Distance Work and Life Satisfaction after the COVID-19 Pandemics

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Abstract
We use data of the 10th European Social Survey containing information on COVID-19 and work at distance. We find that working with employers that accept working from home or place of choice less than before the COVID-19 period impacts negatively and significantly on respondents' wellbeing. We calculate that the reduction of this opportunity produces a fall of 5.6 percent in the probability of declaring high life satisfaction, the effect being concentrated in the subsample of respondents with work-life balance problems where the magnitude of the impact goes up to a maximum of 11 percent.
Our findings contribute to explain the COVID-19 Easterlin paradox (contemporary occurrence of a sharp fall in GDP and non decrease/increase, in life satisfaction in the first 2020 COVID-19 year in many countries) and the great resignation - the rise of quit rates after COVID-19, partly motivated by absence of offers of hybrid contracts allowing a mix of work in presence and work at distance.

Keywords: distance work, life satisfaction, COVID-19.

JEL numbers: I31 (general welfare, wellbeing), J08 (labour economics policies)

1. Introduction

Descriptive evidence on the decoupling between GDP growth and the share of very happy people in the US after the Second World War (the so called Easterlin paradox) challenged the assumption that economic growth was a sufficient condition for life satisfaction and opened the way to a vast literature investigating drivers of subjective wellbeing. This literature has significantly contributed to interpret the puzzle of the misalignment between economic achievements and life satisfaction identifying among rationales relative income, hedonic adaptation, the limits of GDP growth in measuring household financial satisfaction, the neglect of relational goods and the trade-off between comfort and stimulus goods (Becchetti et al. 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Frei and Stutzer, 2002; Scitovsky, 1992).

A new happiness paradox occurred during the COVID-19 pandemics when we observed the surprising resilience of life satisfaction in presence of the sharpest GDP drop after the second world war in most countries. In spite of this extremely adverse economic scenario the World Happiness Report finds that around three fourth of country/2020-year dummies are significantly positive or not significant in a panel estimate on drivers of subjective wellbeing (Helliwell et al. 2021),[1] with the share of very happy people (life satisfaction scores from 8 to 10) in countries like Italy rising from 43.2 to 44.5 percent during 2020.[2] In a closer look at Italian data provided by the National Statistical Institute we find that the increase in the share

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[1] https://worldhappiness.report/ed/2021/overview-life-under-covid-19/

[2] https://www.istat.it/it/files//2021/10/BES-Report-2020.pdf (section 8, pp 148-153).

of very happy people was concentrated among middle age respondents (30 to 54) which are expected to have more severe work-life balance problems.

The other paradox of the post COVID-19 period is the so called phenomenon of great resignation. According to a 2021 research from McKinsey[3] 40 percent of workers in the world wanted to change job and, according to a Pew research Center survey,[4] 64 percent did not want to go back to office. A research from the Harvard Business Review shows in a survey of more than 10,000 Americans in summer 2021 that 36 percent of workers responded that they will search for another job if not offered the hybrid or remote option.[5] A survey on the reasons of those who want to quit their job in the UK, Italy, France, Spain and Germany shows that the second main motivation (after feeling burned out) is the insufficient work-life balance (Ypulse, 2002).

Our paper tests a research hypothesis that can provide evidence helping to understand these two paradoxes. More specifically we argue that workers who were forced to work at distance during the pandemics experienced a progress in capabilities that they do not want to lose after the pandemics when going back to ordinary times. This is why we argue that individuals having employers that accept less than before the COVID-19 period the possibility of working regularly from home or place of choice are significantly less satisfied with their life.

We test our research hypothesis on the 10th wave of the European Social Survey containing data for a sample of 19 countries. Our findings show that working with employers accepting work at distance less than before the COVID-19 period contributes negatively and significantly to respondents' wellbeing. We show that our findings are robust in relevant subsamples, with instrumental variables and confirmed when using as alternative dependent variable the effective respondent declaration about its reduction of distance work after the COVID-19 period.

2. Research hypothesis

Borrowing from the well-known Sen's concept we can define the opportunity of working at distance from home or place of choice as a substantial increase in individual capabilities that is, the set of valuable functionings (states of being and doing) which she/he has access to.

Our research hypothesis is that the forced work at distance exercise during the COVID-19 period made workers experience new capabilities such as those of saving commuting time (a factor always affecting negatively life satisfaction as shown, among others, by Kahneman et al. 2004 and Frei and Stutzer, 2014), thereby improving work-life balance. Another advantage embedded in the opportunity of working at distance is the possibility of choosing the optimal time/place to work (reconciling efficiency and productivity with the quality of living places). This is why with and after the COVID-19 period we observed a rising number of "digital nomad workers" trying to reconcile job opportunities with enjoyment of the preferred living place (de Almeida et al. 2021).

Our research hypothesis is that the reduction of the experimented opportunity of working at distance after the COVID-19 restrictions' is perceived by workers as a reduction of their newly experienced work-life balance capabilities and therefore negatively affects life satisfaction. If this research hypothesis is not rejected by our empirical results the latter can contribute to

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[3] https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/email/shortlist/186/2022-07-15b.html.

[4]   https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/12/09/how-the-coronavirus-outbreak-has-and-hasnt-changed-the-way-americans-work/

[5] https://hbr.org/2021/08/dont-force-people-to-come-back-to-the-office-full-time

explain the COVID-19 happiness paradox (since the experienced increase in capabilities generated by work at distance contributes positively to life satisfaction and compensates the many negative COVID-19 period factors negatively affecting it) and the great resignation paradox with the unexpected increase in job quits mostly related to problems of work-life balance.

H0: workers with employers accepting work at distance less than before COVID-19 period are significantly less satisfied with their life.

3. Empirical findings

We use the 10th wave of the European Social Survey as it contains questions on the dynamics of smart work before and after COVID-19. Variable legend and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Tables 1 and 2. Countries included in this ESS release are Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Switzerland.

The inspection of our dependent variable shows that life satisfaction has the usual right skewed distribution, with concentration of values in the upper side of the 0-10 interval and a modal value around 8.

Our main regressor of interest is built using answers to the question whether the respondent's employer accept working regularly from home or place of choice more or less than before COVID-19. We create a variable for those responding that acceptance has fallen vis-à-vis the alternative of higher acceptance or indifference.[6]

Respondents with employers considering work at home or place of choice less than before COVID-19 are around 5 percent if we sum the two different answers with employers considering "much less" and "less". Respondents actually working at distance less or much less than in the pre COVID-19 period (the control question) are around 4.3 percent, average sample age is 50.9 years, with 13 average education years in the sample

In order to test our research hypothesis we use the following ordered logit specification

$$
\begin{aligned}
Life\ Sat_i = {} & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 Empl\_not\_Smart_i + \alpha_2 Male_i + \alpha_3 Age_{it} + \alpha_4 Agesq_{it} \\
& + \alpha_5 Education\_Years_i + \sum_d \beta_d DIncome\_Decile_{d,i} + \alpha_6 N\_H\_Members_{it} \\
& + \sum_f \gamma_f DMarital\_status_{f,it} + \alpha_7 Covid\_House_{it} \\
& + \sum_m \zeta_m DSelf\_Assessed\_Health_{m,it} + \alpha_8 LRScale_{it} + \alpha_9 SocCap_{it} \\
& + \alpha_{10} IncSat_{it} + \sum_p \xi_p DCountry_{p,i} + u_{it}
\end{aligned}
$$

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[6] A similar question in the survey is whether the respondent is working more or less at home or place of choice compared with before COVID-19. We use the first as our main variable to test our research hypothesis because it represents a decision/attitude of the employer and not of the respondent. In the second case we have, on the contrary, a decision of the respondent that can be determined by the employer choice or by her/his own decision.

where the dependent variable is the usual cognitive measure of subjective wellbeing represented by the 0-10 life satisfaction variable (*"are you satisfied about your life as a whole?"*). Among regressors our main variable of interest (*Empl_not_Smart*) is a dummy taking value one if the respondent's employer accepts work at distance less than before the COVID-19 period. Other controls include a gender dummy (*Male*), age and age squared to account for the U-shaped effect of age on life satisfaction (Blanchflower, 2021), education years, dummies for income deciles, the number of household members, marital status dummies, whether respondent or respondent partner had COVID-19, self-assessed health, political orientation, a social capital dummy, income satisfaction and country dummies. Standard errors are clustered at country level.

Our findings provide support to our research hypothesis showing that respondents having employers that accept work from home or place of choice less than before the COVID-19 period have a significantly lower level of life satisfaction after controlling for the usual variables considered in subjective wellbeing estimates (income, age, education, marital status, country dummies) (Table 3 column 1). To evaluate the magnitude of the effect at first approximation we can compare it with coefficients of income deciles and find that removal of the possibility of work from home corresponds to a fall from the second to the first (lowest) income decile. By calculating marginal impact we as well calculate that the effect reduces by around 5.6 percent the probability of declaring life satisfaction above 7. Other controls give the usual results with income and education years having positive and significant impact and age a nonlinear U-shaped effect.[7]

In our fully augmented specification we test whether our findings are robust when we change our benchmark specification and introduce other variables that can also affect life satisfaction such as social capital (proxied by the decision to vote in the last elections), self-assessed health status, self- assessed income satisfaction and political opinions measured on the left-right scale. Our main finding remains significant and roughly with the same magnitude (Table 3, columns 2-5).

4. Robustness checks and discussion

In a first robustness check we test whether our main results persist when using employees decisions instead of employers' attitudes. We still find that working less at home or in place of choice than before COVID-19 negatively affects life satisfaction (Table 4). The impact is now stronger as it corresponds to an 8 percent lower probability of declaring oneself very happy (life satisfaction above 7).

We as well estimate our main specification eliminating from the sample managers, executives, professionals and clerks that is, those for whom it is easier to work at distance. Note that in this subsample we however identify respondents who have the opportunity to work at distance with this opportunity being reduced after COVID-19. When we limit the analysis to this part of the sample we find that our main variable of interest is strongly significant. (Tables 5 and 6).

We further check the robustness of our findings in other selected subsample splits. A first interesting result is that the significance of our main variables in age splits remains only in the subsample of workers below 56 showing that reduction of distance work is not a problem for the elder workers (Table 7, columns 1-2). This is consistent with the idea that the young and

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[7] The alternative use of 5-year age classes does not change our findings. Results are omitted for reasons of space and available upon request.

the middle aged are more likely to enjoy the distance work opportunity, due to their higher work-life balance pressures and digital skills.

