Hooked on a Subsidy: Transfers and Preferences for State Intervention*

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Abstract

Residents of areas that benefit from outside assistance may develop preferences towards more state intervention and distrust of the market economy. The paper focuses on the backward territories of the Centre and South of Italy, where a massive place-based policy (*extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno*) was implemented over the second half of the twentieth century (from 1950 to 1992). We leverage quasi-experimental variation in public transfers to show that people's attitudes towards state intervention have been shaped permanently in the subsidized areas. We also document that these preferences do not depend on the long-term economic impact of the policy, which was very small, and are empirically well distinguishable from other attitudes in favor of populist instances.

JEL codes: H2, I38, P16, R58
Keywords: Preferences for state intervention, Transfers, Place-based policies

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1. Introduction

The recent global developments have implied a surge in state intervention in the economy to counter the downturn that followed the Covid-19 pandemic (see for instance the IMF Fiscal Monitor, *April 2020*). This is likely to rekindle interests towards unintended consequences of public transfers. In particular, transfers might lead to preference adaptation in favor of more welfare policies and against free markets. The exposure to significant state presence might decrease the extent to which society believes that individual effort determines incomes (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Corneo and Gruner, 2002). If a society believes that effort has only a little role in determining wealth, it will levy high taxes and provide even more generous subsidies, thus distorting allocations and making these beliefs self-sustained. A vicious circle of redistributive policies and preference for state intervention might arise (Alesina and Angeletos, 2004; Benabou, 2008). Transfers that are supposed to alleviate economic imbalances can become shackles from which it is difficult to break free.

To shed light on the role of transfers in shaping preferences for state intervention in the economy, we study a large place-based policy, the *extraordinary intervention*, conducted in Italy over the second half of the twentieth century. The program was born under the auspices of the World Bank and was carried out by a state-owned agency called *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno*[1] (CasMez), which between 1950 and 1992 conveyed large amounts of financial resources towards backward areas of Southern Italy. The policymaker's goal was to stimulate industrial development in these areas, by building infrastructures and bestowing transfers in the form of grants and low-interest (concessional) loans. Initially led by a technocratic steering committee, the management of the CasMez shifted over the years in the hands of local and nationwide politicians. CasMez resources, predominantly used to finance infrastructures in the 1950s, were progressively moved to money transfers to local communities with mere redistributive purposes (Battilani and Fauri, 2008; Cafiero, 2000; Felice and Lepore, 2017).

We document that in 2013 – more than two decades after the termination of the program – having received regional aid in the past is still a significant predictor of local preferences for state intervention. Our econometric test elaborates on the 2013 Italian general election, which elicited in an unprecedented manner people's attitudes towards welfare policies following the appearance of a

[1] The territories of Southern Italy are typically referred to as *Mezzogiorno* ("midday").

new party (*5-Star Movement*) with a political platform focused on a large redistributive program (*reddito di cittadinanza*). To gauge these preferences, we combine the scores developed by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020), which denote a party's position across different categories, with the municipality-level vote shares at the 2013 election. We focus on three categories that best capture state intervention in the economy: "Free market economy", "Market regulation" and "Welfare state expansion". We also calculate a synthetic index of the three that summarizes voters' preferences for state intervention. To quantify state transfers, we use a novel dataset that stores recently digitized records about CasMez activities (transfers and infrastructure investments) since the agency's inception in 1950. We are able to geocode most of these interventions at the municipality level, ending up with a dataset reporting the financial resources allocated by the CasMez from 1950 to 1992 for around 3,000 municipalities in ten Italian regions.

The specific locations targeted by regional policies are not randomly picked but tend to differ from other areas in terms of economic dynamism and local business conditions (Neumark and Simpson, 2015). To the extent that such differences are correlated with the local preferences for state intervention, a simple unconditional comparison of treated (subsidized) versus untreated municipalities gives rise to critical selection issues. We employ a variety of alternative identification strategies to address these issues. We start by using the historical border separating the CasMez territorial jurisdiction from the rest of Italy and run a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) experiment. For identification purposes (Dell, 2010), this border has two desirable features. First, it does not overlap with any of the administrative partitions that delimit Italy's regional jurisdictions. Moreover, it has never been considered under the EU cohesion policy of the last two decades, nor for any other recent place-based program in the country. Using historical records of parliamentary discussions, we further document how the setting of the border was immune to political interests, which we confirm by testing discontinuities in vote shares before 1950. We also fail to detect other relevant jumps in baseline geographic, economic and demographic covariates at the cutoff. Thus, any difference in outcomes across this border refers to the past exposure to the CasMez intervention. Our index of preferences for state intervention shows a sizable discontinuity, equivalent to roughly three quarters of a standard deviation, at the CasMez border. Municipalities in the treated area feature more pronounced preferences for market regulation and welfare policies and less pronounced preferences for free markets relative to municipalities just north of the border.

However, the RD design is unable to disentangle the effect of transfers only, as also infrastructure spending changes discontinuously at the cutoff. In addition, the external validity of RD estimates can

be very low away from the frontier that gives rise to the discontinuity. We thus move to a selection-on-observables set-up that exploits an institutional source of cross-municipality variation in transfers within the assisted area – the so-called Industrial Zones. These were groups of municipalities subject to more intense intervention from the CasMez and whose establishment was subject to the examination of a well-defined set of observables. By taking advantage of a rich historical archive of municipality-level data, we exploit the establishment criteria in a propensity score matching design that compares municipalities belonging to Industrial Zones with otherwise identical municipalities outside of a Zone, which happened to receive much lower transfers. We document that an increase in cumulative transfers of 1,000 real euros (2011 prices) per capita is associated with an increase in our synthetic measure of preferences for state intervention equivalent to slightly more than one tenth of a standard deviation.

The empirical strategies we employ point to the same conclusion: residents of more subsidized places have developed a strong and long-lasting attachment to state intervention in the economy. Our estimates are remarkably stable and survive a battery of robustness tests. In particular, to make sure that our proxies for state intervention do not mistakenly reflect anti-establishment attitudes of local voters, we document that past exposure to CasMez transfers does not predict established measures of populism (Inglehart and Norris, 2019) or the 1994 votes for *Forza Italia*, a right-wing party that ran for the first time at the 1994 general election with a strong anti-establishment narrative but a pro-market platform. We also document that the program had no tangible long-term economic returns, as measured by per capita incomes and labor market outcomes. Therefore, the estimated effect on preferences does not appear to be driven by the effectiveness of public transfers in delivering self-sustained growth or any other economic benefit to the targeted areas. We thus explore an alternative channel related to the potential policy impact on individual preferences and attitudes in the communities involved. Using data from the European Values Survey, we illustrate how individuals who were more exposed to CasMez funding when aged 18-25 – the so-called "impressionable years", a time when individual core beliefs and attitudes crystalize (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014) – display strong preferences for state intervention and tend to distrust free market institutions more. Last, we collect individual-level data from the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth and show that the previous results could reflect a more general change in attitudes and values, with past generosity in subsidies being associated with higher risk aversion, stronger impatience, and less generalized trust.

What we refer to as preferences for state intervention (our main outcome) is in all effects a multifaceted index that encompasses a range of categories such as regulation, free markets and welfare policies. As such, our investigation contributes to the stream of literature that studies the determinants of preferences for redistribution and the welfare state (for an excellent review see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Economic theory suggests that the current and expected individual economic status plays a central role in shaping these preferences (Meltzer and Richards, 1981; Benabou and Ok, 2001)[2]. However, a number of other factors have been shown to matter for the formation and adaptation of individual preferences. One such factor is the local economic condition: a relatively rich person living in a depressed area, for example, might even favor redistributive policies to the extent that they provide a public good at the local level (Luttmer, 2001). Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) underscore the importance of the historical macroeconomic environment: those who experienced a recession when young tend to believe that economic success depends more on luck than effort and support redistribution more.[3] Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) also investigate the role of political regimes in the adaptation of people's preferences. They document how individuals that have lived under the Communist regime in East Germany display more favorable attitudes towards the role of the state in providing social services and redistribution relative to West Germans after reunification.[4] In our paper, we study whether prolonged experience of subsidization and state presence in the past has led to a persistent adaptation of preferences. In this regard, our paper is most closely related to Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), with two important differences. First, we are able to quantify the actual amount of state transfers and directly relate it to people's preferences. Second and most importantly, we do not focus on a stark regime difference such as that between East and West Germany but leverage the territorial differentiation of state intervention *within* the same institutional setting. The broad use of place-based policies makes the latter a rather common circumstance nowadays, which in turn makes our predictions arguably more relevant for policymakers.

Our paper also relates to the literature assessing the role of place-based policies. These policies are widespread all over the world and their effects on local economic growth have been widely explored

[2] For instance, a below-median earner is expected to be in favor of redistribution because she is going to benefit from it. Prospects of future upward mobility also matter: those who expect their incomes to grow may be averse to redistribution, because they may bear the cost in the future.

[3] Malmendier and Nagel (2011) follow a similar approach and observe how the external macroeconomic environment determines risk attitudes.

[4] In related work, Laudenbach et al. (2020) show that the persistent pro-communist attitudes of East Germans induce them to participate less to the stock market. Similarly, Corneo and Gruner (2002) find that former exposure to socialism is an important predictor of current preferences for redistribution.

(e.g., Becker et al., 2010; Busso et al., 2013; Kline and Moretti, 2014a). To the best of our knowledge, their impact on the preferences and attitudes of people within recipient regions has never been investigated. Among other things, there is currently a hot debate, both in the US and Europe, on the need for more regional transfers. Recent socio-economic shocks have been unevenly distributed across territories (Becker et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), in a context where market-based convergence mechanisms, such as the flow of people to high-income regions and of capital toward poorer areas, work only imperfectly (Austin et al., 2018). Rajan (2019) suggests that regional interventions represent a powerful tool to support local communities as relevant elements of a healthy market economy. The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic at the local level is also likely to be quite heterogeneous (OECD, 2020). Our contribution introduces a new perspective on the debate on place-based intervention. By persistently changing people's preferences, encouraging, in particular, attitudes in favor of welfare policies and distrust of free markets, these interventions might have unintended long-term consequences.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief historical overview of the *extraordinary intervention* in favor of the South of Italy. Section 3 illustrates the 2013 electoral context and the central role that state intervention had in that election. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results, derived from different identification strategies. Section 6 sheds some light on the mechanisms behind our findings. Section 7 concludes, highlighting the policy implications of our analysis.

