Pictures at an Exhibition: Conflicting Pressures in Museums and the Display of Art

Victoria D. Alexander

Pictures at an Exhibition: Conflicting Pressures in Museums and the Display of Art[1]

Victoria D. Alexander
Harvard University

Organizations face pressures from their environments. When external pressures conflict with each other or with internal desires, organizational personnel face dilemmas. This article examines conflicting pressures in a setting where they are particularly salient: art museums. Various stakeholders, notably external funders and museum curators, press for specific organizational outputs—that is, particular types of exhibitions. This research examines the format and content of exhibitions from large American museums to gauge the effect of funding. The research demonstrates that funders' importance increased between 1960 and 1986. Funder tastes are translated into exhibitions; however, museum managers use several strategies to retain their autonomy and legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION

How environmental pressures impinge on organizations is an important topic in organizations research, one addressed by both resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer and Scott 1992). The main themes of this literature center around environmental influence, while the problem of organizational response is somewhat more peripheral. If environments do influence organizations, then environmental effects should be apparent in organizational outcomes; however, outcomes are also shaped by internal management.

This article examines environmental pressures in a type of organization

where the process is very vivid, in art museums. Art museums face an uncertain budget every year and must work constantly to raise funds. Museums rely on large, external donors. Further, museum exhibitions are sponsored directly by various funders, notably individual philanthropists, foundations, corporations, and government agencies. Thus, there is a very clear connection between external force (funder) and organizational output (exhibition). Both resource dependency and institutional theories predict that these external funders will have a say in what museums exhibit. Museum curators who set up exhibitions also have a direct effect on these museum outputs, thereby channeling, deflecting, or mediating the external effect. In this article, I address two main questions: (1) What is the size and direction of external funders' influence on exhibitions? (2) How do curators manage the conflict between responsiveness to funders' wishes and their own normative views about what is desirable and proper in museum exhibitions?

More specifically, I want to know how different types of funders sponsor various formats and contents of exhibitions and whether funding patterns change what goes on view in museums. In general, I expect that funders' choices of the exhibitions they sponsor will correspond to their funding goals, which I infer from the research literature on the cultural sponsorship of each funder type. I also expect that curators will try to maintain the ability to mount the prestigious, scholarly exhibitions they prefer.

To examine these questions, I created a data set of 4,026 exhibitions from large American art museums from 1960 to 1986. There are four independent variables that indicate whether an exhibition was supported by an individual, a corporation, a government agency, or a foundation. Exhibitions can be sponsored by more than one funder type. Exhibitions not supported by any of these funder types are termed "internally funded" and serve as the reference category. Dependent variables include measures of the format and content of exhibitions, indicating whether exhibitions are popular, accessible, and/or scholarly and what styles of art they contain. I first examine the association of funder and exhibition types at the level of individual exhibitions and then examine changes in the exhibition pool as a whole before and after a shift in the types of funding available to museums. The data in the analysis speak directly to the environment-output link and sidestep the curator's role. Thus, they are strong indicators of the impact of environmental pressures on organizational outputs. I will infer the curator's role from output results, from anecdotal evidence in interviews I have conducted, and from qualitative information in museums' annual reports.

I hope to refine our theoretical and empirical understanding of conflicting pressures on organizations, as well as demonstrate the usefulness of

organizational theory to researchers interested in the sociology of culture. Most important, I argue that managers are actors, not just reactors, and they strive to maintain their autonomy, their normative visions, and the legitimacy of their organizations as they handle external demands. In museums, they use a variety of strategies, such as buffering, resource shifting, multivocality, innovation, and creative enactment (described below), to manage conflicting pressures. Thus, I argue that a strategic institutional theory, which combines the strengths of both resource dependency and new institutional theories, gives us a powerful tool for understanding organizations.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON MUSEUMS

Central to my argument is the idea that all philanthropists have goals or objectives that focus their giving. If government agencies, corporations, foundations, and elite individuals do not have the same goals, perhaps different sources of giving will encourage different types of art. In other words, the goals of external parties may structure the type of art exhibited. This argument is easily recast from an organizational perspective as resource dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).[2] Museums mount exhibitions, all of which cost money. Museums are highly dependent on concentrated sources of funds for exhibitions. In order to maintain such funding, resource dependency predicts, museums conform to the demands of those who supply resources—for example, they mount shows that conform to funder preferences.

Both resource dependency and institutional theories also predict that managers will react to external pressures in an attempt to maintain autonomy and control (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Oliver 1991). Further, institutional theorists argue that organizations make decisions based on legitimacy as well as tangible resource flows (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer and Scott 1992). Museums are highly symbolic organizations and their resources depend on their reputations (Balfe 1987); consequently, institutional theory and resource dependency theory come together to clarify environmental influences on art museums and museums' responses.

I explore the question of how the funding environment affects the presentation of art in two ways. First, I explore how funders are linked to the format of art exhibitions, the specific methods by which art is packaged in exhibitions. Retrospectives and surveys are traditional formats of art exhibitions; blockbusters, traveling exhibitions, and theme

[2] Institutional theory also recognizes the impact of external resource pressures through its understanding of coercive means of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

shows are examples of nontraditional formats. Second, I examine funders' association with the artistic content of shows, the artistic styles of artworks in an exhibition. "Fine art" from the western canon of high art comprises traditional-content subjects; noncanonical works, such as works from the commercial or decorative arts, are more accessible and nontraditional exhibition subjects.

It is important to note that whatever influence funders have on museum exhibitions is more probabilistic than causal (see Lieberson 1985). Funders do not force a museum to mount any particular type of exhibition. Rather, a museum has a portfolio of exhibition types that it is willing to mount. Similarly, funders have an implicit portfolio of shows they are willing to fund. When a museum accepts external funding, the result is an increase in the number of exhibitions where the portfolios overlap. Funding increases the odds of certain ranges of exhibitions. As Becker (1982, p. 92) states, "Available resources make some things possible, some things easy, and others harder; every pattern of availability reflects the workings of some kind of social organization and becomes part of the pattern of constraints and possibilities that shapes the art produced." This image of exhibitions multiplying in the overlap of portfolios is a funding effects hypothesis. It suggests that funder preferences translate directly into exhibitions. The mechanism of the funding effect works at the level of the exhibition pool (funders disproportionally support particular types of exhibitions, increasing the prevalence of those types), rather than at the exhibition level (funders do not force museums to change individual exhibitions).

CONFLICTING PRESSURES

All philanthropists have goals or objectives that focus their giving (Dauber 1993). I argue that different goals favor different artworks. Here, I review literature on four types of funders to make predictions about types of exhibitions each funder might prefer. I focus on differences among preferences for (1) popular exhibitions, that is, exhibitions attracting broad audiences, (2) accessible exhibitions, that is, shows that are easy to understand without extensive training in art history, and (3) the traditional scholarly exhibitions, that is, those resting on solid art-historical merit and research. The first variable, popular exhibitions, refers to the format of exhibitions. The second two, accessible and scholarly exhibitions, encompass both the format and the artistic content of exhibitions. Alhough many researchers and practitioners have speculated about these funders and their effects on cultural organizations, no research has systematically examined the impact of funders on museum

exhibitions.[3] Let me be clear that to characterize funders, I am necessarily oversimplifying (see Alexander [1996c] for a more detailed and thorough discussion of funder preferences).

Wealthy Individuals

Individual art patrons are connoisseurs. They often love the art they sponsor and have a good deal of knowledge about it (Balfe 1993a; Robinson 1987). Further, traditional patrons are uninterested in attracting broad audiences to museums, and such wealthy philanthropists prefer smaller, narrower exhibitions, both for the safety of the objects they may have personally lent to the museum, and because they are interested in gaining status as connoisseurs of rare or esoteric works (Odendahl 1990; see also Weber 1946; Bourdieu 1984). In terms of the main exhibition variables, I expect that individuals will tend to fund scholarly exhibitions, given their knowledge of art. But as their target audience is a small, elite group (Balfe 1993b), individual funders are not likely to fund either popular exhibitions or accessible exhibitions.

Elite philanthropists are not entirely selfless as benefactors of the arts. As Odendahl (1990) argues, elite individuals tend to favor philanthropy that is beneficial especially to the upper classes. Further, the monetary value of tax incentives and the market value of art play an important role in the philanthropic decisions of wealthy collectors (Odendahl 1987b; Moulin 1987), or they are motivated by other personal goals (Dauber 1993). Along these lines, then, another goal of elite collectors is having their collections exhibited in museums so museums can conserve, appraise, store, market, or otherwise help them with the care of their art objects.

Corporations

Corporate leaders often believe that cultural philanthropy is a good way to improve corporate reputations (Galaskiewicz 1985; Useem 1985). Studies of corporate philanthropy agree that "corporate self-interest" is of leading importance when corporations decide to fund art (Useem 1987; Useem and Kutner 1986). Corporations are more interested in public relations and publicity value than they are in the art per se and tend to

---

[3] Interested readers should consult Balfe (1993c), Benedict (1991), DiMaggio (1986d), Feld, O'Hare, and Schuster (1983), Feldstein (1991), Galaskiewicz (1985), Lowry (1984), Martorella (1990, 1996), Netzer (1978), Odendahl (1990), and Porter (1981), for a start. The funding of museums also gets lively attention in such trade journals as *ArtNews, Art Forum,* and *Museum News.*

fund museums whose programs attract a large, appreciative, middle-class audience (Porter 1981).[4] In a study of corporate art collections, Martorella (1990) demonstrates that corporations are conservative and that they tend to collect more easily understood pieces of contemporary art. Thus, I expect that corporations will tend to fund popular exhibitions (because they wish to reach a larger audience) and accessible exhibitions (because they are conservative, popularly oriented collectors), but will tend not to fund scholarly exhibitions.

Government

To characterize the goals of government agencies, I will discuss the two major players in the government arena: the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and state arts councils. The NEA is guided by the principles (in its charter) of making art available to more people and helping museums better serve the citizens of the United States. The arts panels that distribute the NEA monies are made up of arts professionals, who may have more art-historical concerns. Thus, there is a tension in the NEA between sponsoring broad, popular exhibitions and narrow, scholarly exhibitions (Galligan 1993). The NEA must balance these demands. And as DiMaggio (1991b) argues, state arts councils are not that different from the NEA. Both types of government agency have to meet similar political imperatives. An essential goal of both is self-perpetuation. To achieve this, they need to maintain their prestige and to garner supporters. Support must come from two quarters: from art worlds and from the political arena. Art supporters, whose future grants are at stake, may be more active than populist supporters; on the other hand, if arts funding looks like a boondoggle for elites, government agencies are liable to come under political attack. Consequently, a judicious mix of scholarly and popular exhibitions is called for, in order for the government to retain both art and political supporters (see DiMaggio 1991b, pp. 229–30). Thus, I expect that government agencies will tend to fund popular exhibitions, scholarly exhibitions, and accessible exhibitions.