According to our research hypothesis the interpretation of our findings is that a main benefit of working at distance is the improved work-life balance. To provide additional evidence on it we create two additional sample splits. In a first split we estimate our fully augmented model for the subsample of respondents declaring that online/mobile communication does not make work and personal life interrupt each other. The reduced opportunity of work at distance after the COVID-19 period has a more negative and significant effect for this group, while not for the complementary sample. The magnitude of the effect for this group is a reduction of 11 percent of the probability of declaring life satisfaction above 7 (Table 7, columns 5-6).

In a second split we estimate our fully augmented model for the subsample of those declaring that their job prevents (sometimes, often or always) from giving time to partner/family (hence individuals with stronger work-life balance pressure). Our main variable has strong significance here, while it is not significant in the complementary sample (Table 7, columns 7-8).

In a third split we consider respondents declaring that partner/family is (sometimes, often always) fed up with pressure of their job. Again reduction of the opportunity to work at distance from the employer is negative and significant for them, while not for the complementary subsample. The magnitude of the effect is a reduction by 9 percent of the probability of declaring life satisfaction above 7 (Table 7, columns 9-10).

These three splits provide evidence that does not reject the hypothesis that the fall in life satisfaction for the reduced opportunity of work at distance is determined by the reduced possibility of work-life balance.

Overall, findings from our robustness checks suggest that the overall sample effect observed when estimating our specification hides a much stronger impact for respondents having more serious work-life balance problems, being younger and in occupations where working at distance is more difficult.

The difference of the impact is remarkable since the overall effect reduces by 5.6 percent the probability of declaring a high level of high satisfaction (Table 3, column 1), but goes up to a maximum of 11 percent for respondents declaring problems of work-life balance (Table 7, column 5).

4.1 Instrumental variable estimates

The observed significant correlation between life satisfaction and reduction of work at distance can hide endogeneity problems. We however believe that this is less likely to be the case, at least for endogeneity related to respondent's characteristics, given that in our main estimate in Table 3 the main variable of interest concerns a decision of the employer that is less likely to be affected vy respondent's characteristics as it would be an autonomous and independent respondent decision.

We however address the problem even considering this case with an IV approach using as instruments the inverse of the lagged share of part-time workers in the regions bordering those of the respondent and the same variable divided by the total local population. For the spatial aspect, we construct our measure using a "Rook" spatial matrix. The Rook matrix defines neighboring regions as those that share a common border, excluding regions that only share a point or vertex. In our analysis, we consider only those neighboring regions that have a direct spatial relationship according to this "Rook" definition.. Our assumption is that the instruments are relevant (the flexible work culture in neighbouring regions affect the probability that the respondent's employer is less likely to accept distance work after the COVID-19 period). We

as well believe that the instrument is valid since it is highly unlikely that the inverse of the share of part-time workers in the bordering regions affect life satisfaction of the respondents.

We perform our IV estimate by using an estimation method that takes into account the dichotomous nature of our instrument and therefore uses a probit estimate in the first stage. We focus on the last three estimates of Table 3 (up to the fully augmented estimates) and to the three corresponding estimates in Table 5 where we eliminate from the sample managers, executives, professionals and clerk that is, those for whom it is easier to work at distance.

The two instruments are significant in the first stage and the second stage instrumented variable is negative and significant with coefficient magnitude remarkably similar to its non IV correspondent (Table 8).

To cross-check the validity of our instrument we perform a falsification test by introducing our instruments as regressors in the non IV benchmark model estimated in the subsample excluding employers less likely to accept distance work after the COVID-19 period. The intuition is that, if the two instruments added as regressors are not significant when the instrumented variable is set at zero, it means that they affect the dependent variable only through the instrumented variable. The falsification tests does not reject this hypothesis since the two instruments are never significant (last four columns of Table 8).

4. Conclusions

The COVID-19 pandemics and the mobility constraints associated to it have created the scenario for the largest experiment of forced work at distance at world level. The consequences of such experiment still have to be evaluated by researchers and policymakers.

One hypothesis is that the forced experiment of work at distance allowed to experience the potential increase in capabilities embedded in it (related among others to the elimination of commuting time and costs, improved work-life balance opportunities and the possibility of choosing the preferred time/place to work). If this is the case we should observe a reduction in life satisfaction when this newly experienced opportunity is precluded that is, for workers who experience a reduction in the possibility of work at distance with respect to the pre-COVID-19 period. Empirical findings confirm our guess showing that having an employer that reduces acceptance of work at distance vis-à vis the pre COVID-19 period has a strongly negative and significant effect on life satisfaction.

Our robustness checks and subsample findings seem to reinforce the interpretation we give to our results since this negative effect disappears for those who suffer the negative side of distance work (inability to create a discontinuity between work and leisure) and is instead stronger for those who have work-life balance problems that the opportunity of work at distance is expected to heal. We as well argue that endogeneity concerns are limited since our main variable of interest depends on employer and not worker choices. We however find that our results are confirmed in IV estimates where our instruments are shown to be relevant and valid also with the help of a falsification test.

Our findings have relevant policy implications. If work at distance is an important factor affecting subjective wellbeing policies improving opportunities to work at distance are of utmost importance at firm and government level. As is well known work at distance creates new inequalities determined by differences in quality of internet access, quality of home and size of the household. Government intervention to reduce these inequalities is very important as, for instance, the creation of local smart work hubs where workers of different companies living in the same area can work without necessarily being at office or home. Investment in the

quality of internet access is as well of foremost importance to reduce such inequalities and provide universal quality access to the web, a fundamental prerequisite of work at distance. A final issue evidenced also by our data concerns rules protecting subordinated workers from lack of discontinuity between worktime and leisure (especially that determined by their line managers) since absence of such rule and discontinuity can prevent them from enjoying the benefit of having the option to work at distance.

Given the time limit of our analysis we could test only a research hypothesis related to the short term effect of the removal of the opportunity of work at distance. Longer run analysis on this point is left to future research.

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Figure 1 Sample distribution of life satisfaction

Table 1 Variable legend

Life Sat	Answer to the question "how satisfied with life as a whole" on a 0-10 scale
Empl not Smart	Dummy taking value one if work from home or place of choice, less accepted by the employer compared with before COVID-19
Work Home Less	Dummy taking value one if the respondent is working more or less at home or place of choice compared with before COVID-19.
Male	(0/1) dummy taking value one if the respondent is male
Education Years	Respondent years of education
Income class	Placement of respondent household total net income in one of the income deciles of the country (1=lowest, 10=highest)
Household members	Number of household members
Age	Respondent age
Marital status dummies	(0/1) dummies picking up the following marital status conditions: married, civil union, separated, divorced, widowed, never married
Covid in House	The respondent or the respondent's partner had COVID-19
Social Capital	(0/1) dummy taking value one if the respondent has voted in the last elections

Lrscale	Respondent's placement on the left- right scale (0 extreme left, 10=extreme right)	
Subjective general health	Self-assessed health status (very good, good, fair, bad, very bad)	
Income satisfaction	Feeling about household's income nowadays (living comfortably, coping on, difficult, very difficult)	

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variable	Obs	Frequency			
Work from home or place of choice, How accepted compared with before COVID-19					
Much more accepted now	2273	16.07			
A little more accepted	1827	12.91			
About the same	3043	21.51			
A little less accepted now	347	2.45			
Much less accepted now	349	2.47			
Employees need to work from home	160	1.13			
Employees in my organisation do not hav	286	2.02			
Employees in my organisation do not wor	5862	41.44			
Work from home or place of choice, how often compared with before COVID-19					
Much more often now	1840	10.16			
A little more often now	1660	9.16			
About the same	4653	25.68			
A little less often now	452	2.49			
Much less often now	367	2.03			
I cannot work from home or from another place distant from my job place	9146	50.48			
Job prevents you from giving time to partner/family, how often					
Never	2383	13.02			
Hardly ever	4043	22.08			
Sometimes	6992	38.19			
Often	3021	16.50			
Always	394	2.15			
Don't have partner/family	1476	8.06			
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
Life Satisfaction	33008	7.043	2.130	0	10
Covidinhouse	33351	0.217	0.412	0	1
Income class 1	26003	0.066	0.249	0	1

Income class 2	26003	0.105	0.307	0	1
Income class 3	26003	0.112	0.316	0	1
Income class 4	26003	0.119	0.324	0	1
Income class 5	26003	0.120	0.325	0	1
Income class 6	26003	0.109	0.311	0	1
Income class 7	26003	0.107	0.309	0	1
Income class 8	26003	0.098	0.298	0	1
Income class 9	26003	0.079	0.270	0	1
Income class 10	26003	0.076	0.266	0	1
N. of household members	33212	2.550	1.332	1	13
Age	33087	50.621	18.359	15	90
$[Age]^2$	33087	2899.511	1876.3	225	8100
Marital status					
Married	33043	0.480	0.500	0	1
Civil Union	33043	0.011	0.105	0	1
Separated	33043	0.022	0.145	0	1
Divorced	33043	0.088	0.283	0	1
Widowed	33043	0.094	0.292	0	1
Never Married	33043	0.301	0.459	0	1
Self-Assessed-Health					
Very good	33309	0.257	0.437	0	1
Good	33309	0.415	0.493	0	1
Fair	33309	0.253	0.435	0	1
Bad	33309	0.064	0.245	0	1
Very bad	33309	0.011	0.103	0	1
Left-right scale	28445	5.227	2.376	0	10
Social capital	33351	0.705	0.456	0	1
Income satisfaction	32901	2.026	0.850	1	4
Countries					
Belgium	33351	0.082	0.274	0	1
Switzerland	33351	0.046	0.209	0	1
Czech Republic	33351	0.074	0.262	0	1
Estonia	33351	0.046	0.210	0	1
Finland	33351	0.047	0.212	0	1
France	33351	0.059	0.236	0	1
Greece	33351	0.084	0.277	0	1
Croatia	33351	0.048	0.213	0	1
Hungary	33351	0.055	0.229	0	1
Iceland	33351	0.027	0.162	0	1
Italy	33351	0.079	0.270	0	1
Lituania	33351	0.050	0.217	0	1
Montenegro	33351	0.038	0.192	0	1
North Macedonia	33351	0.043	0.203	0	1
Netherland	33351	0.044	0.205	0	1
Norway	33351	0.042	0.201	0	1
Portugal	33351	0.055	0.228	0	1

Slovenia	33351	0.038 0.190 0 1
Slovakia	33351	0.043 0.202 0 1

Table 3 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.264**	-0.241**	-0.235**	-0.224**	-0.251**
	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.109)
Observations	25,563	25,547	22,772	22,772	22,743
Adj. R^2	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791
Log Likelihood	-50120	-49068	-43102	-43055	-42603