2. The CasMez: historical background

Reducing the stark economic divide between Southern regions and the rest of the country was among the most pressing issues faced by the Italian policymakers after the end of World War II. Regional policy was then introduced in 1950 under the name of *extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno*, with the goal of promoting self-sustaining economic development for the lagging South. The government agency in charge of the intervention was the CasMez, established in 1950 with an initial ten-year mandate and charged with the management of ample financial endowments. CasMez

expenditures have been estimated at slightly less than 1 percent of Italy's GDP, on average each year over the four decades of the *extraordinary intervention* (Felice and Lepore, 2017).[5]

During its first decade of activity, the agency's mandate was that of providing southern territories with basic infrastructural endowments. The CasMez managed the execution of public investments in a range of domains including transport, water supply networks and agriculture. A new phase of the *extraordinary intervention* began in 1957, when the mandate shifted towards the direct promotion of entrepreneurial activities.[6] The agency's primary goal became that of stimulating industrial development in the Mezzogiorno, which had to be pursued by compensating local firms for the less dynamic business environment they were facing. Grants were disbursed to finance firm investments for building new plants, enlarging existing ones or purchasing machinery. Moreover, the CasMez could concede further grants on interest payments borne by firms on low-interest (concessional) loans. The concession of these transfers was tied to the creation of new jobs in the area. Infrastructural intervention remained part of the business, but its primary target gradually shifted from agriculture to the needs of the industrial sector.

CasMez expenditures throughout the 1950s and the 1960s were managed by a steering committee of experts, a technocratic body whose decisions were characterized by centralized processes and great independence from the political agenda. Starting with Law n. 717/1965 and more decisively with Law n. 853/1971, however, the autonomy of the agency was progressively hampered as the newly instituted regional governments played a more and more prominent role into the *extraordinary intervention*. Many of the decision-making prerogatives, originally in the hands of CasMez, shifted to regional policymakers. Local bureaucrats gradually replaced CasMez technicians in the planning and evaluation of the interventions, with particular regards to firm subsidies that became, in all effects, transfers to local communities. Delegates from Southern regions were admitted to the agency's board and CasMez regional offices were opened. The cost of the program jumped from a total of around 49 billion euros (2011 prices) disbursed between 1950 and 1970 to almost 120 billion euros from 1971 to 1986 (Felice and Lepore, 2017). It has been argued that the meddling of nationwide and local politicians into the *extraordinary intervention* resulted into sub-efficient allocations, led by mere welfare purposes (for an empirical investigation see D'Adda and de Blasio, 2017). The *extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno* was gradually phased out and officially

[5] In per capita terms, CasMez expenses amounted to roughly 200 real euros (2011 prices) yearly. They compare well with other very generous regional policies, such as the EU Structural Funds Program (1989-current; Becker et al., 2010) and the German Zonenrandgebiet (1971-1990; von Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018).

[6] See in particular Law n. 634/1957 and Law n. 555/1959.

terminated in 1992, as the large and complex system of state holdings was being dismantled or privatized.

3. The 2013 Italian general election: a vote on state intervention

A fundamental empirical challenge that arises when studying social preferences and their drivers is that preferences are hard to elicit and measure. We propose here to capture people's attitudes towards state intervention by looking at how different Italian parties, characterized by contrasting views on this issue, fared at the 2013 Italian general election. What justifies our focus on this particular election is that it elicited voters' preferences towards state intervention in a way that was unprecedented in the recent political history of the country. The appearance of a new political faction, the 5-Star Movement, in the national political arena as a strong contender to mainstream parties forcefully directed the public debate in the run-up to the 2013 vote towards welfare issues and the role of the state in the economy.

The political platform of the 5-Star Movement was centered upon the so-called *reddito di cittadinanza* (citizen's income), a monetary transfer in favor of low-income, unemployed households. While the proposal had no explicit territorial targeting, the long-established economic disparities between different areas of the country made it in all effects a proposal of regional redistribution. Indeed, the *reddito* was discussed in the political arena as such. In the words of the Movement's leader Beppe Grillo two weeks before the election to be held in late February: "*The first thing we will do, after entering the Parliament, is to introduce a citizen's income to save people*"[7]. For the first time in the recent political history of the country, a relevant party put redistribution at the top of its political agenda. The Movement put forward many other proposals explicitly aimed at hardening regulation and thwarting market competition. For instance, listed in their manifesto were the introduction of salary caps for managers of listed companies, as well as a proposal preventing the dismantlement of manufacturing firms active only in the domestic market. This sparked broad and unprecedented public interest into welfare policies and, more in general, into the role of the state in the economy. This becomes clear when looking at the volume of Google searches related to the basic income topic (Figure 1), which gradually increased in the weeks right before the election and skyrocketed during

[7] See https://basicincome.org/news/2013/03/italy-5-star-movement-and-the-confusing-proposal-of-a-citizens-income/ and https://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2013/02/13/elezioni-grillo-primo-provvedimento-m5s-sara-reddito-di-cittadinanza.

election week. No comparable spikes in interest for basic income can be detected since 2004, the first year of data available on Google Trends.

A natural measure of population attitudes towards state intervention could be provided by the votes share obtained by the 5-Star Movement at the 2013 election. However, this would be an imperfect gauge of such attitudes, for a number of reasons. First, welfare policies and regulation were not the only electoral promises brought about by the 5-Star Movement, hence they might not have been the sole drivers of the party's performance at the polls. Indeed, the Movement's platform included a few other innovative proposals such as a focus on renewable energy sources, the removal of party funding and even a referendum on euro membership. In this regard, however, the visual evidence provided in Figure 1 is somewhat compelling. While a broad interest in basic income can be clearly noted, such pattern is not discernible for the other search topics. More importantly, we are concerned that the marked anti-establishment connotation of the 5-Star Movement also played a key role in determining the party's success at the 2013 election. That said, we will provide ample evidence that past exposure to CasMez transfers does not predict populist attitudes of voters, while it is robustly associated with their preferences for state intervention.

[Figure 1]

A second issue is that welfare-related instances were present in the political manifestos of other traditional parties, albeit with less urgency and clamor than for the 5-Star Movement. This would imply that only looking at the Movement's electoral performance would deliver an incomplete picture of the preferences for state intervention of the Italian voters. A last, crucial issue is related to the relatively recent establishment of the Movement (2009). On the one hand, this serves our purposes well as it implies that the decision to vote for the Movement in 2013 was solely based on its political platform, rather than on the party's behavior in the past. On the other hand, however, the lack of historical information would prevent us from observing our outcome of interest before the beginning of the *extraordinary intervention*.

The above reasons lead us to consider alternative, more suitable outcomes. We build indices of population preferences for state intervention using party-specific scores developed by the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2020), envisaged to capture how particular economic and social categories are supported across political platforms. The Manifesto Project is a large-scale initiative that collects data on the programmatic supply of over 1,000 parties from 1945 until today in more than 50

countries, by covering a number of issues related to political ideology and party preferences. Specifically, for each party and election year, the score associated to a particular category (e.g., Environmental protection) is computed using the incidence of sentences related to that category in the party's publicly available political manifesto. We narrow our focus to three main categories that are linked to the topic of state intervention and display sufficient variation across parties: "Free market economy", "Market regulation" and "Welfare state expansion". We then build our outcome variables by standardizing these party-level scores between 0 and 100 to ensure comparability and mapping them at the municipality level by using the local party shares in each election year. In formulas:

$$score_m^t = \sum_j share_{j,m}^t \cdot manifesto\_score_j^t \quad (1)$$

Where $score_m^t$ is the municipality-year specific outcome, $share_{j,m}^t$ is the votes share of party j in municipality m and election year t and $manifesto\_score_j^t$ is party j's (standardized) score computed by the Manifesto project for election year t. Importantly, we can build such measures in 1946, which enables us to test the balancing properties of our outcomes prior to the program, as well as for the election years towards the end of the *extraordinary intervention* to assess the short-term policy impact on local preferences. We also construct a synthetic index using the first principal component of the three scores, which we then standardize and combine with vote shares for each party. This will be our preferred outcome throughout the analysis, since single items could be affected by random errors and statistical noise in their coding (Budge et al., 2001; Benoit et al., 2009). We provide a graphical illustration of this index in the left panel of Figure 2.

4. Other data sources

We obtain detailed information about CasMez activities since its inception in 1950 from the ASET[8] database. We are able to access records for more than 100,000 firm grants and more than 70,000 infrastructure projects between 1950 and 1992. Each record contains basic information such as the year of the approval of the intervention and the total financial resources allocated. Conveniently, we are able to geocode most of these interventions at the municipality level. We thus collapse the data to

[8] The ASET (Archives for Economic and Regional Development) Project has been launched in 2013 with the goal of cataloguing all activities performed within the *extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno*.

obtain a dataset reporting CasMez expenses between 1950 and 1992 for around 3,000 municipalities located in ten Italian regions,[9] split by intervention type (transfers and infrastructure spending).

Transfers display large cross-sectional variation across municipalities, as is clear from the right panel of Figure 2. The most subsidized regions have been Abruzzo and Sardinia with total transfers of around 8,000 euros (2011 prices) per capita; such amount hovers instead around 2,000 euros in Marche and Calabria. Most transfers were destined to manufacturing firms, especially those operating in the chemical, food, construction and textile sectors. Campania and Apulia were the regions where most establishments – between 3,000 and 4,000 in each region – were recipient of CasMez funds. In relative terms, Abruzzo was the region featuring the highest share of covered establishments - 2 per 1,000 persons against an average of 1 across regions.