Further, government agencies are the only funders among the four types profiled that are explicitly interested in expanding audiences beyond the traditional middle and upper classes that currently consume much art (DiMaggio and Useem 1978). Education and outreach are a part of

---

[4] The popularity of exhibitions is extremely important to corporations. However, it is important to keep in mind that, contrary to what some critics have argued, corporations do not want to fund mindless pabulum. Rather, the art itself must retain some legitimacy if the "halo effect"—the association of sacred art with the profane corporate name—is to work its magic (Balfe 1987).

most grants given by the NEA and state arts agencies. In this respect, government is likely to sponsor art of interest to lower classes or marginalized groups, that is, nontraditional audiences. In addition, the NEA has special programs for exhibitions of work by living artists. I expect, then, that government will strongly support shows of contemporary art.

Foundations

Foundations are the forgotten funders in studies of arts support (DiMaggio 1986c, p. 113). DiMaggio (1986c) reports that foundations tend to be conservative in their funding patterns. Foundations tend to support well-established organizations that are in the foundations' own communities. Large, visible foundations are important exceptions to this pattern, but as DiMaggio demonstrates, the few large, active, and innovative foundations are not representative of most foundations (although the exceptional, large, visible foundations may be particularly important supporters of the large, visible museums I study). DiMaggio's work suggests that foundations do not place much emphasis on audiences. This would lead to the hypothesis that foundations tend not to fund popular or accessible exhibitions. Odendahl (1987a) points out that founding families retain control over most foundations, including many large ones. Consequently, foundations may have giving preferences similar to those of elite individuals. There is little information about the preferences of foundations for art scholarship, however, so I would only tentatively suggest that foundations tend to fund scholarly exhibitions.

Curators

Museum curators are professional art historians whose prestige rests on the scholarliness and quality of their work, including the exhibitions they mount.[5] Museum curators professionalized in the 1920s and were well-established by the 1930s (DiMaggio 1991c; Meyer 1979). Museum curators were instrumental in institutionalizing a vision of museums that focused on conservation and scholarship, as opposed to such matters as education, public outreach, and exhibitions (DiMaggio 1991c; Zolberg 1974, 1981). What these art historians believe about museum integrity

[5] Curators do not represent the entirety of museums and the decision making that goes on within them. Directors, trustees, and educational personnel are among the other important actors. Various factions of museums are often in conflict (DiMaggio 1991a; Allen 1974). I have chosen to focus on museum curators, because (1) they are directly responsible for planning and mounting exhibitions and (2) they represent traditional museum goals.

comes from their background and professional training. I will call the influence of these beliefs "normative forces," following DiMaggio and Powell (1983).

Curators hold advanced degrees in art history, usually Ph.D.'s (Allen 1974, pp. 137–39; Zolberg 1986), and are "object oriented" and uninterested in public education (Zolberg 1986, p. 192). In this regard, I expect that curators will like to mount exhibitions that are scholarly and will be uninterested in popular or accessible exhibitions.

Increasing Conflict

The philanthropy of elite individuals has been associated with American art museums since the end of the 19th century, when museums became institutionalized (DiMaggio 1982a, 1982b). In contrast, corporations did not begin to provide significant funds for the arts until the sixties (Porter 1981; Gingrich 1969). The NEA was established in 1965, and state arts councils followed shortly thereafter, as federal block grants encouraged their formation. All states had arts councils by 1967 (DiMaggio 1991b, p. 218). Since the mid-1960s, then, federal and state government agencies and corporations, along with foundations, have increasingly funded museums (DiMaggio 1986a). These new funders are called "institutional funders," to distinguish them from individual philanthropists (DiMaggio 1986a; Crane 1987, pp. 5–9).[6]

Curators have had plenty of time to become used to the influence of individual patrons, whose interests overlap with their own (Zolberg 1986). Indeed, individual funding of museums was institutionalized before the curatorial profession solidified. But the goals of the institutional funders are not the same as those of traditional museum sponsors. Moreover, the goals of corporate and government funders conflict with normatively defined goals of museum curators. Since the preferences and biases of the institutional funders conflict with the visions already institutionalized in museums, new funding creates problems for museum personnel. Table 1 summarizes the orientation of the funders and curators, as presented in the literature.

MUSEUM RESPONSES

In all organizations, managers seek autonomy from demands from the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Meyer and Rowan

---

[6] Institutional funders are those donors who are based in formal organizations, including government organizations and nonprofit organizations such as foundations. This terminology is a standard way of indicating such organizationally based funders; however, it has the disadvantage of implying "institution" as that term is used in institutional theory, meaning a cultural rule or schema, along with its intended sense of a collective actor or formal organization.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF THE ORIENTATION OF STAKEHOLDERS IN MUSEUM EXHIBITIONS

| | INTEREST | | | |
STAKEHOLDER	Popular Exhibitions	Accessible Exhibitions	Scholarly Exhibitions	Other Concerns
Individual philanthropist	No	No	Yes	Own collection
Corporate funder	Yes	Yes	No	...
Government funder	Yes	Yes	Yes	Nontraditional audiences, living artists
Foundation funder	No	No	Yes(?)	...
Museum curator	No	No	Yes	...

1977; Oliver 1991). Further, because they operate in an institutional envi-
ronment, museum managers must maintain the legitimacy of their muse-
ums. Indeed, to the extent that external demands conflict with curators'
ideas of what grants them legitimacy, they may actively resist these de-
mands. Research on many nonprofit organizations suggests that legiti-
macy considerations are the key to whether managers try to deflect envi-
ronmental demands (Alexander 1996a). Museum curators operate in a
normative context where their views of art and scholarship will shape
their behavior. Along these lines, one would hypothesize that museum
curators will endeavor to maintain the organization's legitimacy as they
mount exhibitions. I test this possibility by examining the exhibition pool
to determine whether it changes.

   I have proposed a model of environmental pressures that suggests that
shifts in funding will change the overall mix of exhibitions as funders
disproportionally sponsor exhibitions they prefer. This model implies that
museums passively accept external resources by mounting more exhibi-
tions of the type that funders prefer. It suggests that as museums become
more reliant on external funders, the exhibition pool will include more
exhibitions that reflect the tastes of the funders.

   This is an environmental effects hypothesis. However, museum cura-
tors may endeavor to retain both autonomy and legitimacy through two
strategies: buffering and resource shifting. By "buffering," I mean a
process by which organizations protect their most crucial functions by
allowing changes in more peripheral areas. Museum curators may be
more interested in the actual content of exhibitions (the artistic styles of
the artworks themselves) than in the format in which those exhibitions
are mounted (the packaging of the works, as in a traveling show). Consis-
tent with Thompson's (1967) idea of buffering the technical core, we

might expect that the format of exhibitions will change more than the content of exhibitions. In other words, if museum curators use buffering as a strategy, the exhibition pool will change more in format than in content as museums become more reliant on external funders.

By "resource shifting," I mean a process by which organizations use discretionary funds to keep the internal balance of activities as closely aligned to the ideal balance as possible. Museums may have latitude in mounting exhibitions paid for internally. It is possible that they rely on external funders to sponsor exhibitions of the sort that both curators and funders prefer. Relying on funders this way will shift the mix of externally funded exhibitions. But museums may compensate by mounting more of excluded types of exhibitions and paying for them with museum funds. Thus, the mix of internally funded exhibitions may shift in the opposite direction, with the net result that there is no change in the overall mix of exhibitions. Museum curators suggest this is true: " 'Our more scholarly projects do tend to get funded internally,' admits Diana Duncan of the Smithsonian. 'If something is not a sexy project, the inside tracks are much more important. But lack of corporate sponsorship doesn't mean we don't do those things' " (Glennon 1988, p. 42). In other words, museums would like to mount certain types of exhibitions—a mix of popular, scholarly, and accessible. They endeavor to "sell" some of them to funders and mount the rest with internal funds. Over time, they may have found more exhibitions amenable to external funders but may not have changed the mix of exhibitions they actually mount. If curators can shift resources in this way, we would expect that as museums become more reliant on external funders, the exhibition pool will not change.

DATA AND METHODS

The core data set for this study contains information on more than 4,000 exhibitions mounted by 15 large museums from 1960 to 1986. The quantitative analysis is supplemented by qualitative data from museum annual reports. I built the data set as follows: I developed a "large museum universe" by taking the top 36 museums ranked by the institutions' annual expenses for museum-related items in 1978. The 1978 National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Museum Universe Study provided operating expense data.[7] To collect information on museums and

[7] I based the sample on 1978 expenditures because (1) it was approximately in the middle of the time period and (2) the Museum Universe Survey was available in 1978. Lists of museums that include budget information are scarce. I ended up with 36 museums in the universe through a rather complex procedure that involved excluding museums inappropriate to the sample (e.g., those that do not mount special exhibitions) and adding large museums that were missing from the NCES survey. The

exhibitions, I consulted annual reports of museums in the Thomas J. Watson Library at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, and then in the Ryerson and Burnham Libraries at the Art Institute of Chicago. Rather than choose a sample of museums, I attempted to gather data on every museum in the universe. Six museums fell out of the sample when information on them was not available in either of these central archives. Although I collected data on all exhibitions from the annual reports available in the archives (6,337 exhibitions from 30 museums), I limited the quantitative data set to museums for which I found annual reports for at least 10 of the 14 time points.[8] Appendix A lists museums included in the sample.

I began the analysis with 1960—five years before the advent of federal funding and about five years before the time that corporations began to sponsor the arts—and I collected data for even-numbered years from 1960 to 1986, creating 14 time points for each museum. This time frame begins before major changes in funding and covers the entire period of the move toward museums' reliance on institutional funders. The start date was set before the advent of institutional funding to provide a base-line for comparison with the changes that occur with the addition of new types of funders. The data stop before the recent controversy over arts funding that began with the 1989 Mapplethorpe exhibition (Dubin 1992).[9]

I chose to study only large museums. Large museums form a conceptu-ally distinct population, since they play a gatekeeping role in the visual arts sector that small museums do not (Crane 1987, chap. 7). I have also chosen to focus on museum exhibitions rather than other aspects of museums influenced by patronage—for example, acquisitions and pro-grams. There are several important advantages in focusing on exhibi-tions. Most of the public, and many critics and art scholars, experience art through exhibitions; consequently, exhibitions may be more important than acquisitions for defining art. Further, exhibitions are under more direct control of museum personnel than are acquisitions, allowing for a broader understanding of curatorial intention and how it might be influ-

---

museums on this list had annual expenditures of approximately $1 million or more in 1978 (see Alexander [1996c] for details).