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very bad self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4 The impact of workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19	-0.234**	-0.226**	-0.277***	-0.269***	-0.307***
	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.0961)	(0.0932)
Observations	25,563	25,547	22,772	22,772	22,743
Adj. R^2	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792
Log likelihood	-50120	-49068	-43099	-43052	-42599

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very bad self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction – professions where work at distance is more difficult

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.325***	-0.303***	-0.363***	-0.354***	-0.387***
	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.0928)
Observations	20,172	20,159	17,732	17,732	17,707
Adj. R^2	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755
Log likelihood	-40180	-39369	-34136	-34097	-33748

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4 and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very bad self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6 The impact of workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction– professions where work at distance is more difficult

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES					
Workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19	-0.369***	-0.354***	-0.342***	-0.327***	-0.354***
	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.113)
Observations	20,172	20,159	17,732	17,732	17,707
Adj. R^2	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754
Log likelihood	-40180	-39368	-34139	-34100	-33751

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very bad self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction – sample splits

VARIABLES	(1) Below 55	(2) Above 55	(3) Able to access internet home	(4) Not able to access internet home	(5) Online reduces work-life balance	(6) Online does not reduce work-life balance	(7) Job prevents work-life balance	(8) Job does not prevent work-life balance	(9) Partner/family fed up with my job pressure	(10) Partner/family not fed up with my job pressure
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.161	-0.282**	-0.238*	-0.407***	-0.160*	-0.490**	-0.400***	0.0607	-0.450***	-0.0692
	(0.176)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.0963)	(0.208)	(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.134)
Observations	11,221	14,342	21,601	3,962	15,987	9,576	8,157	17,406	17,753	7,810
Adj. R^2	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394
Log likelihood	-22314	-27620	-41482	-8457	-30651	-19358	-15379	-34577	-35625	-14296

The estimated specification is described in section 3. Column (5) Respondent answering that online/mobile communication makes work and personal life interrupt each other. Column (7) Respondents answering that job prevents (sometimes, often or always) you from giving time to partner/family. Column (9) Respondents answering that partner/family is (sometimes, often always) fed up with pressure of one's own job. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very bad self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction - IV estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES						
SECOND STAGE						
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-1	-0.246**	-0.246**	-0.257**	-0.267**	-0.267**	-0.280**
	(0.0997)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.110)
FIRST STAGE						
1/(part-time share border)	-0.257	-0.257	-0.257	-0.237	-0.237	-0.237
	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.444)	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.444)
1/(part-time share border)/total population	-5.442**	-5.438**	-5.441**	-4.650*	-4.649*	-4.652*
	(2.342)	(2.338)	(2.339)	(2.488)	(2.487)	(2.489)
Observations	16,282	16,301	16,301	14,204	14,221	14,221
Falsification test						
1/(part-time share border)	0.145	0.0138	0.0179	0.139	0.0152	0.0195
	(0.282)	(0.189)	(0.200)	(0.255)	(0.163)	(0.175)
1/(part-time share border)/total population	0.891	5.098	5.407	-0.271	4.227	4.555
	(2.380)	(4.148)	(4.292)	(2.207)	(3.688)	(3.777)

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The table reports in the first row the second stage estimate coefficient of our main variable of interest when the benchmark model is estimated using as instruments the inverse of the lagged share of part-time workers in the regions bordering those of the respondent and of the same variable divided by the total local population. The first three columns correspond to on the last three estimates of Table 3 (up to the fully augmented estimate), while the last three columns to the three corresponding estimates in Table 5 where we eliminate from the sample managers, executives, professionals and clerk that is, those for whom it is easier to work at distance.

In the first two rows we present coefficients and standard errors of the instrumented variable of interest (unit dummy for employers less likely to accept distance work after the COVID-19 period) at the second stage. The following four rows present coefficients and standard errors of instruments in the first stage. The last four rows present coefficients and standard errors for the instrument used as regressor in the non instrumented benchmark estimate in the subsample excluding employers less likely to accept distance work after the COVID-19 period. The null hypothesis of the falsification test is that if the two instruments added as regressors are not significant when the instrumented variable is set at zero, it means that they affect the dependent variable only through the instrumented variable.

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Appendix

Table 3 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction – full estimate details

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.264**	-0.241**	-0.235**	-0.224**	-0.251**
	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.112)	(0.109)
Male	-0.0686**	-0.0897**	-0.112***	-0.111***	-0.125***
	(0.0343)	(0.0368)	(0.0377)	(0.0375)	(0.0353)
Age	-0.0477***	-0.0390***	-0.0381***	-0.0451***	-0.0338***
	(0.00628)	(0.00651)	(0.00650)	(0.00586)	(0.00611)
$[Age]^2$	0.000440***	0.000478***	0.000472***	0.000522***	0.000405***
	(5.91e-05)	(5.89e-05)	(5.60e-05)	(4.95e-05)	(5.12e-05)
Education Years	0.0221***	0.00866	0.0132***	0.00961**	0.000950
	(0.00611)	(0.00539)	(0.00467)	(0.00467)	(0.00327)
Income class 2	0.283***	0.163**	0.161*	0.152*	-0.0136
	(0.0702)	(0.0813)	(0.0884)	(0.0880)	(0.0872)
Income class 3	0.444***	0.259***	0.230**	0.222**	-0.0694
	(0.0735)	(0.0826)	(0.0907)	(0.0909)	(0.0958)
Income class 4	0.581***	0.359***	0.391***	0.377***	0.00373
	(0.0776)	(0.0868)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Income class 5	0.756***	0.481***	0.485***	0.472***	0.0428
	(0.0742)	(0.0762)	(0.0826)	(0.0835)	(0.0948)
Income class 6	0.850***	0.579***	0.572***	0.555***	0.0538
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.106)
Income class 7	0.946***	0.647***	0.644***	0.624***	0.0650
	(0.0859)	(0.0922)	(0.0974)	(0.0980)	(0.102)
Income class 8	1.055***	0.735***	0.709***	0.692***	0.0750
	(0.0978)	(0.0979)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.102)
Income class 9	1.167***	0.857***	0.844***	0.823***	0.150
	(0.105)	(0.111)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.115)
Income class 10	1.391***	1.024***	0.974***	0.949***	0.202*
	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.126)	(0.122)
N. of household members	-0.00863	-0.00425	-0.0114	-0.00935	0.0337***
	(0.0119)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0123)
Civil Union	0.0425	0.104	0.189	0.204	0.210
	(0.0900)	(0.110)	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.165)
Separated	-0.377***	-0.388***	-0.426***	-0.407***	-0.305**
	(0.0736)	(0.103)	(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.146)
Divorced	-0.218***	-0.235***	-0.238***	-0.214***	-0.175***
	(0.0448)	(0.0452)	(0.0479)	(0.0464)	(0.0414)
Widowed	-0.379***	-0.332***	-0.330***	-0.318***	-0.300***
	(0.0650)	(0.0642)	(0.0662)	(0.0646)	(0.0602)
Never married	-0.323***	-0.331***	-0.310***	-0.304***	-0.300***
	(0.0411)	(0.0359)	(0.0345)	(0.0354)	(0.0349)
covidinhouse	-0.0296	-0.00892	-0.00791	-0.00878	-0.0173
	(0.0274)	(0.0310)	(0.0347)	(0.0338)	(0.0342)
Health: good		-0.652***	-0.656***	-0.654***	-0.625***
		(0.0332)	(0.0310)	(0.0301)	(0.0326)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Health: fair		-1.271***	-1.268***	-1.259***	-1.182***
		(0.0854)	(0.0878)	(0.0886)	(0.0898)
Health: bad		-2.104***	-2.056***	-2.034***	-1.861***
		(0.123)	(0.130)	(0.131)	(0.128)
Health: very bad		-2.872***	-2.891***	-2.843***	-2.597***
		(0.152)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.180)
Left-right scale			0.108***	0.107***	0.104***
			(0.00962)	(0.00948)	(0.00928)
Social Capital				0.287***	0.259***
				(0.0549)	(0.0527)
Income satisfaction					-0.541***
					(0.0533)
Switzerland	2.132***	1.990***	2.087***	2.128***	1.649***
	(0.0798)	(0.0791)	(0.0755)	(0.0731)	(0.0952)
Czech Republic	0.810***	0.870***	0.834***	0.856***	0.676***
	(0.0305)	(0.0326)	(0.0332)	(0.0329)	(0.0398)
Estonia	1.125***	1.386***	1.390***	1.405***	1.147***
	(0.0485)	(0.0526)	(0.0542)	(0.0543)	(0.0661)
Finland	1.798***	1.896***	1.923***	1.910***	1.610***
	(0.0752)	(0.0774)	(0.0779)	(0.0783)	(0.0892)
France	0.744***	0.869***	0.926***	0.978***	0.604***
	(0.0436)	(0.0471)	(0.0532)	(0.0544)	(0.0754)
Greece	0.282***	0.0625**	0.0647***	0.0283	0.0558**
	(0.0175)	(0.0245)	(0.0240)	(0.0252)	(0.0246)
Croatia	1.159***	1.217***	1.285***	1.288***	0.897***
	(0.0407)	(0.0424)	(0.0424)	(0.0418)	(0.0613)
Hungary	0.560***	0.599***	0.564***	0.555***	0.358***
	(0.0182)	(0.0193)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)	(0.0304)
Iceland	1.813***	1.812***	1.880***	1.855***	1.291***
	(0.0697)	(0.0680)	(0.0664)	(0.0676)	(0.0919)
Italy	0.914***	0.854***	0.888***	0.874***	0.495***
	(0.0285)	(0.0267)	(0.0245)	(0.0245)	(0.0508)
Lituania	0.655***	0.894***	0.976***	0.984***	0.786***
	(0.0254)	(0.0339)	(0.0374)	(0.0376)	(0.0461)
Montenegro	0.866***	0.859***	1.015***	0.968***	0.731***
	(0.0264)	(0.0247)	(0.0307)	(0.0329)	(0.0407)
North Macedonia	0.409***	0.404*****	0.358***	0.330***	0.126***
	(0.0152)	(0.0144)	(0.0134)	(0.0158)	(0.0208)
Netherland	1.473***	1.569***	1.639***	1.610***	1.110***
	(0.0715)	(0.0721)	(0.0735)	(0.0738)	(0.0970)
Norway	1.540***	1.549***	1.647***	1.629***	1.111***
	(0.0686)	(0.0657)	(0.0644)	(0.0651)	(0.0897)
Portugal	0.730***	0.910***	0.997***	0.988***	0.783***
	(0.0254)	(0.0276)	(0.0268)	(0.0269)	(0.0364)
Slovenia	1.458***	1.518***	1.630***	1.637***	1.118***
	(0.0540)	(0.0530)	(0.0525)	(0.0521)	(0.0812)
Slovakia	0.164***	0.269***	0.356***	0.343***	0.120***
	(0.0102)	(0.0116)	(0.0148)	(0.0143)	(0.0293)
/cut1	-4.076***	-4.839***	-4.320***	-4.379***	-6.017***
	(0.195)	(0.181)	(0.178)	(0.176)	(0.229)
/cut2	-3.603***	-4.357***	-3.809***	-3.868***	-5.501***
	(0.188)	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.162)	(0.226)
/cut3	-2.902***	-3.638***	-3.064***	-3.122***	-4.744***
	(0.190)	(0.176)	(0.172)	(0.169)	(0.235)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
/cut4	-2.219***	-2.930***	-2.338***	-2.395***	-4.007***
	(0.183)	(0.168)	(0.167)	(0.163)	(0.242)
/cut5	-1.713***	-2.401***	-1.777***	-1.832***	-3.433***
	(0.168)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.240)
/cut6	-0.829***	-1.473***	-0.852***	-0.905***	-2.486***
	(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.150)	(0.234)
/cut7	-0.262*	-0.875***	-0.240	-0.290*	-1.856***
	(0.158)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.239)
/cut8	0.631***	0.0652	0.731***	0.684***	-0.859***
	(0.165)	(0.159)	(0.155)	(0.154)	(0.247)
/cut9	1.843***	1.335***	2.043***	1.999***	0.481*
	(0.193)	(0.187)	(0.175)	(0.176)	(0.262)
/cut10	2.942***	2.469***	3.240***	3.197***	1.693***
	(0.269)	(0.261)	(0.248)	(0.251)	(0.317)
Observations	25,563	25,547	22,772	22,772	22,743
Adj. R^2	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791	0.0791
Log Likelihood	-50120	-49068	-43102	-43055	-42603

