.026	-0.036	0.060	-0.018
	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.050)	(0.044)
Teacher training	0.015	0.011	0.004	-0.030	-0.007	-0.025
	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.044)
Narrative	0.047	-0.001	-0.014	-0.028	0.007	-0.080*
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.042)
Close family	0.000	0.035	-0.010	-0.010	-0.034	-0.008
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.049)
Class lecture · Close family	0.039	-0.089	0.017	0.009	-0.033	0.084
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.067)
Teacher training · Close family	-0.024	0.004	0.012	-0.018	0.008	-0.084
	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.054)	(0.070)
Narrative · Close family	-0.068	-0.007	0.033	0.017	-0.003	-0.130**
	(0.066)	(0.070)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Observations	1,461	1,461	1,461	1,461	1,488	1,488
Adjusted R-squared	0.264	0.199	0.102	0.146	0.088	0.129
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.320	0.574	0.0297	0.0764	0.603	0.340

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table 12: Expected difficulty if staying in Senegal

VARIABLES	(1) Difficulty in Senegal: Finding a job
Class lecture	-0.009
	(0.035)
Teacher training	0.028
	(0.033)
Narrative	-0.028
	(0.039)
Observations	1,524
School FE	Yes
Number of classes	80
Mean Dep. Var.	0.579

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regression controls for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Appendix

A Additional tables

Table A.1: Heterogeneity by gender: Beliefs on labor markets

VARIABLES	(1) Unemployment rate in Europe	(2) Unemployment rate in Senegal
Class lecture	-4.931*	-5.741*
	(2.584)	(3.366)
Teacher training	-3.090	-1.070
	(2.369)	(3.276)
Narrative	-0.894	-4.197
	(2.339)	(3.024)
Female	3.140	2.260
	(3.399)	(3.894)
Class lecture · Female	-1.095	-3.977
	(5.100)	(5.291)
Teacher training · Female	3.291	0.241
	(4.174)	(5.084)
Narrative · Female	2.532	5.079
	(4.236)	(5.194)
Observations	1,321	1,277
Adjusted R-squared	0.111	0.093
School FE	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	12.25	30.33

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table A.2: Heterogeneity by gender: Knowledge of migration statistics

VARIABLES	(1) Share reaching Europe	(2) Physical violence	(3) Robberies	(4) Document needed	(5) Share obtaining document	(6) Repatriation
Class lecture	-1.121	-2.409	-2.448	0.074	-2.461	-0.006
	(2.383)	(3.543)	(3.150)	(0.081)	(2.229)	(0.037)
Teacher training	-2.784	0.221	-0.689	0.007	-2.080	-0.059
	(2.214)	(3.252)	(2.726)	(0.076)	(1.995)	(0.038)
Narrative	-2.877	3.863	4.668	-0.056	0.000	-0.013
	(1.972)	(3.512)	(2.962)	(0.049)	(2.218)	(0.041)
Female = 1	-2.478	3.503	4.357	-0.050	0.467	-0.018
	(1.900)	(3.531)	(3.022)	(0.048)	(2.173)	(0.042)
Class lecture · Female	-0.723	-4.582	-2.815	0.076	-1.838	-0.052
	(2.884)	(4.860)	(4.631)	(0.083)	(2.940)	(0.056)
Teacher training · Female	0.379	-0.852	-1.673	0.038	-3.362	0.064
	(2.755)	(5.296)	(4.203)	(0.063)	(2.564)	(0.056)
Narrative · Female	1.505	-0.763	-4.728	0.016	0.319	-0.016
	(2.737)	(5.184)	(4.107)	(0.064)	(3.069)	(0.060)
Observations	1,337	1,347	1,326	1,410	1,343	1,488
Adjusted R-squared	0.127	0.126	0.156	0.132	0.099	0.056
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	-30.21	-36.79	-28.02	0.211	8.671	0.820

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table A.3: Heterogeneity by migration network: Beliefs on labor markets

	(1)	(2)
VARIABLES	Unemployment rate in Europe	Unemployment rate in Senegal
Class lecture	-7.482***	-6.429**
	(2.185)	(2.678)
Teacher training	-2.986	-1.130
	(2.474)	(2.899)
Narrative	-1.180	-1.549
	(2.025)	(2.871)
close family = 1	-5.093	3.522
	(3.106)	(3.330)
Class lecture · Close family	6.788*	-2.459
	(3.720)	(4.181)
Teacher training · Close family	5.883	-0.626
	(4.683)	(4.726)
Narrative · Close family	4.719	-2.318
	(4.119)	(4.838)
Observations	1,321	1,277
Adjusted R-squared	0.105	0.088
School FE	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	12.25	30.33

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

Table A.4: Heterogeneity by migration network: Knowledge of migration statistics

VARIABLES	(1) Share reaching Europe	(2) Physical violence	(3) Robberies	(4) Document needed	(5) Share obtaining document	(6) Repatriation
Class lecture	-0.975	-5.498*	-3.662	0.155**	-4.038*	-0.028
	(2.203)	(3.069)	(3.179)	(0.078)	(2.243)	(0.035)
Teacher training	-2.103	0.500	0.033	0.047	-3.645*	-0.028
	(2.061)	(3.001)	(2.916)	(0.072)	(2.103)	(0.036)
Narrative	-2.375	-1.336	0.495	0.175**	-3.056	-0.075**
	(2.099)	(2.902)	(3.303)	(0.085)	(2.205)	(0.033)
Close family	2.628	-0.612	0.624	0.060	-0.866	-0.038
	(2.762)	(3.841)	(3.866)	(0.043)	(2.988)	(0.041)
Class lecture · Close family	-3.051	1.257	-1.699	-0.177***	0.393	-0.037
	(3.871)	(5.020)	(5.303)	(0.065)	(4.017)	(0.061)
Teacher training · Close family	-3.333	-4.897	-8.025*	-0.020	-1.397	0.048
	(3.572)	(5.396)	(4.815)	(0.073)	(3.663)	(0.056)
Narrative · Close family	-0.453	0.274	-4.404	-0.060	2.064	0.093
	(3.750)	(4.285)	(4.823)	(0.080)	(3.454)	(0.056)
Observations	1,333	1,342	1,320	1,405	1,338	1,487
Adjusted R-squared	0.126	0.124	0.156	0.129	0.100	0.067
School FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of classes	80	80	80	80	80	80
Mean Dep. Var.	-30.31	-36.75	-28.03	0.209	8.614	0.820

Notes: SE clustered at class level. *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001. The regressions control for: outcome variable at baseline, gender, age, dummy for region of birth, dummy for closest emigrant abroad (parents/siblings, other close family members, friends, acquaintance, none), parents' education level, best friends in classes which received other treatments.

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