[8] This selection procedure further biased the sample toward large museums, as major museums were more likely to send their reports to archives like the two I visited.

[9] The time frame has the advantage of not including what may prove to be a new era for museums. Controversies over the NEA and "obscene art," Reagan-era-induced cuts to federal funding of the arts, tax reform in 1986 reducing tax rates and deductions for donating art objects (both of which reduced individual contributions to museums), and a stagnant economy (which has reduced corporate giving) have made the 1990s financially difficult times for museums.

enced externally. Finally, the mix of funding for exhibitions has changed much more than that for acquisitions. Consequently, studying exhibitions provides a greater opportunity for understanding the impact of the institutional funders on art.

I focus on temporary, special exhibitions. In contrast, permanent exhibitions are the museum's ongoing backdrop; they remain in place for years or decades and serve to anchor the viewer in the museum. Temporary or special exhibitions are mounted in galleries set aside for that purpose. These exhibitions stay in the museum for as little as a few days and as much as several months before they are disassembled.

Coding

I developed a coding scheme for exhibitions that tapped various measures of exhibition format and content. I coded each exhibition mounted by sample museums by its format, the source of the artwork the museum used in the exhibition, and the art-historical style of the art in the exhibition. I was able to identify major funders, and I coded whether the exhibition was externally funded and by which types of funder (corporate, government, foundation, individual). See appendix B for a summary of the aspects of exhibitions coded.

I developed the coding scheme using techniques recommended by content analysis researchers (e.g., Holsti 1969; Namenwirth and Weber 1987). I used a set coding scheme that was designed to test hypotheses about the effect of funding on a range of exhibition characteristics. I pretested my coding scheme on a sample of exhibitions not included in the final analysis. In this pretest, I looked for potential areas of ambiguity and for categories that might have been overlooked in the initial scheme. From this pretest, I developed a set of coding rules that solidified coding categories. As I coded exhibitions, I kept a coding journal that allowed me to resolve ambiguities in the same direction each time.[10]

I coded exhibitions on three different measures of format: layout, traveling status, and type. The category I called "layout" classified exhibitions into standard formats such as a retrospectives, small group exhibitions, and surveys of stylistic development. Other layouts include the accessible exhibition format called the theme show, shows that are oriented toward children, and those that are a jumble of styles with no art-historical organization. I coded exhibitions as to their traveling status; traveling exhibitions appeared in and/or were arranged by other museums. Traveling shows reach a larger number of viewers than shows that

[10] Coding data was a full-time effort for three and one-half months.

appear in just one city. The variable I called "type" categorized the source of the artworks in the exhibition. The majority of exhibitions were coded as "loan exhibitions." These are exhibitions where pieces come from a variety of sources, such as the collections of patrons or other museums (and, perhaps, the museum's own collection). A second type of show is the "blockbuster," a loan exhibition that meets several additional criteria. Blockbuster exhibitions are large-scale, mass-appeal exhibitions, designed to attract broad audiences. Blockbusters are defined in terms of reaching a large public, and are indicated for the coding by three factors: (1) the use of advance ticketing, for instance, by independent ticket agencies, (2) high attendance figures, and (3) mentions in the annual report of long lines of people waiting to get into the exhibition.[11] Other types of exhibitions include shows drawing from a museum's own collection, a patron's collection, or an artist's collection. Exhibitions were coded as coming from these collections when the collection was the sole source of exhibited works (or the source of the vast majority of them). If a patron provides only a few works, with other sources providing additional works, the exhibition is a loan show. "Patron" usually means an individual patron, but occasionally it indicates a corporation or foundation. Each exhibition is coded for each format variable; consequently, format measures in the analysis are not mutually exclusive. For instance, some, but not all, blockbusters travel.

I based the coding of exhibition contents on canonical divisions standard in art history. I have become knowledgeable about artistic styles by taking six courses in art history at Princeton and Stanford universities, attending museums and studio art classes, and reading. The coding scheme divided exhibitions into 21 "style" categories, although some exhibitions are defined by the media of their contents (e.g., photography) without further reference to actual style. The final analysis rests on 14

[11] There is no established definition of a blockbuster. In the art world, some people consider blockbusters to have, by definition, corporate funding. This definition was not helpful, as it did not make sense to define away variation in one of the four independent variables, corporate sponsorship. Blockbusters can also be seen as shows that museums mount with the express purpose of attracting a large audience. My coding scheme was designed to find shows that museums planned to be large (as shown by advance ticketing) and that did reach large audiences (that had high attendance and lines). It is worth mentioning, however, that my definition leans toward discovering successful and/or unplanned blockbusters, as museums may not report the failure of shows they had hoped would appeal to a large audience but that did not draw crowds, and museums may also gleefully point out the popularity of a show that was not designed as a blockbuster. Consequently, it is important to note that my coding scheme does not necessarily come up with a perfect correlation between shows I deem to be blockbusters, based on the information in a museum's annual report, and shows that would be considered blockbusters by some other definitions.

categories: (1) modern art—from postimpressionism at the turn of the century to minimalism and conceptual art in the 1960s and 1970s; (2) European art, medieval through 19th century—from the early Middle Ages (about 600 A.D.) to impressionism in the late 19th century; (3) classical art—art and artifacts up to about 600 A.D. from Europe, the ancient Near East, and Egypt; (4) postmodern and contemporary—including such styles as contemporary figurative painting, pattern painting, photorealism, and pop art (see below); (5) American old masters—early American portraiture, 19th-century realists, and early to mid-twentieth-century realists; (6) American ethnic—a category reserved for shows that were explicitly described in the annual report as containing works by minority artists (shows that include minority artists where the museum did not make an issue of the artists' race or ethnicity are coded under their artistic style); (7) Asian art—art from all parts of Asia except modern or postmodern styles or so-called primitive art; (8) photography—all styles of photography (but not photojournalism, which is coded under commercial art); (9) craft, costume, decorative, and folk art—examples include quilts, inaugural ball gowns, eighteenth-century English furniture, and Paul Revere silver; (10) commercial art—such items as advertisements, posters, products, prototypes, and commercial design; (11) mixed styles— art that spans more than one of the above categories; (12) local artists—a category reserved for shows that are explicitly described as including local or regional professional artists; (13) child- or community-oriented art—art that is specifically geared toward children or art made by children, art that takes into account specific community issues, or art that is created by nonprofessional community members; (14) other styles— including art from several styles (primitive art, architecture, film, South American, Mexican, and African art—i.e., art from these regions that is not otherwise primitive, modern, or postmodern), exhibitions with unidentifiable contents (such as the show *Oom Pah Pah* at the Metropolitan Museum that was not further elaborated), and, finally, exhibitions placed in a residual subcategory as "other" styles. Since this residual category is what is left over after coding for the traditional canon, for postmodern and contemporary art, and for non-Western art (all of which are styles that are established in contemporary or traditional art history literature), it encompasses those styles that are not in any sense part of art history.

Exhibitions of living artists proved to be the most difficult to code. Here, I relied on lists of artists working in two modern and four postmodern styles (Crane 1987, app. C, pp. 153–57), but the job was difficult because of the still-fluid definition of postmodern and modern styles and the large number of contemporary artists exhibiting who were not on Crane's list and were unknown to me. I coded living artists as "modern"

or "postmodern," if I was able to, based on personal knowledge, Crane's list, or the exhibition description.[12] I coded living artists whose styles I could not determine as "contemporary," along with group exhibitions of living artists embodying both modern and postmodern styles. In the final analysis, I folded the categories "postmodern" and "contemporary" into one category indicating the newest thrust of artwork produced mainly by artists who were still living and painting when the exhibition was mounted.

I also coded the funders of exhibitions. Four dummy variables, one for each funder type, indicate whether or not the exhibition was funded by an individual, corporation, government agency, or foundation. Exhibitions were often funded by more than one type of external funder. Exhibitions with no major external funding are indicated by a pattern of 0,0,0,0 for the four funding variables. It is important to note that museums do not report small donations, which may help support an exhibition; consequently, my data concern major funding only. In other words, my data set is biased toward the effects of munificent and visible donors. While it would be useful to know the effects of minor funders (who likely are middle-class individuals and small, local businesses and foundations, not wealthy elites or large, national corporations and foundations), organizational research suggests that museums would also be more heavily influenced by the major funders the research design captures.

Operationalization of Variables

The three main dependent variables are whether an exhibition is (1) popular, (2) accessible, or (3) scholarly. Popular exhibitions (those attracting broad audiences) are indicated by two variables: blockbuster shows and traveling exhibitions. Blockbuster shows attract a large audience in one venue, whereas traveling shows multiply their potential audience by the number of cities in which they appear. Both blockbuster and traveling status indicate the format of an exhibition.

Accessible exhibitions are shows that are easy to understand without extensive training in art history, and they are indicated by both format and content variables. An accessible format is the theme show. Such exhibitions are organized around a theme, rather than around a traditional art-historical category. These are shows such as *The Window in Art,* which included only paintings and drawings incorporating windows, or *A Day in the Country: Impressionism and the French Landscape,*

---

[12] Some living artists' styles were coded as "craft" or "American ethnic," if one of these was the primary way in which the museum presented the artists' work.

which organized paintings by their subject matter instead of the more traditional categories such as the artist or chronology of the work. Several styles of exhibition indicate accessible contents. Although there are more accessible and less accessible artists within each style category, I assume that American old masters, crafts and costumes, commercial art, local artists, and child- or community-oriented art are more accessible style categories than the rest.

Scholarly exhibitions are shows resting on solid art-historical merit and research. A show can be designed in a way for scholars to learn more about the art in the show. A survey, which shows the development of a style or series of styles, and a retrospective, which shows the development of a single artist's oeuvre, are art-historically based formats for exhibitions. In terms of content, scholarly shows are indicated by the traditional canon: the lineage of art usually covered in introductory art history courses (e.g., Janson 1986), which is now called "the history of Western art." It is composed of three style categories: classical art, European art (medieval through the 19th century), and modern art. Postmodern art, a conglomeration of styles that draw on, react against, or play with the conventions of modern art, also indicates art-historical contents.