The estimated specification is described in section 3. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very good self-assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4 The impact of workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES					
Work Home Less	-0.234**	-0.226**	-0.277***	-0.269***	-0.307***
	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.0961)	(0.0932)
Male	-0.0694**	-0.0902**	-0.112***	-0.112***	-0.126***
	(0.0343)	(0.0368)	(0.0378)	(0.0376)	(0.0354)
Age	-0.0477***	-0.0390***	-0.0380***	-0.0450***	-0.0337***
	(0.00627)	(0.00649)	(0.00646)	(0.00583)	(0.00607)
$[Age]^2$	0.000440***	0.000478***	0.000471***	0.000521***	0.000404***
	(5.92e-05)	(5.88e-05)	(5.56e-05)	(4.90e-05)	(5.05e-05)
Education Years	0.0224***	0.00894	0.0135***	0.00995**	0.00133
	(0.00617)	(0.00546)	(0.00477)	(0.00475)	(0.00334)
Income class 2	0.281***	0.161**	0.160*	0.151*	-0.0155
	(0.0696)	(0.0809)	(0.0877)	(0.0873)	(0.0865)
Income class 3	0.445***	0.260***	0.233***	0.224**	-0.0670
	(0.0728)	(0.0821)	(0.0901)	(0.0903)	(0.0955)
Income class 4	0.581***	0.358***	0.392***	0.378***	0.00405
	(0.0764)	(0.0859)	(0.100)	(0.0993)	(0.0996)
Income class 5	0.753***	0.477***	0.482***	0.469***	0.0393
	(0.0737)	(0.0759)	(0.0821)	(0.0830)	(0.0946)
Income class 6	0.850***	0.578***	0.574***	0.557***	0.0544
	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.106)
Income class 7	0.945***	0.645***	0.644***	0.624***	0.0643
	(0.0846)	(0.0912)	(0.0963)	(0.0969)	(0.101)

Income class 8	1.053***	0.733***	0.708***	0.691***	0.0724
	(0.0970)	(0.0973)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.101)
Income class 9	1.167***	0.857***	0.846***	0.825***	0.151
	(0.104)	(0.111)	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.115)
Income class 10	1.388***	1.021***	0.972***	0.947***	0.198*
	(0.112)	(0.117)	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.120)
N. of household members	-0.00840	-0.00399	-0.0113	-0.00927	0.0339***
	(0.0119)	(0.0135)	(0.0134)	(0.0135)	(0.0123)
Civil Union	0.0434	0.105	0.193	0.207	0.214
	(0.0884)	(0.108)	(0.157)	(0.159)	(0.163)
Separated	-0.372***	-0.382***	-0.420***	-0.401***	-0.300**
	(0.0767)	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.134)	(0.150)
Divorced	-0.219***	-0.235***	-0.238***	-0.214***	-0.175***
	(0.0446)	(0.0450)	(0.0476)	(0.0460)	(0.0411)
Widowed	-0.379***	-0.332***	-0.330***	-0.318***	-0.300***
	(0.0646)	(0.0640)	(0.0660)	(0.0644)	(0.0600)
Never married	-0.321***	-0.330***	-0.309***	-0.302***	-0.298***
	(0.0413)	(0.0359)	(0.0347)	(0.0355)	(0.0348)
Covid in house	-0.0304	-0.00941	-0.00828	-0.00916	-0.0178
	(0.0275)	(0.0310)	(0.0348)	(0.0340)	(0.0343)
Health: good		-0.651***	-0.655***	-0.653***	-0.623***
		(0.0333)	(0.0314)	(0.0305)	(0.0330)
Health: fair		-1.271***	-1.268***	-1.258***	-1.181***
		(0.0861)	(0.0886)	(0.0894)	(0.0905)
Health: bad		-2.105***	-2.058***	-2.036***	-1.863***
		(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.129)
Health: very bad		-2.873***	-2.891***	-2.843***	-2.597***
		(0.152)	(0.189)	(0.189)	(0.180)
Left-right scale			0.108***	0.107***	0.104***
			(0.00966)	(0.00951)	(0.00930)
Social Capital				0.287***	0.259***
				(0.0545)	(0.0521)
Income satisfaction					-0.541***
					(0.0533)
Switzerland	2.132***	1.989***	2.087***	2.128***	1.649***
	(0.0798)	(0.0791)	(0.0754)	(0.0730)	(0.0953)
Czech Republic	0.810***	0.870***	0.835***	0.858***	0.678***
	(0.0310)	(0.0331)	(0.0334)	(0.0331)	(0.0405)
Estonia	1.124***	1.385***	1.388***	1.403***	1.145***
	(0.0486)	(0.0526)	(0.0543)	(0.0543)	(0.0662)
Finland	1.800***	1.899***	1.926***	1.913***	1.612***
	(0.0751)	(0.0774)	(0.0779)	(0.0782)	(0.0893)
France	0.743***	0.868***	0.925***	0.976***	0.602***
	(0.0437)	(0.0471)	(0.0532)	(0.0544)	(0.0753)
Greece	0.283***	0.0640***	0.0668***	0.0304	0.0579**
	(0.0175)	(0.0246)	(0.0243)	(0.0253)	(0.0246)
Croatia	1.157***	1.214***	1.283***	1.286***	0.894***
	(0.0408)	(0.0425)	(0.0425)	(0.0418)	(0.0613)
Hungary	0.556***	0.596***	0.561***	0.553***	0.355***
	(0.0184)	(0.0195)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0306)
Iceland	1.808***	1.808***	1.876***	1.852***	1.287***
	(0.0703)	(0.0685)	(0.0667)	(0.0679)	(0.0921)
Italy	0.911***	0.852***	0.887***	0.873***	0.493***
	(0.0296)	(0.0278)	(0.0251)	(0.0251)	(0.0518)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Lituania	0.652***	0.892***	0.975***	0.984***	0.785***
	(0.0260)	(0.0346)	(0.0378)	(0.0379)	(0.0467)
Montenegro	0.868***	0.861***	1.020***	0.974***	0.736***
	(0.0266)	(0.0252)	(0.0312)	(0.0329)	(0.0417)
North Macedonia	0.405***	0.401***	0.355***	0.327***	0.122***
	(0.0153)	(0.0146)	(0.0138)	(0.0164)	(0.0213)
Netherland	1.476***	1.572***	1.643***	1.613***	1.113***
	(0.0713)	(0.0719)	(0.0734)	(0.0736)	(0.0972)
Norway	1.539***	1.549***	1.647***	1.629***	1.111***
	(0.0688)	(0.0659)	(0.0644)	(0.0650)	(0.0900)
Portugal	0.728***	0.909***	0.995***	0.987***	0.781***
	(0.0254)	(0.0275)	(0.0267)	(0.0269)	(0.0365)
Slovenia	1.456***	1.517***	1.629***	1.636***	1.116***
	(0.0543)	(0.0532)	(0.0526)	(0.0522)	(0.0814)
Slovakia	0.153***	0.260***	0.346***	0.334***	0.109***
	(0.00982)	(0.0112)	(0.0137)	(0.0135)	(0.0292)
/cut1	-4.074***	-4.836***	-4.315***	-4.374***	-6.015***
	(0.192)	(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.174)	(0.228)
/cut2	-3.601***	-4.354***	-3.804***	-3.863***	-5.498***
	(0.185)	(0.168)	(0.164)	(0.160)	(0.225)
/cut3	-2.900***	-3.636***	-3.059***	-3.117***	-4.742***
	(0.187)	(0.174)	(0.171)	(0.167)	(0.234)
/cut4	-2.217***	-2.928***	-2.333***	-2.390***	-4.004***
	(0.180)	(0.166)	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.241)
/cut5	-1.711***	-2.399***	-1.772***	-1.827***	-3.431***
	(0.165)	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.147)	(0.240)
/cut6	-0.827***	-1.471***	-0.848***	-0.900***	-2.483***
	(0.162)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.149)	(0.234)
/cut7	-0.260*	-0.873***	-0.235	-0.285*	-1.853***
	(0.156)	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.239)
/cut8	0.633***	0.0674	0.736***	0.689***	-0.856***
	(0.163)	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.153)	(0.247)
/cut9	1.845***	1.337***	2.048***	2.005***	0.485*
	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.174)	(0.175)	(0.261)
/cut10	2.944***	2.471***	3.245***	3.202***	1.697***
	(0.266)	(0.259)	(0.246)	(0.248)	(0.316)
Observations	25,563	25,547	22,772	22,772	22,743
Adj. R^2	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792	0.0792
ll	-50120	-49068	-43099	-43052	-42599