[Figure 2]

We complement our dataset with a rich set of controls for geographic, demographic and economic characteristics for each municipality, sourced from decennial Census data starting in 1951. We further collect data on taxable income sourced from the Italian Finance Ministry, municipality-level public expenditures from the Italian Ministry of Interior and inflows of European Structural funds from the OpenCoesione database. Lastly, we gather individual-level survey data from the European Values Survey (EVS) and the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). In particular, the EVS provides us with measures of preferences for state intervention that are not inferred from voting outcomes but elicited directly from people. The SHIW reports instead more general attitudes and values such as risk preferences, impatience and trust.

5. Empirical analysis

This section illustrates our main results. We begin (5.1) by comparing areas inside the program's jurisdiction with areas just outside of it, in the context of a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design. We then (5.2) seek variation in firm grants within the CasMez territory to uncover the impact on local preferences of a marginal change in a municipality's exposure to transfers.

[9] Abruzzo, Basilicata, Calabria, Campania, Lazio, Marche, Molise, Apulia, Sardinia and Sicily. A small number of interventions carried out in some islands of Tuscany are excluded from the sample.

5.1 The CasMez border

Identifying the causal effect of a place-based policy on people's preferences poses a serious challenge. Places targeted by public transfers tend to differ systematically from other areas. For example, the policymaker might intervene more intensively in poorer regions, or channel larger sums of money towards politically connected municipalities. These differences between treated and control areas might be correlated with local preferences and generate spurious correlation with the treatment. In turn, this will invalidate any empirical strategy that simply compares municipalities that are differentially exposed to transfers. Controlling for municipality characteristics overcomes this challenge only in part, as long as the allocation mechanism remains unknown and unobserved factors are not ruled out.

To correctly identify the effect of interest, we exploit the definition of the program's territorial jurisdiction as a source of exogenous variation in CasMez transfers. The Italian Mezzogiorno is traditionally defined as the macro-region coinciding with the territories of the six southernmost Italian regions plus the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. This region is separated by the rest of Italy by the upper borders of Abruzzo, Campania and Molise. At the time of institution of the *extraordinary intervention* and definition of the covered area, however, the policymaker set the northern boundary of the CasMez jurisdiction above those administrative borders to include some neighboring municipalities in Lazio and Marche. This area was defined in 1950 (a time when the program was supposed to last for ten years only) and remained unchanged for four decades (Figure 3).

[Figure 3]

Figure 4 provides a clear depiction of our "first stage", by showing a sizable jump in firm transfers at the CasMez border. We leverage this discontinuity by applying a spatial sharp RD design and estimate the following equation:

$$score_{m,p,b}^{2013} = \alpha + \beta \cdot T_{m,p,b} + f\left(distance_{m,p,b}\right) + \gamma_p + \varphi_b + \varepsilon_{m,p,b} \quad (2)$$

where $score_{m,p,b}^{2013}$ is the 2013 preference score for municipality m in province p and closest to border segment b, $T_{m,p,b}$ is a dummy variable equal to one if municipality m belongs to the CasMez area and zero otherwise, $f\left(distance_{m,p,b}\right)$ is a third-order polynomial in the geodetic distance between

municipality m's centroid and the closest point of the border, γ_p are province (NUTS-3) fixed effects and φ_b are border-segment fixed effects accounting for the municipality's location in the country.

[Figure 4]

The main identifying assumption behind our spatial RD approach is the continuity of potential outcomes at the CasMez border. The basic idea is that only the treatment status changes discontinuously at the border, while other relevant municipality characteristics remain smooth. In turn, this allows to separate the effect of the policy from other confounding factors (Black, 1999; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). An important threat to this assumption is that the geographic cutoff we exploit may overlap with other relevant administrative and/or historical borders (Dell, 2010; Oto-Peralias and Romero-Avila, 2017; Wahl, 2017). This implies that other factors, unrelated with the policy of interest but potentially correlated with people's preferences, might also jump at the border. This is however not a big concern in our set-up. On the one hand, the border does not systematically separate administrative regions (NUTS-2), whose importance became paramount after their establishment in 1970 (see Section 2), or provinces (NUTS-3). In fact, the border separates administrative units as small as municipalities. Given the large number of pairs of municipalities located immediately north and south of the CasMez border, it is hard to conceive that any systematic imbalance occurs at the cutoff. On the other hand, the border does not coincide with other key partitions that are relevant for the variability of public transfers today, such as that used by the European Cohesion policy (Figure 3). Another crucial observation is that the choice of the additional municipalities to be added to the program's jurisdiction was informed by technical reasons related to the execution of CasMez infrastructural projects,[10] rather than by political or economic rationales. Importantly, our treatment variable (transfers) became part of the CasMez range of interventions only in the 1960s and was not even discussed before then, so that future prospects of industrial concentration and employment were unlikely to be in the policymaker's mind when the CasMez border was being drawn.

To corroborate these claims, Table 1 checks for systematic unbalances in relevant geographic, economic and political covariates in a 50-kilometers (km) symmetric bandwidth around the cutoff.[11] If the variation in CasMez status is as-if random, other relevant baseline covariates should be

[10] For example, a part of the administrative border between Abruzzo and Marche, or between the provinces of Latina and Rome in Lazio, would have cut land reclamation areas in two parts. See the Parliamentary Discussions on Law n. 646/1950 and Law Draft Cervone-Villa (1953) for a detailed discussion.

[11] This is the same sample used in our baseline specification of Table 2.

continuous at the program's border. Columns (1) to (3) consider geographical features (coastal location, elevation and slope). Even if geographical traits might have been, at least in a few cases, relevant for the assignment to the CasMez jurisdiction (see footnote 10), we do not find evidence of systematic differences in these characteristics across the border. Columns (4) to (10) consider a set of variables determined prior to the start of the policy and related to demography (population density and dependency ratio in 1951), labor markets (employment rate and industry share in 1951) and politics (election turnout rate, share of votes for the incumbent *Christian Democrats* and our synthetic index of preferences for state intervention introduced in Section 3, as of 1946). Balancing conditions are met in all cases, supporting the view that the boundary's selection was exogenous to the pre-existing local conditions. Most crucially, our outcome does not change discontinuously at the border prior to the policy (Column 10). Columns (11) to (14) report balancing tests for a set of current (2011) outcomes, possibly affected by the policy, that could have influenced voters' preferences in 2013: income per capita, the unemployment rate, the Gini coefficient and the share of people with tertiary education. We fail to find any significant difference between treated and control municipalities, suggesting that the policy's effect on economic outcomes was nil, at least in the long run (see also Section 6 below). As explained above, regional policies that continued to subsidize the South of Italy after 1992 were not based on the same geographic partition. We confirm this in Columns (15) and (16), which show that current transfers related to municipal budget and expenditures within the European Cohesion policy (both measured as average per capita between 2008 and 2012) are balanced at the CasMez border.

[Table 1]

Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of our synthetic index capturing preferences for state intervention in 2013 around the treatment border, using varying bandwidth sizes. A neat discontinuity in the outcome is visible at the cutoff. To quantify this jump and assess its significance, Table 2 provides baseline estimates for the three individual preference scores as well as for the synthetic index, which can be visualized in Columns (1) through (4). Specifically, we estimate Equation (2) using a symmetric bandwidth of 50-km around the CasMez border and a cubic polynomial in the distance from the border. These results confirm the visual evidence of Figure 5, showing a significant effect of CasMez status on people's preferences for state intervention, except for the single item of Free markets (for which the coefficient has the expected sign but is small and non-significant). In our favorite specification (Column (4)), crossing the CasMez border implies an increase of 3.8 points in the synthetic index (75% of a standard deviation in the estimation sample).

[Figure 5 & Table 2]

Table 3 provides robustness tests for the baseline RD estimates to different specification choices. For the sake of brevity, we only present the estimation output for the synthetic index (Column (4) in Table 2) although results hold for the individual preference scores, too. Columns (1) to (3) report the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the polynomial order. Columns (4) and (5) test different bandwidth sizes (25 km and 75 km, respectively). In Column (6), we drop municipalities within 5 km of the border. This exercise ensures that our findings are not entirely driven by spillovers between nearby municipalities at the boundary. Column (7) provides the nonparametric analogues of our baseline specification using the procedure developed in Calonico et al. (2014, 2018).[12] In Column (8), standard errors are corrected to allow for spatial correlation using Conley (1999)'s procedure. In Column (9), following Dell (2010), we substitute $f(distance_{m,p,b})$ with an analogous, two-dimensional cubic polynomial in latitude and longitude. Reassuringly, the estimated coefficients are very similar to the baseline one for all these checks. Last, we show in Column (10) that preferences for state intervention in the economy have emerged already towards the end of the program's lifespan. More precisely, we find a sizable and significant discontinuity in preferences for state intervention at the 1987 general election. This suggests that a shift in preferences occurred during the long history of the policy, and then largely persisted over time. However, we would caution that this result might be driven by the contemporaneous economic effect of transfers, which were still in place at the time.

[Table 3]

It should be noted that the preference scores we compute partly reflect the votes share of the 5-Star Movement, which at the 2013 election was featuring the highest degree of support for state intervention among the running parties. Indeed, we also detect a large jump in the Movement's electoral performance at the CasMez border (Table 4, Column (1)). However, another distinctive feature of the Movement was its strong anti-establishment rhetoric. We are therefore concerned that that our results might not fully reflect differential preferences for state intervention in the population but may be contaminated by populist attitudes also associated with voting for the 5-Star Movement. This could be the case if, say, subsidized areas have also experienced more episodes of political corruption, thus leading to voters' aversion towards the political class. To provide reassuring evidence

[12] This is implemented using Stata's *rdrobust* routine described in Calonico et al. (2017).

in this regard, we perform two falsification tests. First, we replace our dependent variable with a measure of populist preferences of local voters. Specifically, we use the index built by Inglehart and Norris (2019) capturing party-level populist attitudes[13] and weigh it by local party shares at the 2013 election to obtain a municipality-level index of populist preferences. The estimated impact of CasMez status on the populism index is undistinguishable from zero, as showed in Column (2). In a second test, we look at the experience of the upsurge of Silvio Berlusconi's party (*Forza Italia*), which first ran for election in 1994. This historical comparison is particularly suited to our purposes. On the one hand, the strong populist rhetoric of Forza Italia as a new player in the political arena in 1994 (Jones and Pasquino, 2015) compares well with that of the 5-Star Movement in 2013[14]. On the other, the two political platforms were at poles apart in their economic proposals, with Forza Italia strongly adhering to the principles of market economy (Figure 6). Testing whether the support for Forza Italia in 1994 varies discontinuously at the CasMez border thus serves as a convenient placebo check. Column (3) in Table 4 documents no such discontinuity. Taken together, these two results provide reassuring pieces of evidence that our findings reflect the impact of public transfers on preferences for state intervention, rather than on populist attitudes in the electorate.