The data also address three additional concerns of funders. To test whether individuals tend to sponsor their own artworks, I coded the source of art for exhibitions. The variable "patron collection" indicates that all or virtually all of the art in a given exhibition came from the collection of the individual or corporation that sponsored the exhibition. This variable indicates the format of exhibitions, since the content of a patron collection could be scholarly or accessible. Two content variables address hypotheses about government funding of living artists and art of interest to nontraditional audiences. Sponsorship of American ethnic art demonstrates an interest in nontraditional audiences. Contemporary artists and most of the postmodern artists were living at the time their art was shown, so for the purposes of this analysis, living artists are indicated by the combined style category for postmodern and contemporary art.

The four independent variables for the analysis are the funder variables. Externally funded exhibitions receive support from one or a combination of individual, corporate, government, or foundation donors. Exhibitions termed "internally funded" have been paid for by the museum's operating budget, earned income, an auxiliary entity such as the Ladies' Council, or small donations not directly acknowledged as exhibition support. "Internally funded" is the excluded funding variable. Dummy variables indicating the museum in which the exhibition appeared provide a rough control for various museum effects such as the size of the museum's endowment, skill at fund-raising, and the focus of the museum's collection.

In the analysis, I first investigate whether funders are indeed associated with particular formats or contents of exhibitions. This will provide a baseline for understanding a second phase of the analysis, the change in the entire exhibition pool and the possible influence of funders on the pool of exhibitions as a whole. To learn about this level, I compare the exhibition pool before and after institutional funders increasingly enter the museum arena.

All variables in the analysis are dummy variables. Dependent variables indicate either format (the five format variables are "blockbuster," "traveling exhibition," "theme show," "art-historical exhibition," and "patron collection") or content (the 14 content variables—coded "0" or "1"—were created from the 14 categories of the style variable). A logistic regression equation was estimated, using the maximum likelihood technique, for each of the 19 dependent variables. Independent variables are the four funder dummy variables; thus, the regressions test for associations between the type of funder and each dependent variable. The four types of funders are not mutually exclusive (i.e., exhibitions can be sponsored by more than one funder). The omitted category is exhibitions that were not funded by any of the four external funders. In other words, the comparison group for the β coefficients is composed of exhibitions not funded by the given funder, including those exhibitions that are funded internally. The logistic regressions control for the overlap in funding but do not demonstrate the existence of coalitions among funder types. Using cross-tabulations, I check for significant overlap in funder types for each exhibition variable. This is important, since the NEA funds exhibitions on a matching basis, so there may be an important overlap in government and other types of funding (though the matching funds can come from internal or quasi-internal funds as well as from other major donors).

Museum dummies are included as controls,[13] but not reported, as an analysis of museum differences is beyond the scope of this article; I discuss this issue at length elsewhere (Alexander 1996*b*, 1996*c*). A second series of 19 logistic regressions were estimated to determine changes in the exhibition pool, using a dummy variable to indicate time period and controlling for museum.

RESULTS

How do the goals of different types of funders lead to the sponsorship of different types of exhibitions? The section below explores the connections between (1) the type of funding and the format of art exhibitions, (2) the

[13] The Detroit Institute of Art is the excluded case. Tables are available from the author.

type of funding and the content of art exhibitions, and (3) indications in the exhibition pool of museum autonomy. When in the late 1960s and 1970s funding became increasingly available (DiMaggio 1986b; Crane 1987) and museums expanded (Blau 1989), museums increasingly relied on external funders, especially the new institutional funders, to support the exhibitions they mounted. This trend is graphically confirmed by my data in figure 1. The average number of exhibitions per museum sponsored by corporations, government, and foundations was level until around 1972, after which the average number increased steadily. Individual funding, stable before 1972, rose only slightly by the end of the study.

Table 2 classifies descriptive statistics for the exhibitions by the type of funder. This table provides some detail for understanding the statistical analysis, but note that this is not the table from which the logistic regressions were run (the table does not include the cross-tabulation by museum variables; this would require 15 tables). An interesting point about table 2 is that each funder type sponsors at least some of each exhibition format and content (with the exception of American ethnic exhibitions, which were not supported by foundations in my sample, and child- or community-oriented shows, which were not supported by individuals). But that said, it is more important to recognize the patterns of each funder, as analyzed below.

Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of the four funding variables. It is interesting that they are not highly correlated, although there is a notable negative correlation between each of the institutional funders and the individual philanthropists.[14] This suggests that the new institutional funders have funding goals quite distinct from those of the traditional funders of museums. In addition, I cross-tabulated format and content variables by number of funders (table not shown). Two variables had notably high degrees of overlapping funding: 40% of blockbusters had multiple funders, as did 14% of traveling exhibitions. I report on the coalitions of funders for these variables below.

Format of Art Exhibitions

Funders differentially prefer various kinds of exhibitions that appear in museums; here I show this for the format, or "packaging," of art shows. This section examines the association of funder type with blockbuster and traveling exhibitions (i.e., popular exhibitions), theme shows (accessible exhibitions), and art-historical formats (scholarly exhibitions), along with the association with patron collections.

[14] The correlation matrix also shows that there is no problem with multicollinearity among the four funder variables.

FIG. 1.—Average number of exhibitions per museum sponsored by each type of funder by year

□ corporations   + foundations   ◇ individuals   △ government

TABLE 2

DESCRIPTIVE DATA BY TYPE OF FUNDER: MUSEUM EXHIBITIONS, 1960–86

	No. of Exhibitions Sponsored*				No. Internally Funded†	N (Total)
	Individuals	Corporations	Government	Foundations		
Format:*						
Traveling exhibition	58	101	121	53	386	604
Blockbuster exhibition	5	25	23	15	27	57
Theme show	16	47	25	18	269	344
Art-historical exhibition	70	97	176	81	944	1,258
Patron's collection	269	26	8	19	48	346
Content:‡						
Modern	66	34	79	25	434	596
European, medieval–19th century	40	30	41	30	331	440
Classical	9	5	6	3	31	47
Postmodern and contemporary	16	17	44	6	100	162
American old masters	35	21	16	12	182	247
American ethnic	4	4	5	0	42	53
Asian	39	12	10	17	174	232
Photography	7	20	28	11	229	282
Craft, costume, decorative, and folk	42	20	12	8	250	317
Commercial	7	12	6	5	100	124
Mixed styles	55	29	20	17	304	402
Local artists	7	6	9	7	180	201
Child or community oriented	0	4	2	2	305	312
Other styles	35	45	25	28	507	611
Total by funder type	362	259	303	171	3,171	4,026

* Format and funder type variables are not mutually exclusive.
† "Internally funded" refers to exhibitions not funded by the four funder types, so this variable and the category of funded exhibitions (not reported) are mutually exclusive.
‡ Content variables are mutually exclusive.

TABLE 3

CORRELATION MATRIX OF FUNDING VARIABLES

	Individual	Corporation	Government
Corporation	− .384		
Government	− .441	.039	
Foundation	− .256	.050	.039

Table 4 shows results of logistic regressions with traveling, block-buster, theme, art-historical, and patron collection exhibitions as the dependent variables. The table demonstrates that corporate and government entities disproportionally sponsor both traveling exhibitions and blockbuster exhibitions. The results support the hypothesis that both government and corporations fund more popular exhibitions than other funders. Foundations, which were expected to fund fewer popular exhibitions, actually funded more of them. This suggests that the large, visible foundations DiMaggio (1986c) spoke about are important for museum funding, at least concerning the sponsorship of popular exhibitions.

Both blockbuster and traveling exhibitions are funded by more than one type of funder. Government and corporations together sponsor 33.3% of blockbuster exhibitions, while 9.9% of traveling exhibitions share both corporate and government funding. Just about a quarter of blockbusters are supported by a combination of corporation and foundation dollars (though only 5% of traveling shows are supported by this combination of funders). Similarly, just over a quarter of blockbusters are supported by government agencies and foundations (and just over 5% of traveling exhibitions are thus supported). No combination of institutional and individual funders together sponsored more than 3.5% of either traveling or blockbuster exhibitions. In general, then, institutional funding is associated with popular exhibitions, indicating a broadening of audiences for exhibitions.

Table 4 also demonstrates that corporations sponsor more exhibitions of accessible art, as indicated by their sponsorship of theme shows. Individuals fund fewer accessible exhibitions than other funders, as expected. Government and foundations have no statistical relationship to accessible exhibitions. Art-historical exhibitions are disproportionally favored by government and foundation donors; both sponsor more of these formats. Corporations are not associated positively or negatively with this format. Individuals, however, sponsor fewer shows that are organized along art-historical lines.

In addition, table 4 supports the prediction that individuals sponsor a great deal of exhibitions that are composed of their own collections.

TABLE 4

EFFECTS OF TYPE OF FUNDING ON THE FORMAT OF EXHIBITIONS (Logistic Regressions)

FORMAT[b]	FUNDER[a]				
	Individual	Corporation	Government	Foundation	Constant
Traveling exhibition	.043	1.033***	1.166***	.443*	6.746
	(.162)	(.165)	(.153)	(.212)	(2.026)
Blockbuster exhibition	−.396	1.703***	1.662***	.829*	.497
	(.504)	(.363)	(.375)	(.410)	(6.163)
Theme show	−.840***	1.085***	−.381	−.059	4.529
	(.266)	(.194)	(.244)	(.282)	(2.916)
Art-historical exhibition	−.708***	−.233	1.147***	.771***	.138
	(.144)	(.160)	(.138)	(.182)	(1.781)
Patron's own collection	5.305***	.783	−2.940***	.783*	6.584
	(.195)	(.350)	(.516)	(.429)	(4.175)

NOTE.—Equations control for museum effects (not reported) by including dummy variables for sample museums. $N = 4{,}026$ exhibitions.
[a] The variables "individual," "corporation," "government," and "foundation" are 0,1 variables and are not mutually exclusive. The omitted category in this case is exhibitions not funded by any of the four categories of funder.
[b] All variables are 0,1 variables, where "1" indicates the presence of the trait.
  * $P < .05$.
  ** $P < .01$.
  *** $P < .001$.

Foundations also play a role in supporting patron collection shows. Foundations represented here are most likely family foundations. Government funds disproportionally fewer patron collections—no surprise, since government does not usually own art. The finding that individuals sponsor their own collections but not scholarly or accessible show formats may indicate that individuals are connoisseurs but not scholars or educators. The finding that individuals sponsor fewer theme and art-historical formats may be artifactual, however. Since individuals are strongly associated with exhibitions of their own collections, they are sponsoring a good number of exhibitions that are of a heterogeneous layout (a variety of styles not otherwise ordered), this lowers the proportion of both art-historical and theme layouts they support.

