Optimal Monetary Interventions in Credit Market

Luis Araujo (São Paulo School of Economics - FGV and Michigan State University)

Riccardo Faini CEIS Seminars

Riccardo Faini CEIS Seminars
When

Friday, December 5, 2014 h. 12:00-13:30

Where
Room B - 1st floor - Building B
Description

joint with Tai-Wei Hu

In an environment based on Lagos and Wright (2005) but with two rounds of pairwise meetings, we introduce imperfect monitoring that resembles operations of unsecured loans. We characterize the set of implementable allocations satisfying individual rationality and pairwise core in bilateral meetings. We introduce a class of expansionary monetary policies that use the seignorage revenue to purchase privately issued debts. We show that under the optimal trading mechanism, both money and debt circulate in the economy and the optimal inflation rate is positive, except for very high discount factors under which money alone achieves the fi rst-
best. Our model captures the view that unconventional monetary policy encourages lending while it may create inflation.

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