[Figure 6 & Table 4]

By and large, our findings point to a positive and significant impact of CasMez status on voters' preferences for state intervention. However, this analysis comes with three important limitations associated with the use of a spatial RD design. First and foremost, the identified causal effects are local to the CasMez frontier, which inevitably lowers their external validity. Second, this empirical design compares municipalities within the CasMez area with other municipalities outside of it, which did not happen to receive any transfer. Another policy-relevant question is whether any marginal increase in public transfers has an effect on local preferences in the long term. Third, crossing the policy boundary implies a jump in *total* CasMez expenses. These include not only transfers to local communities but also infrastructure investment. As explained above, we are mostly interested in the effect of transfers, as they gradually became the core business of the agency and a widely used tool to stimulate employment in the South of Italy. In the attempt to overcome the above limitations, we

[13] Inglehart and Norris (2019) exploit the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to capture a party's attitudes towards two main dimensions: 1) Authoritarianism, i.e. preferences towards a strictly ordered society in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely; 2) Anti-elitism, i.e. the anti-establishment ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" – and argues that politics should be an expression of the will of the people.

[14] In this regard, Durante et al. (2019) suggest that supporters of these parties share similar endowments of human and social capital.

now place ourselves *within* the CasMez jurisdiction and exploit variation in firm transfers across municipalities.

5.2 The Industrial Zones

As described above (Section 2), the main purpose of the *extraordinary intervention* was reoriented from infrastructure investment towards the direct promotion of entrepreneurship with Law n. 634 in 1957, which introduced, among other measures, the Industrial Zones. A Zone was created upon the initiative of a group of local public bodies (most commonly, a set of municipalities) to form a *consortium* and submit a general development plan for the area to both the CasMez and the government. The primary goal of the Industrial Zones was to encourage industrial concentration in specific areas of the Mezzogiorno deemed particularly suitable for industrialization, thereby directing locational choices of entrepreneurs. Importantly, the policymaker disposed that firms located within the boundaries of the Zones could benefit of additional transfers, on top of those granted in the remaining CasMez territories.[15] The ASET historical archives provide a list of the Industrial Zones, together with all the included municipalities, which we digitize and plot in Figure 7 (left panel). A quick glance back at Figure 2 suggests that transfers were largely concentrated in these areas.

Legitimate concerns would arise about the validity of an estimation strategy that simply compares municipalities belonging to Industrial Zones to all other municipalities in our sample. Important differences are likely to exist between the former and the latter, which need to be accounted for. We inspect this in Table A1, which compares the average CasMez transfer, along with a range of other observable characteristics, between municipalities within and outside of Industrial Zones. On average, cumulative transfers stand at 8,500 real euros per capita in municipalities belonging to Industrial Zones, around four times the transfer in other municipalities. Municipalities belonging to a Zone were also more likely to be a provincial capital and their geographic traits were more prone to industrialization. They featured a larger, younger and more educated population, as well as a larger industry share of the workforce, relative to other municipalities.

We exploit the fact that the inclusion of a municipality in a Zone was subject to the government's examination of a well-defined set of parameters. A sample form that a *consortium* had to fill, for each candidate municipality, when submitting its application to the government is pasted in Appendix B.

[15] See the 1965-1970 government coordination plan for public intervention in the Mezzogiorno.

The form lists a range of demographic, geographic and economic characteristics aimed at assessing the suitability of the area for future industrial concentration, such as the availability of a large and educated workforce, pre-existing industrial settlements and infrastructure endowment. Conveniently, we observe many of these (and other, likely correlated) characteristics in the 1951 census data, which we use to compute the predicted probability of belonging to a Zone for each municipality. Specifically, we estimate the following logit regression:

$$e_{m,p} \equiv \Pr\left(IZ_{m,p} = 1 \mid W_{m,p}, \gamma_p, \varepsilon_{m,p}\right) = \Phi(\alpha + \gamma_p + W'_{m,p} \cdot \beta + \varepsilon_{m,p}) \tag{3}$$

Where $IZ_{m,p}$ is a dummy variable taking value of one if municipality m in province p belongs to an Industrial Zone and value of zero otherwise. The estimation controls for municipality-level geographic characteristics (elevation, slope, coastal location) and the following covariates in 1951: (log)population and its square, number of establishments per person, share of urban residents, population density, age and gender composition, homeownership rate, illiteracy rate, share of inhabitants with a higher degree, labor market participation rate and workforce sectoral composition. Provincial capitals have been dropped from the sample as most of them were included in a Zone. We also include CasMez infrastructure spending before the establishment of the Industrial Zones to account for different pre-existing infrastructure endowments. Lastly, we control for the municipality's political orientation during the 1960s (when Industrial Zones were being created), proxied by the average votes share for the Christian Democratic party at the 1963 and 1968 election. While obviously not listed among the relevant characteristics for Zone inclusion in the official form, the position of a given municipality across the political spectrum might have influenced such decision. For instance, the incumbent government may have used Zone inclusion to reward local voters in a politically affine municipality, or to erode support for opposition parties in places where these were stronger.

We then match each municipality belonging to a Zone with another municipality lying outside of a Zone but sharing similar values of the relevant covariates based on the estimated propensity score $\widehat{e_{m,p}}$.[16] In other words, we construct a matched sample composed of pairs of municipalities that do not differ in terms of relevant characteristics but are subject to differential exposure to the treatment (CasMez transfers) based on whether they belong to a Zone (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Abadie

[16] We adopt a simple nearest-neighbor matching without replacement and within a 0.05 caliper, corresponding to roughly one quarter of the standard deviation of the estimated propensity score. The matching procedure excludes municipalities whose propensity score lies outside of the common support.

and Imbens, 2016; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). Our matched sample consists of 298 municipalities, half of which belong to a Zone, and is showed in the right panel of Figure 7.

[Figure 7]

Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A2 and confirm the overall balancing of the sample, most importantly in the covariates that, based on our investigation, were relevant for the establishment of a Zone. In addition, treated and control municipalities do not differ in the amount of infrastructure spending they received within the program. By contrast, a stark gap in the amount of CasMez transfers between municipalities remains, with those included in Industrial Zones receiving (on average) funds for almost 10,000 euros per capita versus only 2,500 in control municipalities. This ensures that, differently from the RD estimates, we are able to identify the effect of transfers only. Intuitively, this estimation procedure corresponds to using $IZ_{m,p}$ as an instrument for CasMez transfers. Correct identification thus relies on the conditional independence of potential outcomes and treatment of the Zone status. More precisely, one first requirement is that, conditional on the observed covariates, Zone status is as good as randomly assigned across municipalities[17]. Another requirement is that Zone status affects preferences for state intervention in 2013 only through the variation it induces to CasMez transfers (exclusion restriction). The existence of well-defined and observable criteria for the establishment of an Industrial Zone certainly corroborates our faith in the conditional independence assumption being satisfied. In addition, we address the valid concern that the inclusion in a Zone might also have been influenced by political incentives by also matching on municipalities' political orientation. Importantly, preferences for state intervention in 1946 are perfectly balanced across treated and control municipalities (Table A2).

We thus employ this matched sample to estimate a regression specification relating each preference score for municipality m in province p in 2013 to the total amount of transfers received from 1950 to 1992, scaled by population size in 2011:

$$score_{m,p}^{2013} = \alpha + \gamma_p + \delta \cdot \frac{\sum_{t=1950}^{1992} Transfer_{m,p,t}}{Pop_{m,p,2011}} + \varepsilon_{m,p} \qquad (4)$$

[17] In other words, two municipalities sharing similar characteristics but with different Zone status can be safely compared as the missed inclusion in a Zone is driven by factors exogenous to preferences for state intervention in 2013. This ensures that the reduced form effect of $IZ_{m,p}$ on the outcome of interest has a causal interpretation.

The estimation output is showed in Table 5. As for Table 2, we run separate regressions for each of the three individual preference scores and the synthetic index. Municipalities more intensively exposed to CasMez transfers display larger preferences for state intervention in 2013. Specifically, 1,000 real euros worth of transfers per capita (less than a fourth of the mean transfer in the estimation sample) correspond to a 0.076 points larger value of the synthetic index – a standardized effect of 12 percent of a standard deviation. Looking at the individual preference indices, the intensity of CasMez transfers is positively associated with preferences for market regulation and welfare state expansion and negatively with preferences for free markets, in line with the previous RD analysis.

[Table 5]

Table 6 presents further results and robustness exercises when estimating variations of Equation (4). We again report the estimation output for the synthetic index only (Column (4) in Table 5). Column (2) controls for CasMez infrastructure spending per capita from 1950 to 1992 and shows no tangible change in the coefficient. We are also concerned that our estimates might reflect post-1992 trends in public expenses and other regional aid. Column (3) thus controls for municipality-level public expenditure, which captures regional aid from national sources, and inflow of EU structural funds, both measured over the 5-year period before the 2013 election. Note that, conditional on municipality characteristics, we do not find any significant correlation between CasMez transfers and the other sources of regional aid. Crucially, our coefficient of interest remains very stable. Column (4) reports spatial heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-robust standard errors (Conley, 1999), which does not alter the statistical significance of our results.[18] Column (5) shows the estimation results when the explanatory variable of interest in Equation (4) is scaled by the municipality's population in 1951 (pre-treatment) rather than in 2011. The estimated coefficient remains stable overall, which alleviates concerns that our previous results might be driven by population changes in response to the policy.