Content of Art Exhibitions

In addition to patterned associations with the format of exhibitions, funder type is associated with particular kinds of content. This section addresses the predicted corporate desires for accessible art, government preferences for accessible, scholarly, and ethnic art, as well as for shows of living artists, and individual patrons' desire to fund scholarly but not accessible exhibitions.

Table 5 explores the association of funding and content. In this table, style of exhibition is divided into 14 dummy variables, each of which serves as a dependent variable in a model with four funder types serving as independent variables (controlling for museum). Scholarly contents are indicated by the traditional canonical styles, the first three styles in the table: modern, medieval through 19th-century European art, and classical art. The table demonstrates that, as suggested, corporations fund disproportionally fewer of the canonical styles (they are especially unlikely to sponsor modern art) and that individuals and government fund more canonical styles, with individuals positively associated with exhibitions of modern and classical art and government positively associated with exhibitions of modern and European art. Foundations are not particularly associated with scholarly art.

Table 5 also demonstrates that, as predicted, government sponsors a disproportional share of postmodern and contemporary art, thus supporting shows of living artists. It is interesting that government sponsors a larger share of both modern and postmodern art. Two characteristics distinguish these styles: they predominantly contain American artists, and they tend to require some art-historical training to appreciate. Government sponsors are negatively associated with additional style categories: crafts and costumes, commercial art, mixed styles, child- and community-oriented art, and other styles. With the potential exception

TABLE 5

EFFECTS OF TYPE OF FUNDING ON THE STYLE OF EXHIBITIONS (Logistic Regressions)

STYLE[b]	FUNDER[a]				
	Individual	Corporation	Government	Foundation	Constant
Modern	.461**	−.617**	.637***	.181	2.370
	(.154)	(.219)	(.161)	(.250)	(2.305)
European, medieval–19th century	−.316	−.256	.437*	.283	−9.223
	(.185)	(.228)	(.206)	(.234)	(2.813)
Classical	.815*	.130	.781	−.159	−12.087
	(.381)	(.542)	(.503)	(.657)	(4.155)
Postmodern and contemporary	.303	−.256	1.454***	−.462	4.697
	(.289)	(.317)	(.221)	(.466)	(5.165)
American old masters	.563**	.237	−.193	.223	1.019
	(.199)	(.266)	(.295)	(.333)	(3.461)
American ethnic[c]	−.218	.034	.260	. . .	8.953
	(.528)	(.564)	(.509)		(6.428)
Asian	.805***	−.154	−.445	.876**	−3.044
	(.192)	(.338)	(.367)	(.298)	(3.624)
Photography	−1.384***	.129	.431	−.072	8.418
	(.390)	(.277)	(.242)	(.355)	(3.718)

Craft, costume, decorative, and folk	.499** (.181)	.454 (.263)	−.749* (.319)	−.382 (.389)	3.235 (3.529)
Commercial	−.510 (.399)	.763* (.344)	−.928* (.462)	.210 (.507)	17.751 (3.563)
Mixed styles	.535*** (.160)	.277 (.221)	−.649* (.257)	−.087 (.280)	5.163 (2.512)
Local artists	−.962** (.393)	−.370 (.442)	−.683 (.367)	.436 (.427)	−7.983 (2.828)
Child or community oriented[d]	...	−1.431** (.519)	−1.726** (.722)	−2.000** (.723)	9.182 (3.030)
Other styles	.560** (.186)	.318 (.185)	−.875*** (.229)	.151 (.228)	7.862 (2.223)

NOTE.—Equations control for museum effects (not reported) by including dummy variables for sample museums. N = 4,026 exhibitions.

[a] The variables "individual," "corporation," "government," and "foundation" are 0,1 variables and are not mutually exclusive. The omitted category in this case is exhibitions not funded by any of the four categories of funder.

[b] All variables are 0,1 variables, where "1" indicates the presence of the trait.

[c] During the period sampled, no foundations sponsored an exhibition of ethnic art.

[d] During the period sampled, no individuals sponsored an exhibition of child- or community-oriented art.

   * $P < .05$.
   ** $P < .01$.
   *** $P < .001$.

of mixed styles, these categories all represent more accessible and nontraditional exhibition contents.

Contrary to prediction, government agencies did not tend to sponsor ethnic art. Indeed, virtually no funder sponsored art produced by nontraditional artists, as measured by the American ethnic variable (see table 2). It is possible that this is not a good measure of support for minority artists. There are very few exhibitions captured here. Although I suspect that minority artists are underrepresented even in contemporary art exhibitions, it is possible that funders sponsor ethnic artists who are categorized by museums by their style, rather than in the "affirmative action" exhibitions that explicitly focus on painters and sculptors from disenfranchised groups.

Corporations fund fewer of the modern exhibitions, and it is perhaps no surprise that they sponsor more of the commercial art shows. Commercial art shows may include artworks that are actually corporate products, and they indicate more accessible contents. Corporations are not interested in children or in community shows (none of the funders are).

In addition to the modern and classical canonical styles, individuals sponsor more exhibitions of American old masters, Asian art, crafts and costumes, and mixed styles. (The last, mixed styles, largely reflects sponsorship of patron collections containing mixed styles of art.) Individuals sponsor fewer shows of photography, local artists, and other styles, and they sponsored no child- or community-oriented shows. Thus, individuals have a mixed pattern, preferring both scholarly (canonical) and accessible (American old masters and crafts and costumes) styles of exhibitions. The only style that foundations have a positive association with is Asian art. Foundations, like other funders, sponsored few child- and community-oriented exhibitions; they also sponsored no ethnic art.

Funder Pressures

The patterns in tables 4 and 5 suggest the pressures funders place on museums for particular types of exhibitions. The evidence here shows that corporations are more interested in audiences than in traditional art forms, as indicated by their support of popular formats, accessible formats, and accessible styles, along with their disinterest in scholarly formats and contents. Government supports popular formats but also scholarly formats, and fund only scholarly contents, with an active avoidance of accessible contents. Thus, it would appear that government funders tend to serve two masters: art historians who care about art scholarship, and middle-class audiences who attend large, popular exhibitions. Government appears not to focus on disenfranchised, marginalized, or other nontraditional groups in museums, perhaps because these groups cannot give political, economic,

or cultural capital either to museums or to government funders. Foundations parallel government funders in supporting both popular and scholarly formats but do not mimic individual sponsors in their effects. Individual patrons are uninterested in popular formats, actively shun accessible formats, but at the same time sponsor fewer art-historical formats. Individual sponsors fund both canonical styles and accessible styles, and overwhelmingly support their own collections, legitimating their own, elite tastes. Note that individuals and government agencies—those funders who claim to judge exhibitions using some measure of artistic scholarship—fund fewer exhibitions in the category other styles. It is interesting that of corporate sponsorship in the other category, the lion's share is in the subcategory "other" (table not shown). Styles that were classified in the subcategory "other" were so classified precisely because they did not fit in well with traditional and contemporary classifications.

In general, institutional funders are especially associated with blockbuster and traveling exhibitions; important types of mass-appeal, broad-audience, and wide-exposure shows. Government may attempt to reach more geographically diffuse audiences by sponsoring traveling shows, and corporations increase audience size and name recognition by sponsoring more broadly based exhibitions. The overlap in government, corporate, and foundation sponsorship of such exhibitions suggests that, along the audience dimensions, institutional patrons have similar goals.

The results presented here are reasonably consistent with expectations, given funders' overarching goals. The data show, then, a fairly clear translation of funder goals into exhibition formats and contents. The patterns in tables 4 and 5 also suggest how funder interests align with curator interests, assuming that curators prefer scholarly exhibitions to popular and accessible exhibitions. No funder's interests coincide with those of curators. Corporations' goals conflict with those of curators more than the goals of the other funders, whose exhibition preferences overlap with curator goals more often. I expect that curators will attempt to duck the influence of funders, especially where those interests do not coincide with their own. I will next examine how funder pressures impinge on museums at the level of the exhibition pool.

Museum Autonomy

To test for funder effects on the exhibition pool, I divided the sample into two periods, 1960–72 and 1974–86. This division separates the time that institutional funders were not prevalent in the museum environment from the time that institutional funders were more prevalent, as seen in figure 1.

Table 6 shows a series of logistic regressions to check for changes in the exhibition pool during the period sampled. Most important, table 6 indi-

TABLE 6

CHANGES IN THE FORMAT, CONTENT, AND STYLE OF EXHIBITIONS AFTER THE
INCREASE IN INSTITUTIONAL FUNDING (Logistic Regressions)

Dependent Variable[b]	β[a]	SE
Format:		
Traveling exhibition	.210*	.095
Blockbuster exhibition	.619*	.299
Theme show	.381***	.120
Art-historical exhibition	.331***	.072
Patron's own collection	−.418***	.118
Style:		
Modern	−.001	.095
European, medieval–19th century	−.006	.109
Classical	.675*	.334
Postmodern and contemporary	1.001***	.190
American old masters	−.022	.138
American ethnic	.283	.293
Asian	−.005	.144
Photography	.673***	.141
Craft, costume, decorative, and folk	−.197	.123
Commercial	.012	.190
Mixed styles	−.442***	.110
Local artists	−.923***	.164
Child or community oriented	−.291*	.127
Other styles	.237**	.092

NOTE.—Equations control for museum effects (not reported) by including dummy variables for sample museums. $N = 4{,}026$ exhibitions.

[a] The β coefficient indicates the difference between the exhibition pool in the years 1974–86 as compared with the omitted category, the exhibition pool from 1960 to 1972.

[b] All variables are 0,1 variables where 1 indicates the presence of the trait.

* $P < .05$.
** $P < .01$.
*** $P < .001$.

cates that the format of exhibitions has changed substantially in the latter period. Popular formats (blockbuster and traveling exhibitions) increase, as do accessible formats (theme exhibitions) and scholarly formats (art-historical exhibitions). Patron collections decrease as a proportion of the total.

In terms of content, exhibitions of classical art, postmodern and contemporary art, photography, and other styles have increased. Shows of local artists, exhibitions of children's art, and community-oriented shows have also declined significantly. Mixed exhibitions have declined, although this occurs as a result of the decline in patron collections, as these two categories overlap. Nevertheless, the content seems to have changed less than the format, which lends support to the idea that museum curators have some autonomy and discretion in choosing exhibitions.

That exhibitions of postmodern and contemporary art have increased is not surprising, as postmodern styles are new during the period studied. As we have seen, however, government funds a great deal of these types of art. Although one would expect there to be more postmodern and other contemporary styles in museums as these styles are invented, it is not possible to know whether the availability of government money has increased the proportion of these styles in museum exhibitions more than would have occurred without such funding.