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very good self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction – professions where work at distance is more difficult

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)

VARIABLES					
workhomeless	-0.325***	-0.303***	-0.363***	-0.354***	-0.387***
	(0.111)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.101)	(0.0928)
male	-0.0873**	-0.116***	-0.129***	-0.130***	-0.138***
	(0.0346)	(0.0364)	(0.0355)	(0.0353)	(0.0340)
Age	-0.0451***	-0.0364***	-0.0359***	-0.0434***	-0.0325***
	(0.00691)	(0.00702)	(0.00679)	(0.00582)	(0.00618)
$[Age]^2$	0.000405***	0.000443***	0.000440***	0.000495***	0.000380***
	(6.46e-05)	(6.37e-05)	(5.69e-05)	(4.77e-05)	(5.03e-05)
Education Years	0.0190***	0.00479	0.0111**	0.00734	-0.00107
	(0.00669)	(0.00596)	(0.00532)	(0.00544)	(0.00438)
Income class 2	0.303***	0.177**	0.197**	0.191**	0.0309
	(0.0796)	(0.0866)	(0.0897)	(0.0883)	(0.0840)
Income class 3	0.470***	0.274***	0.276***	0.269***	-0.00911
	(0.0782)	(0.0858)	(0.0915)	(0.0908)	(0.0892)
Income class 4	0.570***	0.348***	0.396***	0.386***	0.0336
	(0.0857)	(0.0938)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.0942)
Income class 5	0.735***	0.462***	0.477***	0.467***	0.0561
	(0.0830)	(0.0848)	(0.0917)	(0.0915)	(0.0932)
Income class 6	0.798***	0.524***	0.531***	0.519***	0.0410
	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.126)	(0.125)	(0.108)
Income class 7	0.925***	0.634***	0.637***	0.620***	0.0785
	(0.0966)	(0.0997)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.0996)
Income class 8	1.056***	0.742***	0.730***	0.717***	0.125
	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.0976)
Income class 9	1.116***	0.810***	0.816***	0.800***	0.160
	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.136)	(0.134)	(0.122)
Income class 10	1.330***	0.968***	0.943***	0.922***	0.217*
	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.140)	(0.137)	(0.128)
N. of household members	-0.00681	-0.00106	-0.00972	-0.00764	0.0332*
	(0.0158)	(0.0182)	(0.0193)	(0.0195)	(0.0180)
Civil Union	0.164	0.217	0.309	0.325	0.347*
	(0.138)	(0.149)	(0.195)	(0.199)	(0.196)
Separated	-0.424***	-0.437***	-0.497***	-0.474***	-0.370**
	(0.0988)	(0.122)	(0.154)	(0.164)	(0.188)
Divorced	-0.245***	-0.257***	-0.264***	-0.238***	-0.198***
	(0.0477)	(0.0467)	(0.0524)	(0.0515)	(0.0493)
Widowed	-0.355***	-0.303***	-0.286***	-0.270***	-0.254***
	(0.0686)	(0.0682)	(0.0679)	(0.0658)	(0.0630)
Never married	-0.323***	-0.332***	-0.318***	-0.310***	-0.309***
	(0.0344)	(0.0331)	(0.0349)	(0.0349)	(0.0346)
covidinhouse	-0.0304	-0.00398	0.00403	0.00231	-0.00876
	(0.0335)	(0.0345)	(0.0351)	(0.0350)	(0.0349)
Health: good		-0.642***	-0.646***	-0.644***	-0.615***
		(0.0384)	(0.0371)	(0.0362)	(0.0386)
Health: fair		-1.216***	-1.214***	-1.206***	-1.131***
		(0.0910)	(0.0947)	(0.0954)	(0.0959)
Health: bad		-2.053***	-2.000***	-1.975***	-1.806***
		(0.128)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.142)
Health: very bad		-2.971***	-3.000***	-2.952***	-2.692***
		(0.176)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.205)
Left-right scale			0.109***	0.108***	0.105***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			(0.00942)	(0.00941)	(0.00948)
Social Capital				0.290***	0.266***
				(0.0575)	(0.0546)
Income satisfaction					-0.520***
					(0.0550)
Switzerland	2.142***	2.005***	2.104***	2.149***	1.685***
	(0.0821)	(0.0802)	(0.0762)	(0.0745)	(0.104)
Czech Republic	0.822***	0.874***	0.834***	0.863***	0.703***
	(0.0312)	(0.0326)	(0.0349)	(0.0357)	(0.0447)
Estonia	1.110***	1.374***	1.385***	1.407***	1.163***
	(0.0457)	(0.0508)	(0.0540)	(0.0548)	(0.0697)
Finland	1.815***	1.905***	1.944***	1.934***	1.637***
	(0.0736)	(0.0761)	(0.0775)	(0.0776)	(0.0941)
France	0.774***	0.900***	0.958***	1.012***	0.640***
	(0.0475)	(0.0510)	(0.0575)	(0.0600)	(0.0827)
Greece	0.314***	0.101***	0.107***	0.0680**	0.112***
	(0.0216)	(0.0288)	(0.0275)	(0.0272)	(0.0267)
Croatia	1.155***	1.190***	1.258***	1.262***	0.879***
	(0.0425)	(0.0430)	(0.0431)	(0.0421)	(0.0651)
Hungary	0.600***	0.641***	0.613***	0.605***	0.410***
	(0.0235)	(0.0246)	(0.0248)	(0.0245)	(0.0379)
Iceland	1.758***	1.765***	1.840***	1.819***	1.263***
	(0.0665)	(0.0642)	(0.0615)	(0.0623)	(0.0960)
Italy	0.912***	0.854***	0.887***	0.877***	0.515***
	(0.0306)	(0.0284)	(0.0254)	(0.0251)	(0.0553)
Lituania	0.594***	0.832***	0.918***	0.936***	0.744***
	(0.0228)	(0.0333)	(0.0365)	(0.0374)	(0.0481)
Montenegro	0.908***	0.902***	1.044***	0.997***	0.767***
	(0.0278)	(0.0262)	(0.0301)	(0.0325)	(0.0435)
North Macedonia	0.379***	0.383***	0.341***	0.314***	0.120***
	(0.0177)	(0.0166)	(0.0172)	(0.0200)	(0.0249)
Netherland	1.500***	1.600***	1.674***	1.645***	1.160***
	(0.0747)	(0.0747)	(0.0772)	(0.0770)	(0.107)
Norway	1.575***	1.612***	1.731***	1.715***	1.202***
	(0.0720)	(0.0685)	(0.0679)	(0.0682)	(0.1000)
Portugal	0.752***	0.924***	1.024***	1.016***	0.815***
	(0.0307)	(0.0307)	(0.0302)	(0.0301)	(0.0402)
Slovenia	1.426***	1.483***	1.594***	1.603***	1.109***
	(0.0549)	(0.0531)	(0.0541)	(0.0538)	(0.0882)
Slovakia	0.165***	0.275***	0.374***	0.362***	0.147***
	(0.0136)	(0.0146)	(0.0175)	(0.0170)	(0.0340)
/cut1	-4.048***	-4.804***	-4.277***	-4.348***	-5.930***
	(0.210)	(0.196)	(0.197)	(0.195)	(0.261)
/cut2	-3.594***	-4.340***	-3.781***	-3.852***	-5.427***
	(0.205)	(0.188)	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.259)
/cut3	-2.887***	-3.613***	-3.025***	-3.095***	-4.661***
	(0.213)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.192)	(0.264)
/cut4	-2.193***	-2.892***	-2.283***	-2.351***	-3.906***
	(0.206)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.274)
/cut5	-1.686***	-2.361***	-1.715***	-1.782***	-3.327***
	(0.193)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.172)	(0.272)
/cut6	-0.798***	-1.427***	-0.781***	-0.845***	-2.370***

	(0.186)	(0.169)	(0.170)	(0.167)	(0.259)
/cut7	-0.220	-0.819***	-0.156	-0.217	-1.728***
	(0.180)	(0.168)	(0.171)	(0.167)	(0.265)
/cut8	0.644***	0.0882	0.781***	0.723***	-0.767***
	(0.188)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.175)	(0.279)
/cut9	1.826***	1.323***	2.059***	2.004***	0.538*
	(0.213)	(0.205)	(0.199)	(0.198)	(0.298)
/cut10	2.851***	2.379***	3.180***	3.126***	1.673***
	(0.280)	(0.269)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.350)
Observations	20,172	20,159	17,732	17,732	17,707
Adj. R^2	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755	0.0755
ll	-40180	-39369	-34136	-34097	-33748

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very good self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 6 The impact of workers reducing work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction– professions where work at distance is more difficult

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES					
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.369***	-0.354***	-0.342***	-0.327***	-0.354***
	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.113)
male	-0.0858**	-0.115***	-0.127***	-0.128***	-0.136***
	(0.0346)	(0.0365)	(0.0354)	(0.0352)	(0.0339)
Age	-0.0451***	-0.0364***	-0.0360***	-0.0435***	-0.0326***
	(0.00690)	(0.00702)	(0.00682)	(0.00585)	(0.00621)
$[Age]^2$	0.000405***	0.000443***	0.000441***	0.000495***	0.000381***
	(6.43e-05)	(6.35e-05)	(5.73e-05)	(4.80e-05)	(5.06e-05)
Education Years	0.0186***	0.00436	0.0105**	0.00682	-0.00164
	(0.00670)	(0.00595)	(0.00528)	(0.00542)	(0.00437)
Income class 2	0.306***	0.180**	0.199**	0.192**	0.0325
	(0.0801)	(0.0869)	(0.0904)	(0.0891)	(0.0848)
Income class 3	0.469***	0.273***	0.274***	0.266***	-0.0121
	(0.0793)	(0.0867)	(0.0925)	(0.0919)	(0.0900)
Income class 4	0.570***	0.349***	0.394***	0.384***	0.0324
	(0.0872)	(0.0952)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.0950)
Income class 5	0.740***	0.467***	0.481***	0.471***	0.0613
	(0.0833)	(0.0847)	(0.0916)	(0.0915)	(0.0931)
Income class 6	0.800***	0.526***	0.531***	0.518***	0.0416
	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.108)
Income class 7	0.928***	0.638***	0.640***	0.623***	0.0815
	(0.0980)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.100)
Income class 8	1.060***	0.746***	0.733***	0.721***	0.130
	(0.112)	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.112)	(0.0983)
Income class 9	1.120***	0.815***	0.818***	0.802***	0.164
	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.121)
Income class 10	1.335***	0.973***	0.946***	0.925***	0.222*