[Table 6]

Lastly, in Table (7) we confirm the previous finding that higher CasMez transfers are not associated with more pronounced populist attitudes from voters. Column (1) shows that an increase in transfers leads to more votes for the 5-Star Movement, with a standardized effect roughly equal to one tenth of a standard deviation. However, this result does not appear to be driven by populist preferences.

[18] This is done to account for correlation between municipalities that are close but potentially belong to different provinces. Results do not change when clustering residuals by province.

This is documented in Column (2), which replaces the dependent variable with the populism index of Inglehart and Norris (2019) and in Column (3), where we use the votes share of Forza Italia in 1994[19].

[Table 7]

An inherent limitation of this strategy relative to the more robust spatial RD design employed in 5.1 is that only selection on observables can be checked. However, this drawback is compensated by the greater external validity of these results, which are by no means local to the CasMez border. It should also be noticed that the parameters identified by the two strategies are not comparable: in the latter approach, we placed ourselves *within* the CasMez territory and exploited variation in the intensity of transfers across municipalities. The RD strategy compares instead municipalities within the CasMez area with other municipalities outside of it.

6. Mechanisms

What emerges from our analysis is a robust link between the exposure to public transfers and voters' support to state-oriented political platforms a few decades after the intervention. While the employed strategies vary in terms of their identifying assumptions and relative degrees of internal and external validity, all of them point to the same conclusion: residents of heavily subsidized places have developed a long-lasting attachment to state intervention. In this section, we offer some suggestive empirical evidence of the mechanisms underlying the above results.

6.1 Long-term economic effects of the policy

A first, relevant question to be addressed is whether CasMez transfers have had long-lasting economic consequences on the subsidized areas. While conducting a thorough empirical evaluation of the *extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno* is beyond the scope of this paper, a better understanding of our results does require some insight into the economic effects of the policy. An increase in public transfers towards a specific region mechanically results into higher wealth and consumption possibilities in that region. The implications on attitudes towards state intervention in the long-term depend on whether such wealth gains are persistent. To the extent that the economic

[19] The lower number of observations in Column (7) is due to the fact that 57 of the 298 municipalities in our matched sample belong to Puglia, where Forza Italia did not run at the 1994 election.

benefits to the area generated by the policy are self-sustaining, residents would have less incentives to support welfare-oriented political platforms. By contrast, if the increase in wealth is short-lived, voters are more likely to call for more state intervention as the past economic benefits dissipate.

Our results would therefore be consistent with nil long-run economic effects of the policy. Indeed, this is what we observe in the data. Some evidence on such effects was already reported in Section 5.1, where we detected no jump in income per capita, unemployment and income inequality across the CasMez border in 2011 (Table 1, Panel B). We complement this evidence by estimating the impact of CasMez transfers on income per capita, employment and unemployment rate in 2011 (Table 8) using the same empirical strategy as in Section 5.2. Overall, we fail to find convincing evidence of positive long-run effects of CasMez transfers on economic outcomes. This result corroborates our main results but raises an important question. Why would people vote for more state intervention even in the absence of long-term economic benefits? We argue below that this can be rationalized by the persistent effects that decades of public transfers have had on individual attitudes and preferences.

[Table 8]

6.2 Attitudes and preferences: individual-level analysis

To substantiate the claim that CasMez transfers led to a persistent change in people's preferences, we match our municipality-level dataset on CasMez interventions with other data sources. In particular, we look for more direct measures of preferences that are not deduced from voting outcomes. We begin by exploiting the 2008 wave of the European Values Survey (EVS), which contains a small set of questions on individual preferences for state intervention. Conveniently, we are able to obtain a correspondent EVS index for each of the three categories we sourced from party manifestos. Specifically, attitudes toward "Free market economy" are measured with a self-placement scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 refers to "the state should control firms more effectively" and 10 to "the state should give more freedom to firms". We then measure preferences for "Welfare state expansion" with the self-placement scale ranging from 1 ("there should be greater incentives for individual effort") to 10 ("incomes should be made more equal"). Last, we proxy "Market regulation" with the self-placement on a scale from 1 ("Competition is good, it stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas") to 10 ("Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people"). As before, we also build a synthetic index of preferences for state intervention using the first principal component of the three scores.

Unfortunately, the EVS does not report the respondent's municipality, but only the region (NUTS-2). This implies that the degree of spatial variation we dispose of in this case is too limited, which induces us to modify our estimation approach. We take advantage of our dataset on CasMez transfers that also reports the year of each intervention and obtain a measure of CasMez exposure that varies across individuals, by exploiting both their region of residence and their birth year. Specifically, we compute for each individual the sum of CasMez (per capita) transfers in the region where she was residing at the age of 14, cumulated during her "impressionable years" (18-25 years old). We are inspired by the social psychology literature, that has characterized early adulthood as a period of "great mental plasticity", during which core beliefs and attitudes crystallize (for an application see Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014). We then estimate the following regression model relating each EVS preference measure for individual i residing in region r and born in year y to the exposure to state intervention during her impressionable years:

$$preference_{i,r,y} = \alpha + \delta \cdot \frac{\sum_{t=y+18}^{y+25} Transfer_{r,t}}{Pop_{r,2011}} + X'_{i,r,y} \cdot \beta_1 + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{i,r,y} \qquad (5)$$

The model includes a set of individual-level covariates (age and its square, gender, education level) and region identifiers. Table 9 shows our results. We document a strong and robust association between an individual's exposure to public transfers during her impressionable years and the EVS preference scores. In particular, we observe that attitudes in favor of free market weaken, while preferences for state intervention and redistribution intensify for those more exposed to CasMez intervention in their early adulthood. Although only suggestive, this finding is consistent with our previous results and corroborates the idea that transfers had a long-lasting effect on individual preferences for state intervention.

[Table 9]

In a second exercise, we explore whether the relationship we have established between past exposure to CasMez intervention and current preferences extends to more general attitudes and values. In order to do this, we exploit a restricted version of the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) - a biennial representative survey of the Italian population, conducted by the Bank of Italy and collecting detailed information on household demographic and economic characteristics including consumption, income and wealth. Crucially for our purposes, some waves of SHIW are equipped with measures of trust, risk and time preferences as the survey is largely devoted to capturing financial

choices. Conveniently, we are able to attribute each respondent to the municipality where she lives, which differently from the EVS data gives us enough spatial variation in the independent variable.

We pool three waves of SHIW (2010, 2012 and 2014) that are close to our reference year (2013) and report information on each of the three preference measures[20]. As for generalized trust, we consider the following question: *"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"*. This question is the same as the one usually adopted in all the most important social surveys (World Values Survey, General Social Survey, European Values Survey, European Social Survey). We measure risk aversion based on the following question: "*When managing your financial investments, do you consider yourself to be more oriented to investments that offer the possibility of: (1) a very high return, with a very high risk; (2) high return with a moderate degree of safety; (3) moderate return and a high degree of safety; (4) low return and no risk*". This is similar to the indicator included in the US Survey of Consumer Finances and has been employed in several studies on risk attitudes (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 2018). Lastly, we measure time preferences (impatience) using a qualitative indicator based on the following sentence: "*Suppose you were told you had won on the lottery the equivalent of your household's net annual income. The sum will be paid to you in a year's time. However, if you give up part of the sum you can have the rest immediately*". The respondent can choose between five options (from 20 to 0 percent) for the fraction they are willing to give up. This question is widely used as a way to elicit time preferences from a survey (Frederick et al., 2002). We standardize each measure to be mean zero and standard deviation one, to ensure comparability.

We then run the following specification relating each preference measure for individual i in municipality m and region r to the total amount of CasMez transfers per capita received by municipality m between 1950 and 1992:

$$preference_{i,m,r} = \alpha + \delta \cdot \frac{\sum_{t=1950}^{1992} Transfer_{m,r,t}}{Pop_{m,r,2011}} + X'_{i,m,r} \cdot \beta_1 + Z'_{m,r} \cdot \beta_2 + \gamma_r + \varepsilon_{i,m,r} \quad (6)$$

We control in each regression for a set of individual covariates (age and its square, gender, education level), municipality controls (population size, provincial capital status, coastal location, elevation and slope) and region (NUTS-2) identifiers. Table 10 shows our results. We find that differential historical exposure to CasMez transfers has a strong association with individual preferences. In particular, we

[20] Each survey wave includes different individuals. For those (very rare) cases in which the same individual is present in more than one wave, we drop that individual's record in all waves but the first one where she appears.

observe that trust decreases while risk aversion and impatience increase for those living in municipalities more exposed to CasMez intervention. This result is in line with previous evidence on socialist regimes (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Heineck and Süssmuth, 2013), and extends it to the case of a massive long-term public program in a democratic society. These variables have been identified in the literature as predictors of individual entrepreneurship (for a review see Liang et al., 2018). All in all, this evidence corroborates the hypothesis of a persistent change in preferences and attitudes in response to prolonged state intervention.

[Table 10]

7. Conclusions

This paper illustrates that transfers from a central authority to lagging areas can have a persistent impact on the preferences of those residing in these areas. Italy's local communities that were exposed to a massive place-based program from 1950 to 1992 have indeed developed a strong attachment to state intervention. We document that in 2013 – more than two decades after the termination of the program – having received aid in the past is still a significant predictor of local preferences for free markets, regulation and redistribution. These preferences are gauged at the polls, by taking advantage of political-science classification tools of party platforms. Our results are very robust and confirmed by various identification strategies, featured by different degrees of internal and external validity. We also illustrate that the program had no tangible long-term economic returns for the communities involved. Therefore, transfers were mostly used to foster unproductive (consumption) activities rather than productive (investment) ones and the persistent quest for public intervention and redistribution might well depend on the program's ineffectiveness in delivering self-sustained growth. Whether more successful programs will have a different long-term impact on people's preferences is an interesting issue that we leave to future research. When contrasting generations differentially exposed to public transfers during their "impressionable years", we find that individual measures of preferences for state intervention are consistent with those inferred from election results. Finally, our work highlights that past aid is correlated with a number of individual outcomes: it negatively predicts trust; positively predicts risk aversion and impatience. Those variables are likely to be key channels, because they are consistently related to entrepreneurship and private sector activity.