The big losers seem to be local artists, although it is possible that museums exhibit local artists under the rubric of "contemporary art" during the later period. It is interesting that exhibitions that are mounted less frequently are mostly of contents that have been peripheral to museums (e.g., children's art). Indeed, these contents may represent an old style of community-outreach exhibitions: small, local, child- or community-oriented, unfunded exhibitions. The current way to exhibit art that may draw a similar middle-class audience is through popular and accessible formats (rather than contents) that are also—notably—large, visible, and funded.

Contents that are mounted more frequently appear to be more accessible styles, though not all the change seems to be associated with funding. For instance, photography, generally an accessible style, has increased as a proportion of the exhibition pool. It is interesting that individual philanthropists sponsored disproportionally fewer photography exhibitions. Corporations, foundations, and government agencies all sponsored some photography exhibitions, but not out of proportion to such exhibitions mounted without such sponsorship.

Interpretation

Why have funder preferences translated into changes in format but not in content? I argue that curators use a combination of buffering and resource-shifting strategies to maintain their own interests in exhibitions. The fact that the content of the exhibition pool does not change much after the advent of the institutional funders suggests that museums may retain autonomy from their environment through a strategy of resource shifting. They may sell exhibitions they want to mount, but which also have funder appeal to external grantors, and may then use resources left over to mount exhibitions that also appeal to curators but not to funders.

The research demonstrates that museums are faced with pressures for increasing popularity and accessibility of art exhibitions. However, museums have not responded, in general, by mounting masses of low-quality but popularly appealing shows. This is because museums must maintain their legitimacy as houses of high culture. I suggest that curators allow

the format to change more, to protect the core of museums—shows containing a variety of artistic contents.

Resource shifting may be an important strategy for donative nonprofit organizations (Alexander 1996a). For instance, in a study of donors to a university, Stout (1992) found that university officials used internal and unspecified grant funds to subsidize departments underfunded by external entities, reducing the disparity between them and more richly supported departments.

The evidence I have for resource shifting is more anecdotal than systematic; consequently, this interpretation is tentative, and more research will be needed to understand the phenomenon. I conducted interviews with museum directors, curators, and educators as part of the larger study from which this article is drawn. I did not ask the respondents about resource shifting or their strategies for avoiding external influence; rather, I asked how exhibitions were funded and what influences funders might have on museums and exhibitions. Nevertheless, some of what the curators said supports my contention that museum managers react strategically to environmental pressures. For instance, the director of a large, encyclopedic museum told me that funding in the museum is a "matching process." Curators plan exhibitions that then "go looking" for funding. At the same time, the development department tries to find funding possibilities that then look for exhibitions curators are planning. This process has some affinities to the garbage can decision model (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). The director, however, keeps a general mix in the exhibition schedule, which is planned several years in advance: "I try to shape shows on a yearly basis. That is, strike a balance between large and small shows, shows with a broad audience and those with a small audience, those [shown only in the museum] and those for outside travel." Funding usually happens after these decisions are made. In a telling setback, the museum found itself short of funding (and time) for a Chagall exhibition. The museum managers had anticipated easily obtaining support for the show and were quite surprised when several possible funders turned them down. But the show went on as scheduled, and the museum used an internal source for underwriting the show: They charged a hefty fee for the opening dinner.

A curator in a second museum avoided funder pressures by avoiding funding. The modern art department he ran did not pursue corporate funds, but as a result, also did not mount major exhibitions in modern art and had reduced opportunity for scholarship published in the catalogs that accompany such exhibitions. The curator said to me: "It's a trade-off. Contemporary art here is a low-budget operation. It was a very conscious trade off."

In addition, my reading of the annual reports of 30 museums suggest

two other strategies museums use to retain autonomy: "multivocality" and a related strategy, "creative enactment," both of which require innovation on the part of museum personnel. By multivocality, I refer to programs or activities that have many facets, and therefore, the ability to appeal to a variety of stakeholders. Museums have mounted many more shows that are multivocal—that appeal to different audiences on different levels. Museum curators innovate to find art that is both accessible and can be viewed with a critical eye. Since corporate funders of large, traveling blockbusters may be less interested in the art, per se, than they are in the press coverage, some writers have argued that blockbusters are just low-quality pabulum designed to bring in mindless crowds (Balfe 1987). It is important to recognize, however, that many blockbuster and traveling exhibitions solve the problems posed by multiple stakeholders pressing for different sorts of exhibitions. Curators, along with NEA panels, are interested in the art-historical merit of exhibitions. These stakeholders often have input into popular exhibitions. Popular exhibitions, especially blockbusters, attract large, middle-class audiences, many of whom are not particularly schooled in the intricacies of art history. Along these lines, popular exhibitions also attract corporate sponsors. The resources of a large, traveling, blockbuster exhibition, however, can also finance scholarly advantages: well-researched and nicely designed exhibitions often (1) bring together a large number of objects from overseas museums, objects that have not been seen together before, or objects that have not been seen in the United States, (2) publish blockbuster catalogs, full of new scholarly analyses alongside the pretty reproductions, and (3) provide an opportunity to conserve and repair artworks, obtain display cases, or otherwise improve a museum's holdings. That some blockbuster exhibitions can have a scholarly component points to the ability of curators to use funding to meet their own ends.[15]

For instance, a traveling exhibition appearing at the Art Institute of Chicago offered a valuable scholarly opportunity to its curators and allowed an added local interpretation that pleased community elites: "The superb survey of 'Master Drawings by Picasso,' organized by the Fogg Art Museum, gave us both an insight into the private decisions behind many of the artist's public statements and a better understanding of how works from the Institute's superb holdings and those of a number of private Chicago collections—which were added to the Chicago showing—related to his entire oeuvre" (Art Institute of Chicago, 1980–81, p. 10). The exhibition also provided a scholarly and beautiful catalog and

[15] Not all popular shows solve the stakeholder dilemma, however. The exhibition must contain a scholarly as well as a public component to resolve the conflicts involved and to gain art-historical legitimacy for the museum.

attracted quite a few Chicago viewers. In addition to the Fogg, this show also traveled to the Philadelphia Museum of Art; the exhibition was supported by the NEA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain, and the Alsdorf Foundation, as was the catalog, which mentioned each of the 102 objects displayed in the show (and also included an addendum on items appearing at only one venue). The exhibition was indemnified by the Federal Council on the Arts and Humanities.

Museum managers innovate to find multiple uses for available funding as well as to mount multivocal exhibitions. The Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco used a strategy that "was creative, fulfilling needs beyond those of the immediate exhibit" (Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco, 1983–85, p. 13). The museum expanded its temporary exhibition space to accommodate a large traveling blockbuster—art from the Vatican. Funds for the gallery expansion came from donations supporting the special show. The Vatican show was installed in the special exhibition galleries and the newly created space. After the exhibition was over, the American galleries, which were adjacent to the temporary exhibition rooms, claimed the new space and American works were installed there.

To define "creative enactment," I draw on Weick's (1979) concept of an enacted environment. Weick argues that people in organizations actively construct their environment through the sense-making process people use to order all reality. To enact is to bring imagined things to life. Here, I wish to say that managers who extend the possibilities of their environment beyond the standard limits are creatively enacting their environment. Museum managers appear to creatively enact their environment as they seek external funding. They may think of clever ways to attract funding for an exhibition they wish to mount by appealing to an interest a corporation might have that is not ordinarily associated with art. For instance, the Philadelphia Museum mounted an exhibition of seventeenth-century Dutch art sponsored by Mobil Oil, which owns offshore drilling rigs in Dutch waters. Theme exhibitions sometimes have theme sponsorship. For instance, Polo/Ralph Lauren sponsored the show titled *Horse and Man,* filled with hunting pictures, other canvases of people and horses, and hunting apparel (see Silverman 1986). *Undercover Agents: Antique Undergarments from the Costume Collection of the Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco,* was supported by Victoria's Secret, the lingerie firm. Folger's has sponsored a traveling exhibitions of its silver coffee pot collection. And Fisher-Price Toys underwrote *Jouets Américains,* an exhibition of American toys, organized by the Musée des Arts Décoratifs in Paris, which toured the United States.

Museums continue to mount exhibitions of more esoteric art, past and present, but these shows tend to be funded by museum sources, sometimes supplemented by government grants, rather than by the combina-

tion of government and corporate monies that support the more popular exhibitions. For instance, in 1987 the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art started a program for small, flexible exhibitions that would complement its main program of larger exhibitions that are planned well ahead. An auxiliary group, the Collector's Forum (in this study, considered an internal funder) supported the program, which was later also subsidized by the NEA: "The *New Work* concept was to give the Museum a program that could be reasonably nimble in responding to new ideas and opportunities, in contrast to a large museum's usual scheduling, which occurs several years in advance. It consists of a series of five or six serious but modestly scaled projects annually that are intended to provide West Coast museum audiences with a timely opportunity to see and consider some of the most interesting and important artistic accomplishments— regional, national, and international—of the day, by both younger and established artists" (San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 1988, p. 11). This may suggest that unfunded exhibitions represent true curator desires. Although curators most likely value exhibitions that are internally funded (they would not be mounted otherwise), curators may equally value at least some of the funded exhibitions. Further, if museums plan ahead and shift resources, then it is important to recognize that to a considerable degree, unfunded exhibitions should be seen as a residual category, not just as art for curators' sake.

Nevertheless, funding has clearly encouraged museums to mount shows accessible to broad audiences. This has been the big change in museums in the past two decades (Alexander 1996c). It is important to recognize, however, that the situation in museums today is not a result only of constraints imposed by the new funders. Instead, a different set of funders (and attached opportunities, as well as constraints) has come to rival an older set of funders: the institutional funders versus the traditional philanthropists. Museums have always mounted popular and accessible exhibitions (see Coleman 1939; Meyer 1979; and Zolberg 1974); today these "middlebrow" exhibitions take the form of funded blockbusters, traveling exhibitions, and theme shows, rather than unfunded community-outreach contents.

Still, this new emphasis on blockbusters, theme exhibitions, and popular subject matter does not make most curators happy (McGuigan 1985). They often assert that corporations and government have distorted the types of shows that museums put on. A general theme among curators (but not among museum directors) is a belief that corporations, especially, constrain and flaw exhibitions. However, museums clearly have some discretion in balancing large, crowd-drawing exhibitions with much smaller ones that lack external support. Museums attempt to balance mass-appeal shows and smaller, more academic shows. Indeed, I believe

that the new funders have given curators more freedom than they have had in the past. One piece of evidence for this is the increase in art-historical formats of exhibitions. If museums are primarily funded by wealthy, elite donors, then curators are limited by the ability and desire of those patrons to fund their ideas. Additional funders create more options. Each type of funding has its own limits, but now there are several types of limits from which to choose. Nonetheless, questions of discretion and constraint are analytically complex. Clearly, even if curators are free to choose within a set of possibilities, the universe of possibilities is determined by funding.