	(0.123)	(0.131)	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.129)
N. of household members	-0.00734	-0.00160	-0.0101	-0.00800	0.0326*
	(0.0159)	(0.0182)	(0.0193)	(0.0195)	(0.0180)
Civil Union	0.162	0.217	0.305	0.321	0.343*
	(0.141)	(0.152)	(0.198)	(0.202)	(0.200)
Separated	-0.432***	-0.446***	-0.504***	-0.481***	-0.376**
	(0.0959)	(0.119)	(0.149)	(0.160)	(0.184)
Divorced	-0.243***	-0.256***	-0.263***	-0.238***	-0.197***
	(0.0480)	(0.0469)	(0.0524)	(0.0517)	(0.0495)
Widowed	-0.355***	-0.303***	-0.286***	-0.270***	-0.253***
	(0.0691)	(0.0684)	(0.0682)	(0.0662)	(0.0633)
Never married	-0.324***	-0.333***	-0.320***	-0.311***	-0.310***
	(0.0348)	(0.0334)	(0.0351)	(0.0351)	(0.0351)
covidinhouse	-0.0299	-0.00379	0.00409	0.00238	-0.00865
	(0.0331)	(0.0340)	(0.0346)	(0.0345)	(0.0345)
Health: good		-0.644***	-0.647***	-0.646***	-0.617***
		(0.0384)	(0.0367)	(0.0359)	(0.0384)
Health: fair		-1.217***	-1.215***	-1.207***	-1.132***
		(0.0900)	(0.0935)	(0.0943)	(0.0948)
Health: bad		-2.053***	-1.999***	-1.975***	-1.805***
		(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.144)	(0.141)
Health: very bad		-2.971***	-3.001***	-2.953***	-2.693***
		(0.176)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.205)
Left-right scale			0.109***	0.107***	0.104***
			(0.00939)	(0.00938)	(0.00946)
Social Capital				0.289***	0.266***
				(0.0579)	(0.0551)
Income satisfaction					-0.519***
					(0.0550)
Switzerland	2.144***	2.007***	2.105***	2.150***	1.686***
	(0.0820)	(0.0802)	(0.0763)	(0.0745)	(0.104)
Czech Republic	0.823***	0.876***	0.834***	0.863***	0.702***
	(0.0308)	(0.0325)	(0.0350)	(0.0359)	(0.0444)
Estonia	1.110***	1.374***	1.386***	1.408***	1.164***
	(0.0457)	(0.0508)	(0.0540)	(0.0548)	(0.0697)
Finland	1.807***	1.898***	1.936***	1.926***	1.628***
	(0.0738)	(0.0761)	(0.0777)	(0.0779)	(0.0941)
France	0.775***	0.901***	0.959***	1.014***	0.643***
	(0.0474)	(0.0509)	(0.0574)	(0.0599)	(0.0826)
Greece	0.312***	0.0984***	0.104***	0.0647**	0.109***
	(0.0216)	(0.0285)	(0.0270)	(0.0270)	(0.0264)
Croatia	1.157***	1.191***	1.259***	1.262***	0.881***
	(0.0423)	(0.0428)	(0.0429)	(0.0420)	(0.0649)
Hungary	0.604***	0.645***	0.616***	0.609***	0.415***
	(0.0233)	(0.0244)	(0.0248)	(0.0245)	(0.0377)
Iceland	1.765***	1.771***	1.846***	1.824***	1.271***
	(0.0659)	(0.0637)	(0.0614)	(0.0622)	(0.0959)
Italy	0.915***	0.857***	0.889***	0.878***	0.517***
	(0.0299)	(0.0278)	(0.0253)	(0.0249)	(0.0547)
Lituania	0.598***	0.836***	0.920***	0.937***	0.747***
	(0.0219)	(0.0325)	(0.0363)	(0.0373)	(0.0476)
Montenegro	0.905***	0.899***	1.036***	0.988***	0.759***
	(0.0278)	(0.0259)	(0.0303)	(0.0333)	(0.0431)
North Macedonia	0.383***	0.386***	0.347***	0.319***	0.126***

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.0173)	(0.0162)	(0.0165)	(0.0193)	(0.0243)
Netherland	1.495***	1.595***	1.668***	1.639***	1.155***
	(0.0748)	(0.0747)	(0.0772)	(0.0771)	(0.107)
Norway	1.575***	1.611***	1.727***	1.712***	1.199***
	(0.0720)	(0.0684)	(0.0682)	(0.0686)	(0.0998)
Portugal	0.753***	0.924***	1.024***	1.016***	0.815***
	(0.0306)	(0.0307)	(0.0302)	(0.0301)	(0.0400)
Slovenia	1.427***	1.485***	1.595***	1.604***	1.111***
	(0.0547)	(0.0529)	(0.0541)	(0.0537)	(0.0880)
Slovakia	0.179***	0.288***	0.388***	0.374***	0.161***
	(0.0130)	(0.0143)	(0.0188)	(0.0181)	(0.0341)
/cut1	-4.054***	-4.809***	-4.287***	-4.358***	-5.938***
	(0.213)	(0.197)	(0.199)	(0.197)	(0.261)
/cut2	-3.600***	-4.345***	-3.791***	-3.861***	-5.436***
	(0.208)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.259)
/cut3	-2.893***	-3.618***	-3.036***	-3.105***	-4.669***
	(0.215)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.193)	(0.263)
/cut4	-2.199***	-2.897***	-2.293***	-2.361***	-3.915***
	(0.209)	(0.190)	(0.191)	(0.187)	(0.274)
/cut5	-1.691***	-2.366***	-1.725***	-1.791***	-3.336***
	(0.196)	(0.177)	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.271)
/cut6	-0.803***	-1.432***	-0.791***	-0.854***	-2.379***
	(0.188)	(0.170)	(0.171)	(0.168)	(0.258)
/cut7	-0.226	-0.824***	-0.166	-0.227	-1.737***
	(0.182)	(0.169)	(0.171)	(0.168)	(0.263)
/cut8	0.638***	0.0833	0.770***	0.713***	-0.776***
	(0.190)	(0.180)	(0.179)	(0.176)	(0.277)
/cut9	1.821***	1.318***	2.048***	1.994***	0.528*
	(0.216)	(0.206)	(0.201)	(0.199)	(0.297)
/cut10	2.845***	2.374***	3.169***	3.116***	1.664***
	(0.283)	(0.271)	(0.268)	(0.268)	(0.351)
Observations	20,172	20,159	17,732	17,732	17,707
Adj. R^2	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754	0.0754
Ll	-40180	-39368	-34139	-34100	-33751

The estimated specification is described in section 3. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Self-assessed health is added in column 2, political preferences in column 3), social capital in column 4) and income satisfaction in column 5). Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very good self-assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 7 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction – sample splits

VARIABLES	(1) Below 55	(2) Above 55	(3) Able to access internet home	(4) Not able to access internet home	(5) Online reduces work-life balance	(6) Online does not reduce work-life balance	(7) Job prevents work-life balance	(8) Job does not prevent work-life balance	(9) Partner/family fed up with my job pressure	(10) Partner/family not fed up with my job pressure
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.161	-0.282**	-0.238*	-0.407***	-0.160*	-0.490**	-0.400***	0.0607	-0.450***	-0.0692
	(0.176)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.0963)	(0.208)	(0.125)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.134)
male	-0.131***	-0.0230	-0.0489	-0.151*	-0.0545	-0.0933***	-0.0164	-0.0873**	-0.105**	-0.0133
	(0.0418)	(0.0454)	(0.0369)	(0.0800)	(0.0470)	(0.0320)	(0.0394)	(0.0369)	(0.0412)	(0.0489)
Age	0.0465	-0.0505***	-0.0597***	-0.0270**	-0.0460***	-0.0502***	-0.0481***	-0.0396***	-0.0595***	-0.0301**
	(0.0384)	(0.0130)	(0.00627)	(0.0119)	(0.00644)	(0.00918)	(0.0165)	(0.00660)	(0.00623)	(0.0132)
$[Age]^2$	-0.000252	0.000465***	0.000590***	0.000252**	0.000429***	0.000452***	0.000435**	0.000344***	0.000574***	0.000262*
	(0.000278)	(0.000157)	(5.16e-05)	(0.000105)	(6.17e-05)	(8.72e-05)	(0.000177)	(5.73e-05)	(5.77e-05)	(0.000152)
Education Years	0.0203***	0.0220***	0.0160***	0.0246**	0.0201***	0.0262***	0.0217**	0.0221***	0.0200***	0.0227***
	(0.00646)	(0.00734)	(0.00601)	(0.0117)	(0.00632)	(0.00734)	(0.00845)	(0.00561)	(0.00632)	(0.00721)
Income class 2	0.252***	0.243**	0.247**	0.230**	0.275***	0.294***	0.189	0.284***	0.262***	0.286*
	(0.0787)	(0.113)	(0.0957)	(0.0970)	(0.0812)	(0.0725)	(0.171)	(0.0710)	(0.0780)	(0.172)
Income class 3	0.387***	0.487***	0.423***	0.314***	0.463***	0.425***	0.202	0.473***	0.448***	0.201
	(0.0956)	(0.116)	(0.101)	(0.111)	(0.0836)	(0.0927)	(0.192)	(0.0747)	(0.0809)	(0.147)
Income class 4	0.539***	0.586***	0.543***	0.392***	0.631***	0.514***	0.231	0.643***	0.553***	0.463***
	(0.0793)	(0.128)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.0891)	(0.0944)	(0.175)	(0.0730)	(0.0840)	(0.140)
Income class 5	0.652***	0.794***	0.727***	0.436***	0.828***	0.650***	0.428**	0.815***	0.715***	0.567***
	(0.0852)	(0.117)	(0.104)	(0.125)	(0.0873)	(0.101)	(0.182)	(0.0713)	(0.0804)	(0.146)
Income class 6	0.773***	0.835***	0.801***	0.633***	0.912***	0.750***	0.527***	0.919***	0.850***	0.557***
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.176)	(0.109)	(0.122)	(0.120)
Income class 7	0.889***	0.947***	0.885***	1.004***	0.986***	0.878***	0.638***	1.031***	0.951***	0.610***
	(0.123)	(0.0971)	(0.106)	(0.189)	(0.105)	(0.0991)	(0.176)	(0.0741)	(0.0903)	(0.126)