Overall, our contribution stresses that transfers should be used very carefully. In the case of the *extraordinary intervention in the Mezzogiorno*, the lack of effectiveness of the program was not the only deleterious upshot. We show that a subtler consequence – namely, a persistent preference shift

in favor of the welfare state – has derived from a place-based policy that has lasted a long time. Future research will investigate what is the role of this preference change in explaining the poor economic performance of the South of Italy. As a matter of fact, at least since the mid-1970s, this area has not been showing any tendency to growth and convergence towards the rest of Italy. The electorate's demand for protection and state presence can push party platforms more and more toward welfare measures that focus on short-term benefits, further exacerbating this divide. Lastly, we believe that our findings, albeit derived from an historical country-specific example, might be instructive for policymakers worldwide. For instance, they might be relevant for countries that receive EU cohesion aid or those that will soon receive relief financing in the Covid-19 aftermath.

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List of figures

Figure 1



Note: Relative share of weekly searches from Google Trends for the selected search topics. Each data point is divided by the total amount of searches in Italy between 2012 and 2014. Shares are then normalized on a 0-100 scale based on all searches for all topics.

Figure 2



Note: The left panel shows our synthetic index of preferences for state intervention across municipalities (see text for details). The right panel shows the total amount of firm subsidies allocated by the CasMez to each municipality between 1950 and 1992 in thousand euros (2011 prices), as a fraction of municipality population in 2011.

Figure 3



Note: The red line traces the CasMez northern border. The blue line indicates the border traditionally separating the Centre-North from the South of Italy, corresponding to regional delimitations. The green line indicates the border separating Convergence Objective and Competitiveness Objective regions in the 2007-2013 EU programming period.

Figure 4



Note: CasMez transfers are cumulated between 1950 and 1992 and scaled by population in 2011. The solid line is a third order polynomial of the outcome on the running variable, fit separately north and south of the border. The grey dots are binned means of the outcome computed within disjoint, evenly-spaced bins of the running variable. The number of bins is chosen in a data-driven way that mimics the variability of the underlying data (Calonico et al., 2015).

Figure 5



Note: The dependent variable is our baseline measure of preference for state intervention computed using the first principal component of the individual Manifesto Project scores, then weighted by the relative party votes shares in 2013. In the top (bottom) panel, the solid black line is a linear (cubic) polynomial of the outcome on the running variable, fit separately north and south of the border and accounting for border-segment and province effects. See Figure 4 and text for details.

Figure 6



Note: The figure shows the difference between the party's scores based on electoral manifestos (source: Manifesto Project) and the median score for each index among all the Italian parties in the corresponding election.

Figure 7



Note: Municipalities belonging to Industrial Zones are portrayed in the left panel. The right panel shows the matched sample used for estimation in Section 5.2.

List of tables

Table 1: CasMez Border - balance checks

Panel A

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable	*Coastal location*	*Elevation*	*Slope*	*Population density, 1951*	*Dependency ratio, 1951*	*Employment rate, 1951*	*Industry share, 1951*	*Turnout rate, 1946 election*
CasMez status	0.07	-52.82	122.37	19.22	0.54	-1.37	1.40	-0.03
	(0.08)	(75.20)	(113.36)	(25.99)	(0.91)	(9.08)	(2.87)	(0.02)
Baseline mean	*0.07*	*520.91*	*720.26*	129.57	*48.47*	*65.23*	*42.28*	*0.60*
Number of municipalities	*541*	*541*	*541*	524	*524*	*524*	*524*	*516*

Panel B

	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Dependent variable	*Christian Democrats share, 1946 election*	*Preference for welfare policies, 1946*	*Tax income per capita, 2011*	*Unemployment rate, 2011*	*Gini coefficient, 2011*	*Share of people with tertiary education, 2011*	*Municipal transfers, 2008-2012*	*EU Cohesion programs expenditure, 2008-2012*
CasMez status	-4.14	-0.97	-0.23	0.89	0.01	-0.25	-112.34	-0.72
	(3.03)	(1.37)	(0.34)	(0.77)	(0.01)	(0.41)	(70.61)	(8.22)
Baseline mean	*37.2*	*12.03*	*10.41*	*11.27*	*0.37*	*5.03*	*353.63*	*31.59*
Number of municipalities	*512*	*512*	*541*	*541*	*541*	*541*	*541*	*541*

CasMez status is a dummy equal to one for the municipalities belonging to the CasMez area. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include a third-order polynomial of the geodetic distance from the border, province-level fixed effects and border-segment fixed effects. The sample includes municipalities in a 50-km symmetric bandwidth around the CasMez border. The baseline mean is calculated within the estimation sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2: Baseline RD results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	*Free market economy*	*Market Regulation*	*Welfare state expansion*	*Preference for state intervention*
CasMez status	-0.501	3.736***	3.957***	3.784***
	(1.051)	(1.110)	(1.146)	(1.068)
Bandwidth (km)	*50*	*50*	*50*	*50*
Polynomial order	*3rd*	*3rd*	*3rd*	*3rd*
Number of municipalities	*541*	*541*	*541*	*541*

CasMez status is a dummy equal to one for the municipalities belonging to the CasMez area. Outcomes in Columns (1)-(3) are indices denoting voters' preferences for the related topic computed using party scores based on electoral manifestos (source: Manifesto Project) and vote shares at the 2013 general election. The outcome in Column (4) is computed using the first principal component of the three individual Manifesto Project scores, then weighted by relative party vote shares. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include province-level fixed effects and border-segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 3: RD results - robustness tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
CasMez status	3.662***	3.881***	3.921***	2.945**	3.727***	3.833**	3.383***	3.784***	2.490***	4.963***
	(0.913)	(0.924)	(1.071)	(1.400)	(0.991)	(1.492)	(1.180)	(1.216)	(0.798)	(1.824)
Bandwidth (km)	*50*	*50*	*50*	*25*	*75*	*50*	*39.3*	*50*	*50*	*50*
Parametric form	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*N*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Forcing variable	*km*	*km*	*km*	*km*	*km*	*km*	*km*	*km*	*lat, lon*	*km*
Polynomial order	*1st*	*2nd*	*4th*	*3rd*	*3rd*	*3rd*	*1st*	*3rd*	*3rd*	*3rd*
Border municipalities	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*N*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Number of municipalities	*541*	*541*	*541*	*340*	*754*	*446*	*449*	*541*	*541*	*541*

CasMez status is a dummy equal to one for the municipalities belonging to the CasMez area. The outcome is computed using the first principal component of the three individual Manifesto Project scores, then weighted by relative party vote shares in 2013 (in column (10), the election year is 1987). Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include province-level fixed effects and border-segment fixed effects. In column (7), the choice of the bandwidth is based on the MSE-criterion proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). Robust standard errors in parentheses (in column (8), standard errors are corrected following Conley (1999)'s procedure with a radius equal to 25 km). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4: RD results - extensions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*5-Star Movement votes share*	*Populism Index*	*Forza Italia votes share 1994*
CasMez status	3.970***	1.251	2.006
	(1.203)	(0.762)	(1.265)
Bandwidth	*50*	*50*	*50*
Polynomial order	*3rd*	*3rd*	*3rd*
Number of municipalities	*512*	*537*	*541*

CasMez status is a dummy equal to one for the municipalities belonging to the CasMez area. Column (1) uses the electoral share of the 5-Star Movement at the 2013 general election. The outcome in Column (2) is computed using the Populism Index built by Inglehart and Norris (2019), then weighted by relative party vote shares in 2013. Column (3) uses the electoral share of Forza Italia at the 1994 general election. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include province-level fixed effects and border-segment fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5: Industrial Zones

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	*Free market economy*	*Market Regulation*	*Welfare state expansion*	*Preferences for state intervention*
CasMez transfers	-0.080***	0.067*	0.059	0.076**
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.033)
Number of municipalities	*298*	*298*	*298*	*298*
R^2	*0.410*	*0.486*	*0.365*	*0.463*

Estimation output for Equation (4) using a matched sample based on the predicted probability of belonging to an Industrial Zone. CasMez transfers are computed as the capital and interest grants conceded by CasMez to firms from 1950 to 1992 measured as thousand euros (2011 prices) per capita, at the municipality level. Outcomes in Columns (1)-(3) are indices denoting voters' preferences for the related topic computed using party scores based on electoral manifestos (source: Manifesto Project) and vote shares at the 2013 general election. The outcome in Column (4) is computed using the first principal component of the individual Manifesto Project scores, then weighted by relative party vote shares. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include province-level fixed effects and control for (log) population in 2011. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for details.

Table 6: Industrial Zones – robustness tests

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Baseline specification	*Control for CasMez infrastructure spending*	*Control for post-1992 transfers*	*Spatial HAC standard errors*	*Scale by lagged population*
CasMez transfers	0.076**	0.074**	0.067**	0.076**	0.084***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.022)
Number of municipalities	*298*	*298*	*298*	*298*	*298*
R^2	*0.463*	*0.463*	*0.510*	*0.463*	0.474

All regressions are variations of the baseline specification of Column (4) in Table 5. Column (1) reports the baseline specification. Column (2) controls for CasMez infrastructure spending per capita. Column (3) controls for municipality-level per capita expenses and EU transfers between 2008 and 2013. Column (4) uses spatial HAC standard errors (Conley, 1999). Column (5) scales the independent variable by municipality population in 1951. Except for Column (4), robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for details.

Table 7: Industrial Zones – extensions

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*5-Star Movement votes share, 2013*	*Populism index, 2013*	*Forza Italia votes share, 1994*
CasMez transfers	0.087**	-0.018	0.021
	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.034)
Number of municipalities	*298*	*298*	241
R^2	*0.514*	*0.294*	*0.389*

Estimation output for Equation (4) using a matched sample based on the predicted probability of belonging to an Industrial Zone. CasMez transfers are computed as the capital and interest grants conceded by CasMez to firms from 1950 to 1992 measured as thousand euros (2011 prices) per capita, at the municipality level. Column (1) uses the 5-Star Movement votes share at the 2013 election. Column (2) uses an index of populist preferences developed by Inglehart and Norris (2019). Column (7) uses the electoral share of Forza Italia at the 1994 general election. Variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. All regressions include province-level fixed effects and control for (log) population in 2011. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for details.

