Bank Stability and Enforcement Actions in Banking
Caiazza StefanoCotugno MatteoFiordelisi FrancoStefanelli Valeria
CEIS Research Paper
This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of the enforcement actions (sanctions) imposed by supervisory authorities for banks. Focusing on a sample of Italian banks between 2005 and 2012, we found 302 sanctions regarding 3,588 persons (i.e. Board of directors, Top Managers, and Chief Executive Officers) were sanctioned in banks. We have three main results. First, enforcement actions are given to banks having high credit risk and poor Return on Assets (both one and two years in before the sanction). Second, sanctioned banks are unable to change their conduct in the first year following the enforcement sanction and the stability levels do not improve. Rather, it takes at least two years after an enforcement action so that banks are able to improve their stability. We also provide evidence that socio-eco-demographic differences in Italy have a substantial impact on the banks reaction after enforcement actions.
Number: 334
Keywords: Enforcement actions, Supervisory, Credit Risk
JEL codes: G20; G21; G32
Volume: 13
Issue: 1
Date: Friday, March 20, 2015
Revision Date: Friday, March 20, 2015