Income class 8	0.965***	1.063***	1.017***	0.854***	1.058***	1.047***	0.659***	1.227***	0.970***	0.844***
	(0.145)	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.233)	(0.0992)	(0.138)	(0.187)	(0.117)	(0.112)	(0.131)
Income class 9	1.171***	1.152***	1.146***	0.798***	1.185***	1.141***	0.885***	1.258***	1.138***	0.884***
	(0.121)	(0.106)	(0.120)	(0.198)	(0.111)	(0.138)	(0.188)	(0.102)	(0.124)	(0.133)
Income class 10	1.255***	1.424***	1.385***	0.908***	1.367***	1.459***	1.186***	1.442***	1.371***	1.09**7***
	(0.181)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.222)	(0.120)	(0.153)	(0.172)	(0.119)	(0.146)	(0.141)
N. of household members	-0.0397	0.0128	-0.00798	0.0189	0.00187	-0.0231	0.0142	-0.0179	-0.0163	0.0187
	(0.0263)	(0.0111)	(0.0125)	(0.0187)	(0.0119)	(0.0217)	(0.0219)	(0.0216)	(0.0190)	(0.0226)
Civil Union	-0.638***	0.236*	0.0812	-0.126	-0.00204	0.166	0.218**	-0.0505	-0.148	0.232**
	(0.238)	(0.130)	(0.0923)	(0.302)	(0.0835)	(0.173)	(0.0898)	(0.180)	(0.118)	(0.115)
Separated	-0.201**	-0.588***	-0.401***	-0.313	-0.316***	-0.490***	-0.511***	-0.350***	-0.345***	-0.477***
	(0.0930)	(0.117)	(0.0612)	(0.220)	(0.0888)	(0.0901)	(0.166)	(0.0765)	(0.0839)	(0.163)
Divorced	-0.168***	-0.362***	-0.212***	-0.421***	-0.254***	-0.163***	-0.334***	-0.164***	-0.180***	-0.337***
	(0.0521)	(0.0594)	(0.0560)	(0.119)	(0.0557)	(0.0528)	(0.0970)	(0.0568)	(0.0495)	(0.113)
Widowed	-0.305***	-0.769***	-0.374***	-0.289***	-0.392***	-0.355***	-0.827***	-0.311***	-0.377***	-0.322*
	(0.0555)	(0.164)	(0.0774)	(0.0605)	(0.0797)	(0.0936)	(0.205)	(0.0513)	(0.0603)	(0.181)
Never married	-0.348***	-0.343***	-0.326***	-0.315**	-0.363***	-0.262***	-0.303***	-0.364***	-0.278***	-0.419***
	(0.0633)	(0.0504)	(0.0397)	(0.144)	(0.0508)	(0.0536)	(0.0697)	(0.0425)	(0.0361)	(0.0862)
covidinhouse	-0.121**	0.0363	-0.0181	-0.223***	-0.00660	-0.0645	-0.0196	-0.0262	-0.0565	0.00756
	(0.0587)	(0.0279)	(0.0245)	(0.0795)	(0.0466)	(0.0423)	(0.0481)	(0.0318)	(0.0405)	(0.0406)
Switzerland	2.829***	1.611***	1.949***	2.694***	2.249***	2.145***	2.021***	2.215***	2.141***	2.005***
	(0.123)	(0.0626)	(0.0665)	(0.147)	(0.0910)	(0.0656)	(0.0753)	(0.0827)	(0.0764)	(0.0863)
Czech Republic	1.067***	0.548***	0.643***	1.180***	0.927***	0.716***	0.685***	0.862***	0.925***	0.556***
	(0.0390)	(0.0261)	(0.0238)	(0.0593)	(0.0335)	(0.0360)	(0.0418)	(0.0335)	(0.0331)	(0.0322)
Estonia	1.326***	0.940***	0.970***	1.522***	1.383***	0.891***	1.184***	1.107***	1.149***	1.010***
	(0.0626)	(0.0449)	(0.0370)	(0.101)	(0.0676)	(0.0292)	(0.0528)	(0.0462)	(0.0477)	(0.0469)
Finland	2.274***	1.372***	1.616***	2.569***	1.994***	1.639***	1.794***	1.818***	1.867***	1.630***
	(0.114)	(0.0685)	(0.0636)	(0.160)	(0.0881)	(0.0578)	(0.0881)	(0.0732)	(0.0752)	(0.0826)
France	1.044***	0.474***	0.593***	0.837***	1.012***	0.323***	0.554***	0.811***	0.759***	0.610***
	(0.0735)	(0.0439)	(0.0362)	(0.0791)	(0.0539)	(0.0282)	(0.0510)	(0.0425)	(0.0461)	(0.0442)
Greece	0.414***	0.128***	0.209***	0.513***	0.303***	0.347***	0.371***	0.221***	0.403***	-0.0479**
	(0.0361)	(0.0201)	(0.0165)	(0.0408)	(0.0220)	(0.0316)	(0.0205)	(0.0220)	(0.0229)	(0.0230)
Croatia	1.294***	1.010***	1.093***	1.270***	1.335***	0.998***	1.270***	1.117***	1.177***	1.308***
	(0.0450)	(0.0440)	(0.0392)	(0.0668)	(0.0545)	(0.0289)	(0.0517)	(0.0402)	(0.0411)	(0.0670)

Hungary	0.704***	0.402***	0.448***	0.788***	0.711***	0.415***	0.315***	0.647***	0.522***	0.491***
	(0.0321)	(0.0184)	(0.0153)	(0.0327)	(0.0232)	(0.0184)	(0.0199)	(0.0235)	(0.0168)	(0.0291)
Iceland	2.267***	1.432***	1.679***	1.876***	2.018***	1.605***	1.771***	1.839***	1.787***	1.738***
	(0.0960)	(0.0659)	(0.0588)	(0.0937)	(0.0887)	(0.0508)	(0.0752)	(0.0689)	(0.0606)	(0.0840)
Italy	1.105***	0.739***	0.788***	1.200***	1.046***		1.014***	0.862***	0.894***	0.832***
	(0.0514)	(0.0280)	(0.0222)	(0.0789)	(0.0388)		(0.0324)	(0.0325)	(0.0281)	(0.0356)
Lituania	0.867***	0.448***	0.491***	1.023***	0.882***	0.465***	0.608***	0.681***	0.652***	0.683***
	(0.0321)	(0.0296)	(0.0217)	(0.0518)	(0.0355)	(0.0205)	(0.0421)	(0.0235)	(0.0229)	(0.0398)
Montenegro	1.054***	0.674***	0.735***	0.984***	1.122***	0.685***	0.913***	0.834***	0.891***	0.916***
	(0.0360)	(0.0243)	(0.0226)	(0.0503)	(0.0441)	(0.0223)	(0.0299)	(0.0330)	(0.0270)	(0.0551)
North Macedonia	0.608***	0.196***	0.330***	0.580***	0.554***	0.300***	0.356***	0.412***	0.479***	0.221***
	(0.0218)	(0.0229)	(0.0194)	(0.0293)	(0.0212)	(0.0145)	(0.0249)	(0.0195)	(0.0161)	(0.0381)
Netherland	1.921***	1.109***	1.315***	2.038***	1.689***	1.145***	1.403***	1.480***	1.523***	1.274***
	(0.0996)	(0.0616)	(0.0586)	(0.133)	(0.0844)	(0.0465)	(0.0828)	(0.0706)	(0.0636)	(0.0766)
Norway	2.208***	1.073***	1.388***	2.345***	1.719***	1.358***	1.477***	1.569***	1.609***	1.307***
	(0.103)	(0.0546)	(0.0557)	(0.166)	(0.0817)	(0.0525)	(0.0700)	(0.0702)	(0.0666)	(0.0635)
Portugal	0.813***	0.648***	0.649***	0.950***	0.886***	0.590***	0.780***	0.712***	0.692***	0.661***
	(0.0451)	(0.0217)	(0.0181)	(0.0855)	(0.0329)	(0.0229)	(0.0204)	(0.0297)	(0.0309)	(0.0334)
Slovenia	1.561***	1.322***	1.313***	1.660***	1.594***	1.437***	1.347***	1.499***	1.507***	1.264***
	(0.0580)	(0.0537)	(0.0435)	(0.0828)	(0.0668)	(0.0410)	(0.0509)	(0.0567)	(0.0496)	(0.0652)
Slovakia	0.393***	-0.0488***	0.0863***	0.342***	0.209***	0.151***	-0.0727***	0.273***	0.262***	-0.0311
	(0.0231)	(0.0188)	(0.0108)	(0.0202)	(0.0185)	(0.0112)	(0.0240)	(0.0129)	(0.0137)	(0.0194)
/cut1	-0.803	-4.356***	-4.652***	-3.050***	-3.963***	-4.172***	-4.715***	-3.827***	-4.177***	-4.475***
	(1.256)	(0.310)	(0.240)	(0.370)	(0.215)	(0.270)	(0.471)	(0.224)	(0.204)	(0.390)
/cut2	-0.320	-3.895***	-4.148***	-2.628***	-3.441***	-3.757***	-4.198***	-3.364***	-3.708***	-3.971***
	(1.271)	(0.283)	(0.227)	(0.356)	(0.217)	(0.256)	(0.482)	(0.220)	(0.194)	(0.423)
/cut3	0.403	-3.220***	-3.458***	-1.895***	-2.755***	-3.037***	-3.410***	-2.683***	-2.992***	-3.342***
	(1.274)	(0.277)	(0.212)	(0.365)	(0.212)	(0.277)	(0.430)	(0.231)	(0.203)	(0.404)
/cut4	1.055	-2.494***	-2.749***	-1.244***	-2.096***	-2.322***	-2.670***	-2.014***	-2.315***	-2.601***
	(1.276)	(0.254)	(0.202)	(0.354)	(0.194)	(0.276)	(0.454)	(0.219)	(0.199)	(0.387)
/cut5	1.523	-1.943***	-2.210***	-0.799**	-1.545***	-1.869***	-2.094***	-1.528***	-1.838***	-1.945***
	(1.271)	(0.244)	(0.190)	(0.342)	(0.174)	(0.277)	(0.446)	(0.206)	(0.188)	(0.365)
/cut6	2.471**	-1.112***	-1.321***	0.108	-0.677***	-0.959***	-1.144**	-0.664***	-0.942***	-1.070***
	(1.257)	(0.225)	(0.189)	(0.334)	(0.157)	(0.285)	(0.479)	(0.193)	(0.184)	(0.371)