Table 8: Economic outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Baseline specification	*Control for CasMez infrastructure spending*	*Control for post-1992 transfers*	*Spatial HAC standard errors*	*Scale by lagged population*
			Panel A. Income per capita		
CasMez transfers	0.004	-0.000	0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.006)
R^2	*0.252*	*0.290*	*0.339*	*0.252*	*0.252*
			Panel B. Employment rate		
CasMez transfers	0.012	0.011	0.008	0.004	0.030
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.006)	(0.019)
R^2	*0.434*	*0.434*	*0.479*	*0.407*	*0.438*
			Panel C. Unemployment rate		
CasMez transfers	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	-0.004	0.000
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.018)
R^2	*0.381*	*0.383*	*0.389*	*0.380*	*0.380*
Number of municipalities	*298*	*298*	*298*	*298*	*298*

All regressions are variations of the baseline specification of Table 5, estimated on a matched sample based on the predicted probability of belonging to an Industrial Zone. Column (1) presents the baseline specification. Column (2) controls for CasMez infrastructure spending per capita. Column (3) controls for municipality-level per capita expenses and EU transfers between 2008 and 2013. Column (4) uses spatial HAC standard errors (Conley, 1999). Column (5) scales the independent variable by municipality population in 1951. Except for Column (4), robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See text for details.

Table 9: Individual preferences – European Values Survey

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable	*Free market economy (EVS)*	*Market Regulation (EVS)*	*Welfare state expansion (EVS)*	*Preferences for state intervention (EVS)*
CasMez exposure	-0.122**	0.114*	0.148**	0.192***
	(0.048)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.061)
R^2	*0.05*	*0.07*	*0.07*	*0.06*
Observations	*1,302*	*1,345*	*1,373*	*1,260*

CasMez exposure is computed as total CasMez transfers per capita, at the regional level, during the individual's impressionable years (age 18-25). The outcomes are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation one. The outcome in Column (4) is computed using the first principal component of the individual EVS scores for the outcomes reported in Columns (1)-(3). All regressions include individual-level covariates (age and its square, gender, education level) and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10: Individual preferences – Bank of Italy's SHIW

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable	*Trust*	*Risk aversion*	*Impatience*
CasMez transfers	-0.014***	0.005***	0.008***
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
R^2	*0.12*	*0.10*	*0.06*
Observations	*1,348*	*5,737*	*3,047*

CasMez transfers are computed as the capital and interest grants conceded by CasMez to firms from 1950 to 1992 measured as thousand euros (2011 prices) per capita, at the municipality level. Indicators for Trust, Risk aversion and Impatience are standardized to be mean zero and standard deviation one. All regressions include individual-level covariates (age and its square, gender, education level), municipality-level controls (population size, provincial capital status, coastal location, elevation and slope) and region fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix A

Figure A1



Note: Party-level scores at the 2013 Italian general election (source: Manifesto Project). The score associated to each category is computed using the incidence of sentences related to that category in the party's publicly available political manifesto.

Table A1: Balancing table, Industrial Zones versus other municipalities

	(1) Industrial Zone	(2) Other municipalities	(3) P-Value
CasMez transfers	8.48	2.18	0.000
	(29.59)	*(17.85)*	
(Log)Population, 1951	9.11	8.10	0.000
	(1.057)	*(0.825)*	
Provincial capital	0.08	0.01	0.000
	(0.277)	*(0.085)*	
Coastal location	0.29	0.16	0.000
	(0.454)	*(0.367)*	
Area	69.59	44.53	0.000
	(92.14)	*(47.64)*	
Mean elevation	173.52	468.17	0.000
	(163.2)	*(318.5)*	
Slope	440.62	725.14	0.000
	(444.7)	*(468.7)*	
Population density, 1951	557.97	162.99	0.000
	(942.0)	*(325.3)*	
Old-age dependency ratio, 1951	10.34	11.93	0.000
	(2.267)	*(2.712)*	
Illiteracy rate, 1951	24.35	25.62	0.005
	(6.476)	*(8.592)*	
Higher degree, 1951	2.50	1.76	0.000
	(1.814)	*(0.936)*	
Labor market participation rate, 1951	50.38	54.55	0.000
	(8.443)	*(10.79)*	
Agriculture employment share, 1951	54.08	71.23	0.000
	(21.39)	*(15.46)*	
Industry employment share, 1951	25.50	16.87	0.000
	(12.92)	*(11.23)*	
Number of municipalities	*405*	*2328*	

CasMez transfers are computed as the capital and interest grants conceded by CasMez to firms from 1950 to 1992 measured as thousand euros (2011 prices) per capita, at the municipality level. Standard deviations in parentheses. Column (3) reports the p-value for the two-sided t-test for the difference in the means in Columns (1) and (2).

Table A2: Balancing table, Industrial Zones versus other municipalities: matched sample

	(1) Industrial Zone	(2) Other municipalities	(3) P-Value
CasMez transfers	9.75	2.49	0.004
	(30.11)	*(5.917)*	
CasMez infrastructure spending	3.56	3.60	0.952
	(7.395)	*(5.444)*	
Preferences for state intervention, 1946	18.36	17.26	0.432
	(11.67)	*(12.33)*	
(Log)Population, 1951	8.64	8.73	0.326
	(0.802)	*(0.814)*	
Coastal location	0.23	0.24	0.892
	(0.425)	*(0.429)*	
Altitude	225.17	248.60	0.276
	(195.8)	*(173.9)*	
Slope	515.60	589.16	0.147
	(468.2)	*(402.1)*	
Number of plants per capita, 1951	27.96	27.50	0.575
	(7.233)	*(6.658)*	
Population density, 1951	271.40	320.28	0.317
	(408.7)	*(433.4)*	
Urban population, 1951	25.60	25.84	0.936
	(26.18)	*(24.26)*	
Old-age dependency ratio, 1951	10.56	10.22	0.147
	(2.172)	*(1.821)*	
Illiteracy rate, 1951	24.66	24.39	0.738
	(6.652)	*(7.330)*	
Higher degree, 1951	1.99	2.14	0.297
	(1.240)	*(1.293)*	
Population gender composition, 1951	97.84	97.16	0.288
	(5.264)	*(5.823)*	
Home ownership ratio, 1951	54.57	51.79	0.160
	(17.45)	*(16.62)*	
Labor market participation rate, 1951	53.35	53.48	0.887
	(8.002)	*(8.889)*	
Agriculture employment share, 1951	63.14	60.78	0.269
	(17.16)	*(19.46)*	
Industry employment share, 1951	21.64	23.12	0.311
	(11.01)	*(13.95)*	
Christian Democrats share	37.07	36.70	0.840
	(16.13)	*(15.74)*	
Number of municipalities	*149*	*149*	

Descriptive statistics for the matched sample based on estimated probability of belonging to an Industrial Zone. CasMez transfers are computed as the capital and interest grants conceded by CasMez to firms from 1950 to 1992 measured as thousand euros (2011 prices) per capita, at the municipality level. Standard deviations in parentheses. Column (3) reports the p-value for the two-sided t-test for the difference in the means in Columns (1) and (2). See text for details.

Appendix B

Scheda del Comune di .....

VOCI	Data	Unità di misura	Cifre (*)
I. INDICATORI DEMOGRAFICO-ECONOMICO-SOCIALI			
Popolazione	31-12-1958	N. abitanti	
2. *Popolazione attiva* (censimento demografico):			
2.1. In complesso	4-11-1951	unità	
2.2. Attivi in agricoltura in % sul complesso	4-11-1951	%	
3. *Situazione Industriale* (censimento industriale e commerciale):			
3.1. Industrie in totale (estrattive, manifatturiere, delle costruzioni, ecc.):			
3.1.1. Addetti in complesso . .	5-11-1951	numero	
3.1.2. Addetti in esercizi con oltre 50 addetti	5-11-1951	»	
3.1.3. % addetti ad esercizi maggiori (3.1.2.) su addetti in complesso (3.1.1.)	5-11-1951	%	
3.2. Industrie in totale escluso artigianato (1) addetti	5-11-1951	numero	
3.3. Industrie manifatturiere:			
3.3.1. Addetti in complesso . .	5-11-1951	»	
3.3.2. Addetti in esercizi con oltre 50 addetti	5-11-1951	»	
3.3.3. % addetti ad esercizi maggiori (3.3.2.) su addetti in complesso (3.3.1.)	5-11-1951	%	
3.4. Proporzione degli addetti industriali su popolazione attiva:			
3.4.1. Addetti industriali in totale (3.1.1.) per 1.000 attivi (2.1.)	5-11-1951	%	
3.4.2. Addetti industrie escluso artigianato (3.2.) per 1.000 attivi	5-11-1951	%	
3.4.3. Addetti industrie manifatturiere (3.3.1.) per 1.000 attivi	5-11-1951	%	
3.5. Forza motrice utilizzabile:			
3.5.1. In tutte le industrie (3.1.)	5-11-1951	HP	
3.5.2. Media HP per addetto (3.5.1. diviso 3.1.1.)	5-11-1951	»	
3.6. Industrie prevalenti (2):			
3.6.1. ..... addetti	5-11-1951	numero	
3.6.2. ..... addetti	5-11-1951	»	
3.6.3. ..... addetti	5-11-1951	»	
3.6.4. ..... addetti	5-11-1951	»	

(1) Addetti alle industrie in totale (3.1.1.) meno addetti all'artigianato secondo le indicazioni del *Censimento Industriale del 1951*.

(2) Classi di industrie (secondo classificazione del Censimento) con *non meno del 20%* sugli addetti alle industrie in totale (3.1.1.).

(*) Da riportare se possibile in quattro colonne distinte per le quattro categorie indicate nella Avvertenza.