DISCUSSION

These results suggest that the type of funding has important influences on art exhibitions. Funders sponsor certain types of exhibitions, although they have a lesser influence on the overall mix of exhibitions because curators engage in buffering and resource shifting, mount multivocal exhibitions, and creatively enact their environment to maintain autonomy and their vision of museum legitimacy. Even so, museums mount a larger share of exhibitions in popular formats now than they have in the past. In this concluding section, I will first make a plea for a move to a "strategic institutional" theory of organizations that combines the insights of resource dependency and institutional theory. After discussing strategic institutional theory, I will briefly highlight the implications of this project for the sociology of culture.

Strategic Institutional Theory

This analysis provides some support for resource dependency pressures on organizations. It is easy to see the general orientations of funders translated into exhibition outcomes. However, this resource effect is tempered by institutional pressures that lead museum people to maintain the legitimacy of museums by retaining art-historical standards in the face of pressures for increased accessibility of exhibitions, and by balancing the demands of funders.

Funders have goals that shape their giving. But the goals of the funders conflict with one another, and more important, with normative visions of museum integrity held by curators. In other words, coercive pressures conflict with one another and with normative pressures. It is important to recognize that museums must continue to win legitimacy both from funders and from other actors internal and external to the organization, especially curators, critics, and scholars who are oriented to the art-historical merit of a museum's operation. Neither institutional theory

nor resource dependency theory has adequately addressed the issue of conflicting pressures. This research suggests that museum curators operating within an institutional context actively manage external pressures so as to keep museums functioning as closely as possible to curators' normative requirements.

Though funders have goals that are readily apparent in their funding patterns, the increasing prevalence of institutional funders has given curators leverage, allowing them to pick and choose funders and to play them off one another to reach their own goals, and has spurred curators to innovate in order to maintain their autonomy. The existence of multiple potential funders with competing agendas can allow organizational managers more room to maneuver than a single entity or a unified or similar array of entities would allow. In addition, there are more funds available in the environment, and curators try to tap these funds. This argument has something in common with economic approaches to museums, which argue that museums will innovate and mount appealing exhibitions when there are monetary incentives to do so (Frey and Pommerehne 1989). But this article argues that the engine is different: Curators do not innovate because they are interested in financial incentives. Rather, they are constrained by the need for external funding, and they innovate in order to keep as much autonomy and legitimacy as possible.

I have shown elsewhere that the functions of museums have changed in the past two decades: Museums have become more managerial and less scholarly, more exhibition oriented and less curatorial (Alexander 1996*b*, 1996*c*). It is not surprising that the existence of competing external entities and related organizational strategies to manage them can engender a good deal of internal conflict (Alexander 1996*a*). These changes suggest a strategy that I cannot test with the data at hand. Museum curators tend to view the changes in the exhibition pool as a distortion of the art-historical mission of museums. Yet it is possible that museum curators allow the mounting of a "corrupted" pool of exhibitions in an effort to preserve even more valuable and permanent functions of the museum, such as the collection, conservation, and art-historical research facets of the museum.

On a theoretical level, it is time to put aside the artificial distinctions between resource dependency and institutional theories. As many theorists have noted (e.g., Powell 1991; Zucker 1991), institutional and technical resources are hard to distinguish theoretically, let alone empirically.[16] (Institutional resources grant legitimacy and provide rules of the game; technical resources support production, service, and marketing processes.) Though some have argued that institutional theory is a special

---

[16] See Meyer, Scott, and Deal (1983) and Scott and Meyer (1991) for a discussion of technical and institutional environments.

case of resource dependency theory (since legitimacy is a resource), I would strongly disagree. Putting the two theories together in this way eliminates many of the important insights of institutional theory. Rather, resource dependency is a special case of institutional theory. While a complete integration of these theories is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that institutional theory has both a resource dependency (environmental effects) aspect and a broader cultural and cognitive aspect. Indeed, it is often the case that a given resource is institutionalized so strongly as to be considered objective. Money (in such forms as capital, loans, profit, income, and stock markets) is exactly such a highly constructed and legitimated resource. Some "realist" researchers (Jepperson 1991)—economists, for example—might be horrified to think of their subject matter as socially constructed; however, much realist research can be easily incorporated into the institutional framework.

There are at least three benefits of viewing the two theories as one. First, highly institutionalized cultural resources are often indistinguishable from technical resources, so we are unable to truly separate the two theories. Second, to the extent that distinctions can be made among resources, institutional resources can attract technical resources, and vice versa. Further, all organizations face a spectrum of resources, so institutional theorists would be foolish to ignore the existence of real, physical resources, and realist researchers would be conversely foolish to ignore the existence of institutionalized resources. Though there is a continuum of resources, running from most concrete to most abstract, "resources impinging on organizations" can be understood as "coercive" pressures, in accordance with DiMaggio and Powell (1983), or "resource" pressures, in accordance with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).[17] Artificially separating types of resources then ignoring one type reduces our ability to understand organizations.

The third benefit to organizational theory comes from the unique contribution of institutional theory, the understanding that institutional frameworks actually create the context for technical efficiency (Orrù, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991; Dobbin 1994). To understand organizations, we must understand how cognitively held ideas shape organizational actors (Zucker 1991) and how normative frames interact with external pressures to form an organizational response. When curators decry the increasing proportion of popular exhibitions in museums, they are relying on their normative understandings of what an art museum is and what makes a museum legitimate. Museum curators respond to external pressures within a context created by their own personal and professional

---

[17] It is useful to point out that institutional theorists do not deny the existence of a physical reality. But they argue that reality is shaped and understood (and, in some senses, created) by cognitive frames.

orientations. And they are no more shaped by their training and background than are other types of organizational managers.

The caricature of both institutional theory and resource dependency theory in the literature suggests environmental determinism. The theme of coercive pressures and related resource dependency, for instance, is oversimplified to suggest the restructuring of organizational prerogative as organizations import externally validated and required structures. As Powell (1991, p. 194) points out, "Institutional isomorphism appears as somehow external to human action, as a source of binding constraint. We neglected, however, to emphasize that *each form of constraint is, in varying ways also a form of enablement*. Constraints open up possibilities at the same time as they restrict or deny others" (emphasis added). Further, it does not take too careful a reading of these literatures to find a concern with forms of human agency such as resistance to environmental pressures (DiMaggio 1988; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Oliver 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, chaps. 5–8). In addition to folding institutional and resource dependency theories together, I suggest giving equal status to the idea that individuals and institutional structure interact in a dialectic (see Sewell 1992).[18] This will create what might be termed "strategic institutional theory."

Strategic institutional theorists must look at managers' reactions to and interactions with environmental pressures. Organizations are buffeted by institutional pressures. But organizations have some defense mechanisms against such pressures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest two: rituals of good faith and loose coupling. In their work on organizational responses to the technical environment, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest two other strategies for which there was some evidence in this study: creative enactment of the environment on the part of museum managers (clever funding arrangements) and buffering artistic content by changing exhibition format. This research suggests an additional mechanism, resource shifting within the organization.

Organizations and the Sociology of Culture

Sociologists have come to understand that art is not produced in a vacuum. Social and production features of arts distribution channels have perhaps as much or even more influence on the content of art as aesthetic criteria. Researchers have proposed a variety of mechanisms that shape art. These include filtering by gatekeepers (Hirsch 1972), industry competition, which stifles or encourages creativity (Peterson and Berger 1975), legal incentives,

---

[18] In other words, individual actors use and change institutions to their own benefit and react to institutionalized environmental pressures.

which favor certain styles or genres of art (Griswold 1981), and populariz-ing effects of market systems in contrast to patronage systems (DiMaggio and Stenberg 1985). All of these effects are organizational: the mundane, daily actions of decision makers acting in contexts such as a concentrated industry or a patronage system profoundly shape the art that constitutes that organization's output. Thus, to understand art, we must study the organizations that produce, distribute, or create it.

This article focuses on major American art museums, key organizations in the fine arts distribution system. The main focus of the article is how types of funding are related to the presentation of art. I study the exhibitions produced by museums and determine how external funding arrangements shape these exhibitions. Strategic institutional theory provides the frame for understanding the pressures funders exert on museums and to under-stand the museums' response. More specifically, the research provides a model of how funding arrangements affect art. Museum funders provide opportunities to museums, which museums are free to accept or reject. Funders do not force museums to change exhibition policy. Nevertheless, funders have a general idea of the types of exhibitions they wish to fund, and museums have ideas of exhibitions they would like to mount. More exhibitions happen where these areas overlap. Such opportunity-providing institutions stand in contrast to more frequently studied (and opportunity-reducing) gatekeeping institutions.

Art is a social product, and what is seen in museums is an important component of what art becomes institutionalized in the canon (Crane 1987; Danto 1987; Williams 1981). To the extent that museums legitimate and signal current definitions of the artistic canon, museum exhibitions influence artistic boundaries. Along these lines, the research suggests that art is shaped by mundane organizational processes. The research suggests as well that funder pressures for accessibility are mainly handled by changes in exhibition formats, and because of the actions of professional museum curators, the basis for inclusion of artworks in exhibitions re-mains art-historical merit, rather than popularity.

APPENDIX A

Museums and Time Points in Sample (Even Years Only)

Art Institute of Chicago, 1960–86
Brooklyn Museum, 1960–72, 1980–84
Cincinnati Art Museum, 1960–82
Cleveland Museum, 1960–80, 1984–86
Detroit Institute of Art, 1960–86
Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1960–86

Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, 1966–84
Museum of Modern Art, 1960–86
National Gallery, 1966–84
Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1960–84
Saint Louis Art Museum, 1960–78, 1984–86
Toledo Museum of Art, 1960, 1964, 1968–86
Wadsworth Atheneum, 1960–86
Whitney Museum, 1960–74, 1978–82
Yale Art Gallery, 1960, 1966–78, 1982–86

APPENDIX B

Exhibition Code Summary

Style

Postmodern (1); modern (2); contemporary (3); European, medieval through 19th century (4); American old masters (5); American ethnic (6); classical (7); primitive art of Asia, South America, Mexico, Africa, and Oceania (8); Asian art, not primitive (9); South American and Mexican art, not primitive (10); craft, costume, European or American decorative arts, folk art (11); commercial art, illustration, design (12); architecture (13); photography (14); film (15); local artists (16); child or community oriented (17); other (18); mixed (19); unknown style (fine arts) (20); unclear (21)

Funding

The following sources were coded "1" for yes, "0" for no: corporate, foundation, individual, government.