/cut7	3.031**	-0.529**	-0.749***	0.685**	-0.0845	-0.421	-0.524	-0.115	-0.377**	-0.469
	(1.264)	(0.218)	(0.182)	(0.336)	(0.160)	(0.273)	(0.481)	(0.188)	(0.180)	(0.378)
/cut8	3.877***	0.413*	0.173	1.463***	0.868***	0.389	0.470	0.738***	0.495***	0.511
	(1.285)	(0.232)	(0.190)	(0.337)	(0.173)	(0.272)	(0.487)	(0.199)	(0.189)	(0.367)
/cut9	5.071***	1.653***	1.408***	2.507***	2.142***	1.503***	1.797***	1.904***	1.666***	1.828***
	(1.312)	(0.263)	(0.220)	(0.335)	(0.202)	(0.286)	(0.493)	(0.233)	(0.216)	(0.371)
/cut10	6.102***	2.813***	2.555***	3.211***	3.316***	2.477***	3.054***	2.945***	2.707***	3.037***
	(1.355)	(0.348)	(0.300)	(0.341)	(0.291)	(0.325)	(0.529)	(0.293)	(0.292)	(0.398)
Observations	11,221	14,342	21,601	3,962	15,987	9,576	8,157	17,406	17,753	7,810
Adj. R^2	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394	0.0394
ll	-22314	-27620	-41482	-8457	-30651	-19358	-15379	-34577	-35625	-14296

The estimated specification is described in section 3. Column (5) Respondent answering that online/mobile communication makes work and personal life interrupt each other. Column (7) Respondents answering that job prevents (sometimes, often or always) you from giving time to partner/family. Column (9) Respondents answering that partner/family is (sometimes, often always) fed up with pressure of one's own job. The main regressor of interest is a dummy taking value one if the respondents declare to have reduced working at distance after COVID-19. Omitted benchmarks: income class 1, legally married, living in Belgium. Very good self- assessed health status. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 8 The impact of employers accepting less work at distance after COVID-19 on respondent life satisfaction - IV estimates

	(1)	(5)	(9)	(13)	(17)	(21)
VARIABLES						
SECOND STAGE						
male	-0.0589**	-0.0495**	-0.0492*	-0.0676***	-0.0606**	-0.0603**
	(0.0235)	(0.0251)	(0.0253)	(0.0228)	(0.0244)	(0.0246)
Income class 2	-0.0454	0.0722	0.0753	-0.0370	0.0810	0.0835
	(0.0622)	(0.0585)	(0.0584)	(0.0603)	(0.0580)	(0.0580)
Income class 3	-0.0683	0.127**	0.132**	-0.0532	0.139**	0.144**

	(0.0706)	(0.0628)	(0.0627)	(0.0671)	(0.0603)	(0.0600)
Income class 4	-0.0240	0.217***	0.226***	-0.00663	0.228***	0.235***
	(0.0777)	(0.0730)	(0.0737)	(0.0741)	(0.0727)	(0.0733)
Income class 5	0.00371	0.274***	0.284***	0.00997	0.275***	0.283***
	(0.0723)	(0.0640)	(0.0635)	(0.0697)	(0.0656)	(0.0654)
Income class 6	-0.00369	0.309***	0.318***	-0.0100	0.295***	0.302***
	(0.0831)	(0.0871)	(0.0868)	(0.0799)	(0.0883)	(0.0883)
Income class 7	0.0131	0.361***	0.373***	0.0251	0.366***	0.377***
	(0.0697)	(0.0662)	(0.0660)	(0.0652)	(0.0675)	(0.0672)
Income class 8	-0.0370	0.347***	0.356***	-0.0208	0.355***	0.363***
	(0.0672)	(0.0770)	(0.0779)	(0.0658)	(0.0827)	(0.0842)
Income class 9	0.0204	0.440***	0.452***	0.0373	0.448***	0.456***
	(0.0873)	(0.0971)	(0.0977)	(0.0886)	(0.104)	(0.106)
Income class 10	0.0692	0.529***	0.546***	0.0831	0.532***	0.546***
	(0.0788)	(0.0886)	(0.0887)	(0.0835)	(0.0974)	(0.0981)
N. of household members	0.0236**	-0.00285	-0.00372	0.0272**	0.00181	0.00100
	(0.00927)	(0.0102)	(0.0102)	(0.0111)	(0.0124)	(0.0124)
Age	-0.0170***	-0.0233***	-0.0200***	-0.0170***	-0.0233***	-0.0198***
	(0.00448)	(0.00409)	(0.00435)	(0.00484)	(0.00435)	(0.00472)
$[Age]^2$	0.000206***	0.000273***	0.000249***	0.000202***	0.000268***	0.000244***
	(3.61e-05)	(3.27e-05)	(3.52e-05)	(3.81e-05)	(3.33e-05)	(3.65e-05)
Civil Union	0.0975	0.0877	0.0808	0.146	0.124	0.117
	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.105)	(0.129)	(0.129)	(0.127)
Separated	-0.196***	-0.255***	-0.268***	-0.223***	-0.281***	-0.296***
	(0.0579)	(0.0548)	(0.0506)	(0.0676)	(0.0642)	(0.0583)
Divorced	-0.145***	-0.170***	-0.182***	-0.144***	-0.166***	-0.180***
	(0.0262)	(0.0297)	(0.0297)	(0.0279)	(0.0305)	(0.0299)
Widowed	-0.205***	-0.214***	-0.219***	-0.192***	-0.200***	-0.207***
	(0.0457)	(0.0514)	(0.0522)	(0.0493)	(0.0545)	(0.0552)
Never married	-0.174***	-0.182***	-0.187***	-0.174***	-0.182***	-0.188***
	(0.0251)	(0.0238)	(0.0227)	(0.0241)	(0.0223)	(0.0210)
Education years	0.000121	0.00620*	0.00808**	-0.000225	0.00582	0.00782**
	(0.00245)	(0.00327)	(0.00332)	(0.00294)	(0.00371)	(0.00365)
Health: good	-0.378***	-0.396***	-0.396***	-0.375***	-0.392***	-0.392***
	(0.0256)	(0.0242)	(0.0249)	(0.0267)	(0.0249)	(0.0258)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Health: fair	-0.659***	-0.702***	-0.706***	-0.645***	-0.688***	-0.690***
	(0.0688)	(0.0676)	(0.0673)	(0.0728)	(0.0718)	(0.0719)
Health: bad	-1.075***	-1.179***	-1.189***	-1.057***	-1.159***	-1.169***
	(0.101)	(0.0988)	(0.0994)	(0.104)	(0.102)	(0.103)
Health: very bad	-1.426***	-1.560***	-1.582***	-1.471***	-1.605***	-1.629***
	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.126)	(0.127)	(0.129)
Left-right scale	0.0566***	0.0576***	0.0581***	0.0588***	0.0599***	0.0605***
	(0.00638)	(0.00656)	(0.00667)	(0.00645)	(0.00659)	(0.00668)
Social Capital	0.128***	0.144***		0.132***	0.146***	
	(0.0367)	(0.0386)		(0.0374)	(0.0396)	
Income satisfaction	-0.311***			-0.303***		
	(0.0324)			(0.0337)		
Switzerland	0.928***	1.201***	1.180***	0.927***	1.194***	1.174***
	(0.0620)	(0.0422)	(0.0426)	(0.0642)	(0.0417)	(0.0420)
Czech Republic	0.380***	0.487***	0.478***	0.405***	0.508***	0.497***
	(0.0261)	(0.0174)	(0.0165)	(0.0281)	(0.0191)	(0.0180)
Finland	0.920***	1.087***	1.093***	0.922***	1.088***	1.094***
	(0.0552)	(0.0443)	(0.0444)	(0.0566)	(0.0433)	(0.0434)
France	0.333***	0.541***	0.515***	0.322***	0.527***	0.500***
	(0.0529)	(0.0362)	(0.0333)	(0.0539)	(0.0364)	(0.0332)
Greece	-0.0211	-0.0430**	-0.0253	-0.00183	-0.0236	-0.00455
	(0.0180)	(0.0177)	(0.0174)	(0.0189)	(0.0186)	(0.0184)
Croatia	0.530***	0.772***	0.771***	0.518***	0.762***	0.761***
	(0.0426)	(0.0246)	(0.0248)	(0.0440)	(0.0243)	(0.0246)
Hungary	0.210***	0.316***	0.319***	0.212***	0.321***	0.323***
	(0.0174)	(0.00900)	(0.00912)	(0.0188)	(0.00975)	(0.00990)
Italy	0.218***	0.447***	0.453***	0.217***	0.445***	0.451***
	(0.0337)	(0.0131)	(0.0135)	(0.0354)	(0.0136)	(0.0140)
North Macedonia	0.0574***	0.174***	0.187***	0.0528***	0.164***	0.179***
	(0.0103)	(0.0103)	(0.00864)	(0.0105)	(0.0115)	(0.00964)
Netherland	0.621***	0.901***	0.916***	0.626***	0.903***	0.918***
	(0.0626)	(0.0409)	(0.0411)	(0.0652)	(0.0409)	(0.0412)
Norway	0.729***	1.048***	1.058***	0.788***	1.105***	1.114***
	(0.0602)	(0.0378)	(0.0374)	(0.0628)	(0.0373)	(0.0368)
Portugal	0.440***	0.559***	0.563***	0.456***	0.571***	0.575***

	(0.0261)	(0.0185)	(0.0186)	(0.0267)	(0.0200)	(0.0198)
Slovenia	0.617***	0.911***	0.907***	0.596***	0.880***	0.876***
	(0.0510)	(0.0277)	(0.0277)	(0.0523)	(0.0272)	(0.0271)
Slovakia	0.0465**	0.173***	0.178***	0.0447**	0.167***	0.173***
	(0.0201)	(0.0100)	(0.0106)	(0.0211)	(0.0108)	(0.0115)
Employers reducing distance work opportunities after COVID-19	-0.246**	-0.246**	-0.257**	-0.267**	-0.267**	-0.280**
	(0.0997)	(0.105)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.110)
FIRST STAGE						
1/(part-time share border)	-0.257	-0.257	-0.257	-0.237	-0.237	-0.237
	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.444)	(0.445)	(0.444)	(0.444)
1/(part-time share border)/total population	-5.442**	-5.438**	-5.441**	-4.650*	-4.649*	-4.652*
	(2.342)	(2.338)	(2.339)	(2.488)	(2.487)	(2.489)
Constant	-1.945***	-1.946***	-1.946***	-1.955***	-1.956***	-1.956***
	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.119)	(0.119)	(0.119)
Observations	16,282	16,301	16,301	14,204	14,221	14,221

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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