Segue: **Scheda del Comune di**.....

VOCI	Data	Unità di misura	Cifre (*)
4. *Evoluzione storica del settore industriale* (compilare prospetto allegato)			
5. *Consumi energia e combustibili per uso industriale:*			
5.1. Energia elettrica	(1)	kWh	
5.2. Carbone	(1)	tonn.	
5.3. Oli combustibili	(1)	»	
5.4. Combustibili gassosi	(1)	mc	
6. *Disoccupazione:*			
6.1. Disoccupazione registrata (2)	(2)	numero (2)	
6.2. Disoccupati (6.1.) in % su popolazione attiva (2.1.)	(2)	%	
7. *Sottoccupazione agricola:*			
7.1. Densità generica della popolazione agricola (3)	4-11-1951	N. per ha	
7.2. Densità specifica della popolazione agricola (4)	4-11-1951	»	
7.3. Stima della sottoccupazione (5)	(5)	(5)	
8. *Scuole elementari* (7)			
8.1. Scuole in complesso:			
8.1.1. Numero degli edifici . . .	(6)	numero	
8.1.2. Aule	(6)	»	
8.1.3. Scolari	(6)	»	
8.2. Popolazione da 6 ad 11 anni di età	4-11-1951	unità	
9. *Scuole medie e di avviamento* (9):			
9.1. Scuole medie:			
9.1.1. In complesso	(8)	numero	
9.1.2. Aule	(8)	»	
9.1.3. Alunni	(8)	»	

(1) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati (se possibile, riferire dati relativi ad una media di tre anni).

(2) Disoccupati registrati presso l'Ufficio di collocamento: specificare se i dati sono una media di 20 o più rilevazioni, o si riferiscono ad un periodo compreso tra due diverse epoche, o medie annue fornendone indicazione nella colonna «data». Se possibile indicare a parte i disoccupati per grandi settori economici

(3) Numero delle persone componenti le famiglie con a capo un agricoltore, per ettaro di superficie salda (superficie agraria escluso le foreste e i pascoli); dati tratti dal Censimento demografico del 1951.

(4) Numero delle persone componenti le famiglie con a capo un conduttore-coltivatore (conduzione familiare) per ettaro di superficie salda (c.s.).

(5) Indicare le fonti delle valutazioni ed il numero dei sottoccupati; oppure la percentuale di questi sul totale della popolazione agricola.

(6) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati.

(7) Riferirsi *solamente* alle scuole *pubbliche* ed a quelle parificate a tutti gli effetti: se del caso, fornire a parte dati su scuole private. Indicare a parte la percentuale di analfabeti (rispetto alla popolazione di 6 anni e più) al 4 novembre 1951.

(8) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati.

(9) Riferirsi *solamente* alle scuole *pubbliche* ed a quelle parificate a tutti gli effetti; se del caso, fornire a parte dati su scuole private.

(*) Vedi nota a pagina 29.

VOCI	Data	Unità di misura	Cifre (*)
9.2. Scuole di avviamento:			
9.1.1. In complesso	(1)	»	
di cui: scuole tecniche	(1)	»	
9.1.2. Aule	(1)	»	
di cui: aule scuole tecniche .	(1)	»	
9.1.3. Alunni	(1)	»	
di cui: alunni scuole tecniche	(1)	»	
10. *Scuole medie superiori* (2):			
10.1. Ginnasi, licei e licei scientifici:			
10.1.1. In complesso	(1)	»	
10.1.2. Aule	(1)	»	
10.1.3. Alunni	(1)	»	
10.2. Istituti tecnici e professionali:			
10.2.1. In complesso	(1)	»	
10.2.2. Aule	(1)	»	
10.2.3. Alunni	(1)	»	
11. *Istruzione superiore:*			
11.1. Università (3)			
(Fornire dati e notizie in allegato)			
11.2. Istituti e/o corsi di perfezionamento post-universitari (4)			
(Fornire dati e notizie in allegato)			
II. INDICATORI INFRASTRUTTURALI:			
12. *Strade:*			
12.1. Strade statali	(1)	km	
12.1.1. Km. per 10.000 abitanti	(1)	km/10.000 ab.	
12.1.2. Km. per kmq. di territorio	(1)	km/kmq.	
12.2. Strade provinciali	(1)	km	
12.2.1. Km per 10.000 abitanti .	(1)	km/10.000 ab.	
12.2.2. Km per kmq di territorio	(1)	km/kmq.	
12.3. Strade comunali:			
12.3.1. Km per 10.000 abitanti .	(1)	km/10.000 ab.	
12.3.2. Km per kmq. di territorio	(1)	km/kmq.	
12.4. Strade minori (5)	(1)	km	
12.4.1. Km per 10.000 abitanti .	(1)	km/10.000 ab.	
12.4.2. Km per kmq. di territorio	(1)	km/kmq.	

(1) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati.
(2) Riferirsi *solamente* alle scuole *pubbliche* ed a quelle parificate a tutti gli effetti: se del caso, fornire a parte dati su scuole private.
(3) Indicare a parte, con riferimento ad anno recente, il numero degli iscritti (in corso e fuori corso) in complesso e possibilmente suddiviso tra le diverse facoltà.
(4) Indicare a parte: *a*) ente patrocinante; *b*) natura e finalità delle scuole o dei corsi; *c*) durata del periodo di insegnamento; *d*) numero dei frequentanti.
(5) Strade di bonifica, poderali, di colonizzazione e simili
(*) Vedi nota a pagina 29.

Segue: **Scheda del Comune di**.....

VOCI	Data	Unità di misura	Cifre (*)
13. *Ferrovie:*			
13.1. Ferrovie dello Stato	(1)	km	
13.1.1. Km per 10.000 abitanti .	(1)	km/10.000 ab.	
13.1.2. Km per kmq. di territorio	(1)	km/kmq.	
13.2. Ferrovie secondarie	(1)	km	
13.3. Ferrovie a doppio binario (statali e secondarie)	(1)	»	
13.4. Ferrovie elettrificate (statali e secondarie)	(1)	»	
13.5. Altre attrezzature ferroviarie (2) da descrivere, eventualmente, in allegato.	—	—	
14. *Tramvie, Filovie, Autolinee* (3) *da descrivere in allegato*		—	
15. *Telefoni:*			
15.1. Posti telefonici pubblici interurbani	(1)	numero	
15.2. Apparecchi privati in servizio	(1)	»	
15.3. Conversazioni interurbane nell'anno	(1)	»	
15.3.1. di cui, su rete dello Stato	(1)	»	
16. *Servizi postali:*			
16.1. Uffici postali esistenti . . .	(1)	»	
16.2. Corrispondenza impostata nell'anno	(1)	kg.	
16.3. Telegrammi partiti nell'anno	(1)	numero	
17. *Servizio e traffico portuale:*			
17.1. Navi in arrivo più navi in partenza (a vapore)			
17.1.1. Numero	(1)	numero	
17.1.2. Stazza	(1)	T.S.L.	
17.2. Merci sbarcate e imbarcate (4)	(1)	Tonn.	
17.2.1. di cui, imbarcate - descrivere in allegato (5)			
17.3. Attrezzature portuali			

(1) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati.
(2) Fornire dati relativi all eventuale scalo merci (capacità complessiva, attrezzature di carico e scarico mobili o fisse).
(3) Fornire elenco dei servizi, con speciale riguardo a quelli extraurbani (o anche misti), indicandone i rispettivi capolinea, la distanza e il numero dei passeggeri trasportati nell'anno.
(4) Eventualmente indicare a parte le merci che costituiscono la parte principale del traffico portuale.
(5) Indicare: *a*) capacità ricettiva del porto (con riferimento al tipo e alla stazza delle navi cui è possibile attraccare); *b*) attrezzature fisse o mobili di carico o scarico; *c*) eventuale esistenza di magazzini, silos ecc.
(*) Vedi nota a pagina 29.

VOCI	Data	Unità di misura	Cifre (*)
18. *Servizi bancari:*			
18.1. Sportelli bancari:			
18.1.1. In complesso	(1)	numero	
18.1.2. Per 1.000 abitanti . . .	(1)	Sportelli per 1000 abitanti	
18.2. Depositi bancari in complesso (situazione fine anno)	(1)	milioni di lire	
18.2.1. di cui c/c in corrispondenza	(1)	»	
18.3. Impieghi in complesso (situazione fine anno)	(1)	»	
19. *Distribuzione energia elettrica:*			
19.1. Elettrodotti:			
19.1.1. Ad alta tensione kW (2)	(1)	kW	
19.1.2. A bassa tensione kW (2)	(1)	»	
19.2. Stazione di trasformazione .	(1)	numero	
20. *Servizi idrici:*			
20.1. Serbatoi di raccolta o invaso acqua - capacità complessiva . .	(1)	mc	
20.2. Acquedotti (rete primaria) .	(1)	metri	
20.2.1. Sviluppo lineare	(1)	metri	
20.2.2. Portata complessiva . .	(1)	l/sec.	
di cui, per uso industriale . .	(1)		
20.3. Altre eventuali risorse industriali da specificare in all. (3)			
21. *Fognature:*			
21.1. Canalizzazioni (bianche o nere)	(1)	metri	
21.1.1. di cui, canalizzazioni nere (se separate)	(1)	»	
21.2. Eventuali attrezzature per lo smaltimento rifiuti industriali - da descrivere in allegato.			
22. *Gas o metano:*			
22.1. Gas di città:			
22.1.1. Gasometri, capacità complessiva	(1)	mc	
22.1.2. Gasdotti (rete primaria) portata complessiva	(1)	mc/sec.	
22.2. Metanodotti:			
22.2.1. Sviluppo lineare	(1)	metri	
22.2.2. Portata complessiva . .	(1)	mc/sec.	

(1) Indicare l'anno più recente per il quale si dispone di dati.
(2) Indicare il voltaggio delle linee.
(3) Altre risorse idriche utilizzabili (fiumi, sorgenti, falde freatiche, ecc.) con indicazione di eventuali progetti per lo sfruttamento.
(*) Vedi nota a pagina 29.