Layout

Retrospective or one-artist show (1); two or three artists (2); style (3); survey (4); period (5); location (country, continent, or area) (6); theme (7); heterogeneous, fine art (8); heterogeneous, decorative or primitive (9); child or community oriented (10); media (11); other (12); unclear (13)

Traveling

Exhibitions were coded "1" if they traveled, "0" if they did not.

Type

Blockbuster (1); loan exhibition (2); museum collection (3); patron collection (4); juried exhibition (5); artist collection (6); art school (7); other (8)

REFERENCES

Alexander, Victoria D. 1996a. "Environmental Constraints and Organizational Strategies: Complexity, Conflict, and Coping in the Nonprofit Sector." In *Private Action and the Public Good,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Elisabeth Clemens. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, in press.
———. 1996b. "From Philanthropy to Funding: The Effects of Corporate and Public Support on American Art Museums." *Poetics: Journal of Empirical Research on Literature, the Media and Arts,* vol. 23, in press.
———. 1996c. *Museums and Money: The Impact of Funding on Exhibitions, Scholarship, and Management.* Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, in press.
Allen, Barbara Jacobsen. 1974. "Organization and Administration in Formal Organization: The Art Museum." Ph.D. dissertation. New York University.
Art Institute of Chicago. 1980–81. *Annual Report.*
Balfe, Judith Huggins. 1987. "Artworks as Symbols in International Politics." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 1:195–217.
———. 1993a. "Art Patronage: Perennial Problems, Current Complications." Pp. 306–23 in *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage,* edited by Judith Huggins Balfe. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
———. 1993b. " 'Friends of . . .': Individual Patronage through Arts Institutions." Pp. 119–33 in *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage,* edited by Judith Huggins Balfe. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
———, ed. 1993c. *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Becker, Howard S. 1982. *Art Worlds.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Benedict, Stephen, ed. 1991. *Public Money and the Muse: Essays on Government Funding for the Arts.* New York: Norton.
Blau, Judith R. 1989. *The Shape of Culture: A Study of Contemporary Cultural Patterns in the United States.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,* translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cohen, Michael, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen. 1972. "A Garbage-Can Model of Organizational Choice." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17:1–25.
Coleman, Lawrence Vail. 1939. *The Museum in America: A Critical Study.* Washington: American Association of Museums.
Crane, Diana. 1987. *The Transformation of the Avant-Garde: The New York Art World, 1940–1985.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Danto, Arthur C. 1987. *The State of the Art.* New York: Prentice-Hall.
Dauber, Kenneth. 1993. "The Indian Arts Fund and the Patronage of Native American Arts." Pp. 76–93 in *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage,* edited by Judith Huggins Balfe. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
DiMaggio, Paul J. 1982a. "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston: The Creation of an Organizational Base for High Culture in America." *Media, Culture and Society* 4:33–50.
———. 1982b. "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston, Part II: The Classification and Framing of American Art." *Media, Culture and Society* 4:303–22.
———. 1986a. "Introduction." Pp. 3–13 in *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint,* edited by Paul DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1986b. "Can Culture Survive the Marketplace?" Pp. 65–92 in *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint,* edited by Paul DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press.
———. 1986c. "Support for the Arts from Independent Foundations." Pp. 113–39

in *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint,* edited by Paul DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press.

————, ed. 1986*d*. *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint.* New York: Oxford University Press.

————. 1988. "Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory." Pp. 3–21 in *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment,* edited by Lynne G. Zucker. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger.

————. 1991*a*. "The Museum and The Public." Pp. 39–50 in *The Economics of Art Museums,* edited by Martin Felstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

————. 1991*b*. "Decentralization of Arts Funding from the Federal Government to the States." Pp. 216–56 in *Public Money and the Muse: Essays on Government Funding for the Arts,* edited by Stephen Benedict. New York: Norton.

————. 1991*c*. "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920–1940." Pp. 267–92 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48:147–60.

————. 1991. "Introduction." Pp. 1–38 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Kristin Stenberg. 1985. "Why Do Some Theatres Innovate More than Others?" *Poetics* 14:107–22.

DiMaggio, Paul J., and Michael Useem. 1978. "Social Class and Arts Consumption: The Origin and Consequences of Class Differences in Exposure to the Arts in America." *Theory and Society* 5:141–61.

Dobbin, Frank. 1994. *Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dubin, Stephen C. 1992. *Arresting Images: Impolitic Art and Uncivil Actions.* New York: Routledge.

Feld, Alan L., Michael O'Hare, and J. Mark Davidson Schuster. 1983. *Patrons Despite Themselves: Taxpayers and Arts Policy.* New York: New York University Press.

Feldstein, Martin, ed. 1991. *The Economics of Art Museums.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco. 1983–85. *Report.*

Frey, Bruno S., and Werner W. Pommerehne. 1989. *Muses and Markets: Explorations in the Economics of the Arts.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Galaskiewicz, Joseph. 1985. *Social Organization of an Urban Grants Economy: A Study of Corporate Contributions to Nonprofit Organizations.* New York: Academic Press.

Galligan, Ann M. 1993. "The Politicization of Peer-Review Panels at the NEA." Pp. 254–72 in *Paying the Piper: Causes and Consequences of Art Patronage,* edited by Judith Huggins Balfe. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Gingrich, Arnold. 1969. *Business and the Arts: An Answer to Tomorrow.* New York: Eriksson.

Glennon, Lorraine. 1988. "The Museum and the Corporation: New Realities." *Museum News* 66 (3): 36–43.

Griswold, Wendy. 1987. "American Character and the American Novel: An Expansion of Reflection Theory in the Sociology of Literature." *American Journal of Sociology* 86:740–65.

Hirsch, Paul M. 1972. "Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organization-Set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems." *American Journal of Sociology* 77:639–59.

Holsti, Ole R. 1969. *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Janson, Anthony F. 1986. *History of Art*, 3d ed. New York: Abrams.

Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism." Pp. 143–63 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lieberson, Stanley. 1985. *Making It Count: The Improvement of Social Research and Theory*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Lowry, W. McNeil, ed. 1984. *The Arts and Public Policy in the United States*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Martorella, Rosanne. 1990. *Corporate Art*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

———, ed. 1996. *Art and Business: An International Perspective on Sponsorship*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, in press.

McGuigan, Cathleen, with Shawn Doherty, Janet Huck, and Maggie Malone. 1985. "A Word from Our Sponsor: Increasing Ties between Big Business and the Art World Raise Some Delicate Questions." *Newsweek*, November 25, pp. 96–98.

Meyer, John W., and Brian Rowan. 1977. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." *American Journal of Sociology* 83:340–63.

Meyer, John W., and W. Richard Scott, eds. 1992. *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality*, 2d ed. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Meyer, John W., W. Richard Scott, and Terrence E. Deal. 1983. "Institutional and Technical Sources of Organizational Structures: Explaining the Structure of Educational Organizations." Pp. 45–67 in *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality*, edited by John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Meyer, Karl E. 1979. *The Art Museum: Power, Money, Ethics*. New York: Morrow.

Moulin, Raymonde. 1987. *The French Art Market: A Sociological View*, translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Namenwirth, J. Zvi, and Robert Philip Weber. 1987. *Dynamics of Culture*. Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Netzer, Dick. 1978. *The Subsidized Muse: Public Support for the Arts in the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Odendahl, Teresa. 1987a. "Foundations and the Nonprofit Sector." Pp. 27–42 in *America's Wealthy and the Future of Foundations*, edited by Teresa Odendahl. New York: Foundation Center.

———. 1987b. "Independent Foundations and Wealthy Donors: An Overview." Pp. 1–26 in *America's Wealthy and the Future of Foundations*, edited by Teresa Odendahl. New York: Foundation Center.

———. 1990. *Charity Begins at Home: Generosity and Self-Interest among the Philanthropic Elite*. New York: Basic.

Oliver, Christine. 1991. "Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes." *Academy of Management Review* 16:145–79.

Orrù, Marco, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, and Gary G. Hamilton. 1991. "Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia." Pp. 361–89 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Peterson, Richard A., and David G. Berger. 1975. "Cycles in Symbol Production: The Case of Popular Music." *American Sociological Review* 40:158–73.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald R. Salancik. 1978. *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective*. New York: Harper & Row.

Porter, Robert, ed. 1981. *A Guide to Corporate Giving in the Arts*. New York: American Council for the Arts.

Powell, Walter W. 1991. "Expanding the Scope of Institutional Analysis." Pp. 183–

203 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Powell, Walter W., and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991. *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Robinson, Rick E. 1987. "Why *This* Piece? On the Choices of Collectors in the Fine Arts." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago.

San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. 1988. *Annual Report.*

Scott, W. Richard, and John W. Meyer. 1991. "The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early Evidence." Pp. 108–40 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sewell, William H. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation." *American Journal of Sociology* 98:1–29.

Silverman, Debora. 1986. *Selling Culture: Bloomingdale's, Diana Vreeland, and the New Aristocracy of Taste in Reagan's America.* New York: Pantheon.

Stout, Suzanne Kay. 1992. "The Dynamics of Organizational Linkages: The Case of Higher Education and Philanthropy." Ph.D. dissertation. Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.

Thompson, James D. 1967. *Organizations in Action.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Useem, Michael. 1985. *The Inner Circle: Large Corporations and the Rise of Business and Political Activity in the U.S. and the U.K.* New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1987. "Corporate Philanthropy." Pp. 340–59 in *The Handbook of Non-Profit Organizations,* edited by Walter W. Powell. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Useem, Michael, and Stephen I. Kutner. 1986. "Corporate Contributions to Culture and the Arts: The Organization of Giving and the Influence of the Chief Executive Officer and of Other Firms on Company Contributions in Massachusetts." Pp. 93–112 in *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint,* edited by Paul DiMaggio. New York, Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1946. "Class, Status and Party." Pp. 180–95 in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,* edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weick, Karl E. 1979. *The Social-Psychology of Organizing,* 2d ed. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Williams, Raymond. 1981. *The Sociology of Culture.* New York: Schocken.

Zolberg, Vera L. 1974. *The Art Institute of Chicago: The Sociology of a Cultural Organization.* Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago.

———. 1981. "Conflicting Visions in American Art Museums." *Theory and Society* 10:103–25.

———. 1986. "Tensions of Mission in American Art Museums." Pp. 184–98 in *Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint,* edited by Paul DiMaggio. New York: Oxford University Press.

Zucker, Lynne G. 1991. "The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence." Pp. 83–107 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.